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Abstract
Institutional Analysis of Agri-Environmental Externalities: Issues on Collective Action 
and Technology Diffusion in the Lake Naivasha Basin, Kenya
Lake Naivasha is the second largest fresh water lake in Kenya and the only fresh 
water Lake located in Kenya’s Rift Valley. Its basin supports important economic activities 
such as floriculture, horticulture, food crop production, tourism, fisheries, pastoralism and 
geothermal electricity generation. Agriculture is the most dominant type of land use in the 
basin and has substantial direct effects on the Lake Naivasha ecosystem. These effects are 
manifested through the dependence of the sector on the ecosystem for provisioning, 
supporting and regulating ecosystem services. As a result of these agri-environmental 
interactions, the basin has been grappling with three main environmental challenges: siltation, 
eutrophication and water scarcity. Through these challenges resource users impose unilateral 
negative externalities on third parties causing a policy challenge.  
The goal of this thesis is to identify the institutional challenges encountered while 
seeking solutions to these environmental problems. It also seeks to analyze the diffusion 
process of technologies that help to mitigate negative agri-environmental externalities. The 
thesis is composed of four empirical studies, each addressing a specific objective. All the 
studies utilized cross-sectional household survey data collected from 308 randomly selected 
farm households from the Lake Naivasha basin, Kenya. The first empirical chapter identifies
co-operators and defectors among the sampled households using two step cluster analysis. 
Motivated by the theory of collective action, a logistic regression model was used to identify 
the factors influencing the cooperative behaviour of households. In the next chapter, 
propensity score matching and exogenous switching regression models were used to assess 
the effect of implementing multiple soil conservation practices on the value of crop 
production. The third empirical chapter used a two step regression procedure to assess the 
influence of participation in collective action and neighbourhood social influence on farm 
level soil conservation efforts. Finally, a parametric econometric log-logistic duration model 
was used to analyze the diffusion of rain water harvesting techniques among the sampled 
households.
The results from the above analyses indicate that the sampled households are 
predominantly defectors. The tendency to cooperate is influenced by expected benefits, 
labour endowments, human capital, social sanctions and norms of trust. With regard to 
private economic benefits of soil conservation practices, the results indicate that multiple soil 
conservation practices generate higher value of crop production. However, the results 
indicate that under certain circumstances, these additional positive benefits might not be 
substantial enough to cover the opportunity costs associated with these practices. Therefore, it 
was thought important to assess whether there are other factors besides private economic 
benefits that could motivate farmers to adopt soil conservation practices. It emerged from the 
results of the third empirical study that participation in collective action is a significant 
determinant of the soil conservation effort among the sampled households. Secondly, results 
indicate that social control that emerges from neighbourhood social influence and subjective 
norms are also key determinants of soil conservation efforts. Therefore, social control can 
substitute for pure economic incentives as a motivation for engaging in soil conservation. The 
results from the final empirical study indicate that rainfall variability, access to information 
and socio-demographic attributes such as age and education level are the key drivers of the 
process of diffusion of rain water harvesting techniques. It emerged that technology adoption 
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has become more of an endogenous process of social exchange within communities and less 
driven by external natural predicament and persuasion by external agents. Informal sources of 
information have emerged as an important medium of technology dissemination. 
For each of these results we draw imperative policy implications pointing out areas 
where policy could focus on so as to enhance mitigation of agri-environmental externalities.  
Zusammenfassung
iv
Zusammenfassung
Institutionelle Analyse der Agrar-Umwelt Externalitäten: Aspekte zum kollektiven 
Handeln und Technologieverbreitung im Becken des Naivasha Sees in Kenia
Der Naivasha See ist der zweitgrößte Süßwassersee in Kenia und der einzige 
Süßwassersee in Kenias „Rift Valley“. Das Wasser des Sees stellt eine wichtige Grundlage 
für eine Vielzahl von wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten rund um den See dar, darunter 
Blumenzucht, Gemüse und Obstanbau für den Export, Landwirtschaft, Tourismus, Fischerei, 
Weidewirtschaft und geothermischen Stromerzeugung. Die Landwirtschaft stellt der 
dominierenden Landnutzungstyp dar und wirkt sich so wesentlich auf das Ökosystem rund 
um den See aus. Diese Auswirkungen sind bedingt durch die Abhängigkeit der 
Landwirtschaft von unterstützenden, regulierenden und bereitstellenden 
Ökosystemdienstleistungen des Sees. Resultierend aus der Wechselwirkung zwischen 
Umwelt und Agrarwirtschaft im Seebecken ergeben sich drei wesentliche Probleme: 
Verschlammung, Eutrophierung und Wasserknappheit. Durch diese bürden die 
Ressourcennutzer Dritten unilateral negative Externalitäten auf, welches eine 
Herausforderung für die Politik bedeutet. Die durch die wirtschaftliche Nutzung des Sees 
einseitig verursachten negativen Auswirkungen auf Dritte ziehen agrarpolitische 
Herausforderungen nach sich. 
Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, die institutionellen Herausforderungen zu identifizieren und 
Lösungen für die bestehenden ökologischen Probleme zu suchen. Ferner wird der 
Diffusionsprozessvon Technologien analysiert, welche helfen, die negativen
agrarökologischen Auswirkungen zu vermindern. Die Arbeit setzt sich aus vier empirischen 
Untersuchungen mit jeweils spezifischen Zielsetzungen zusammen.  Für alle Untersuchungen 
wurden Querschnittsdaten auf Haushaltsebene verwendet, die von 308 zufällig ausgewählten 
landwirtschaftlichen Haushalten im Becken des Naivasha Sees stammen. Mit Hilfe einer 
zweistufigen Cluster-Analyse wurden im ersten empirischen Kapitel kooperierende und 
nicht-kooperierende Haushalte in der Stichprobe ermittelt. Angeregt durch die Theorie des 
kollektiven Handelns wurde ein logistisches Regressionsmodel genutzt, um die 
Einflussfaktoren für das Kooperationsverhalten in Haushalten festzustellen. Im nächsten 
Kapitel wurden zur Beurteilung der Auswirkungen verschiedener Bodenschutzmethoden auf 
den Produktionswert der pflanzlichen Erzeugung das Propensity Score Matching und  
Exogenous Switching Regression Modelle verwendet. Für das dritte empirische Kapitel 
wurde mit einem zweistufigen Regressionsmodell der Einfluss der Beteiligung an 
gemeinschaftlichen Maßnahmen sowie der soziale Einfluss der Nachbarschaft auf 
Bodenerhaltungsanstrengungen auf Betriebsebene geschätzt. Abschließend wurde ein 
parametrisches ökonometrisches log-logistisches Durationsmodell genutzt, um die 
Verbreitung von Regenwasserspeicherungstechniken in den befragten Haushalten zu 
untersuchen. 
Die Ergebnisse der oben genannten Analysen zeigten, dass sich die befragten 
Haushalte in erster Linie nicht-kooperativ verhalten. Es wurde festgestellt, dass die Tendenz 
zu kooperieren von den zu erwartenden Vorteilen, Arbeitsverfügbarkeit, Humankapital, 
gesellschaftlichen Sanktionen sowie Normen des Vertrauens beeinflusst wird. Im Hinblick 
auf den privaten wirtschaftlichen Nutzen der Bodenschutzmethoden deuten die Ergebnisse 
darauf hin, dass integrierte Bodenschutzmethoden einen höheren Produktionswert des
Pflanzenanbaus erzeugen. Allerdings zeigen die Ergebnisse auch, dass dieser zusätzliche 
positive Nutzen unter gewissen Umständen möglicherweise zu gering ist, um die 
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entstehenden Opportunitätskosten zu decken. Deshalb wurde es als wichtig erachtet, neben 
dem privaten wirtschaftlichen Nutzen mögliche andere Faktoren zu identifizieren, die die 
Landwirte dazu motivieren könnten, die Bodenschutzmethoden anzuwenden. Die Ergebnisse 
der dritten empirischen Studie machten deutlich, dass bei den befragten Haushalten die 
Teilnahme an kollektiven Maßnahmen ein entscheidender Faktor für die 
Bodenschutzbemühungen ist. Zweitens zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass soziale Kontrolle, die 
durch den sozialen Einfluss der Nachbarschaft entsteht, und subjektive Normen ebenfalls 
Schlüsseldeterminanten für Maßnahmen zur Bodenerhaltung sind. Also können soziale 
Kontrolle und soziale Normen rein ökonomische Anreize zur Implementierung von 
Bodenschutzmechanismen ersetzen. Die Ergebnisse der letzten empirischen Studie zeigen, 
dass Niederschlagsschwankungen, der Zugang zu Informationen und soziodemographische 
Merkmale wie Alter und Bildungsniveau die treibenden Kräfte im Diffusionsprozess der 
Regenwasserspeicherungstechnologien sind. Es wurde deutlich, dass die Adaption von 
Technologien mehr ein endogener Prozess eines sozialen Austauschs innerhalb von 
Gemeinschaften ist und weniger von externen Natureinflüssen oder der Beeinflussung durch 
externe Vermittler getrieben ist. Informelle Informationsquellen haben sich als ein wichtiges 
Medium zur Technologieverbreitung herausgestellt. 
Für jedes dieser Ergebnisse wurden wichtige Politikimplikationen aufgezeigt, die 
Politikfelder herausstellen, auf die sich die Politik fokussieren könnte, um die Vermeidung 
von Agrar-Umwelt Externalitäten der agrarischen Produktion zu fördern.
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CHAPTER ONE
1 Introduction
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 The Agriculture-Environment Nexus
Ecosystems have historically played an important role in supporting terrestrial and 
aquatic life. Unfortunately, as indicated by the United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP) in the Millennium Assessment Report, over 60 % of global ecosystem services are 
being exploited at higher rates than they accrete/regenerate naturally (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005). The latest Living Planet Report by the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF) indicates that by 2008, the global ecological foot print had exceeded the earth’s 
biocapacity by 50% (WWF, 2012). The living planet report documents the changes in 
ecosystems, biodiversity and human demand on natural resources. The figures provided in 
this report indicate a worrying trend. This is particularly so since most of the negative effects 
on ecosystems are attributable to human activity. In day to day human activities, there are 
multiple, nested and coupled interactions between the social, physical and ecological systems, 
with varied outcomes. To understand these outcomes, it is important to analyze the entire 
Socio-Ecological System (SES). Anderies et al. (2004) defines a SES as ‘‘....the subset of 
social systems in which some of the interdependent relationships among humans are mediated 
through interactions with biophysical and non-human biological units’’. From this 
perspective, a SES can be viewed as a system of interdependent interactions between the units 
of a social system with those of an ecosystem. These interactions mostly involve complex
coupled processes and non linear dynamics involving both physical and social systems 
(Berkes et al. 2003). Most of the dynamics in ecosystems are usually related to changes in 
climate factors such as temperature and precipitation causing inevitable transformations in 
species through ecological succession. However, although ecosystems inevitably undergo 
changes, human activities have a tendency of altering the natural ecosystem dynamics. 
Anthropogenic influences on the bio-physical system have particularly led to a multiple 
environmental challenges such as desertification, biodiversity loss and impacts associated 
with climate change.
Agriculture is the most dominant type of land use globally and one of the sectors with 
substantial direct effects on ecosystems (Power 2010). The sector particularly bears a great 
Chapter 1 : Introduction 
2
responsibility of the observed increase in global ecological footprints. The pressure from 
agriculture to the environment might even increase as the world continues to grapple with the 
twin challenges of feeding 9 billion people by 2050 in the face of climate change and cyclical 
financial crises.
Agriculture is highly dependent on ecosystems for provisioning, supporting and 
regulating ecosystem services.  Agricultural production draws most of the major inputs (e.g. 
water, land) and natural services (e.g. pollination, biological pest control and nutrient cycling) 
from nature (Power 2010). Other important nature services to agriculture include genetic 
biodiversity, carbon sequestration and hydrology cycles. Because of this dependence, 
agriculture is usually associated with processes that impact on the environment negatively 
such as deforestation, land degradation, greenhouse gas emission, soil erosion and 
biodiversity loss. Agriculture also contributes to environmental pollution through the use of 
inputs such as inorganic fertilizers, manure, pesticides and plastics, some of which are non-
biodegradable and toxic. Also, soil erosion which is associated with tillage of farm land 
causes siltation on water bodies while seepage of fertilizer based leachates-mostly Nitrogen 
and Phosphorous- into water causes eutrophication on surface water and Nitrate pollution on 
ground water. Irrigation return flows also cause similar effects. However, besides the negative 
impacts, agriculture can also create positive externalities in the form of ecosystem services 
such as clean water, landscapes and clean air that emerge from environmentally friendly 
farming systems such as agro-forestry, crop rotation and other soil conservation practices.
Tisdell (2009) classifies externalities associated with agriculture into three categories: 
spillovers from non-agricultural sectors into agriculture, spillovers from agriculture to non-
agricultural sectors and spillovers within agriculture. The first category is largely exogenous 
to agricultural decision making and its mitigation can only happen by decisions made outside 
the sector. These external effects could however influence the stream of costs and benefits 
within agriculture. The last two categories emanate from agricultural production and 
marketing decisions. As Tisdell (2009) points out however, not all externalities are Pareto 
relevant since some externalities do not affect the market equilibrium. Agricultural 
externalities that are Pareto relevant include ground and surface water depletion, biodiversity 
loss, nutrient run-off, sedimentation of water ways, pesticide poisoning and greenhouse gas 
emission. These externalities combined with other factors such as private discount rates could 
explain agricultural sustainability challenges and therefore are of policy relevance. Policies 
focusing on designing agricultural strategies for achieving sustainability in the face of 
Chapter 1 : Introduction 
3
growing population and climate change are likely to dominate agri-environmental and 
development policy agenda in the coming years.  In view of the fact that agriculture has many 
negative impacts on the environment more proactive policies are needed. This thesis seeks to 
contribute to this debate by providing information on institutional economic aspects of agri-
environmental externality mitigation from a low income country perspective. In the next 
section we assess some of the potential institutional and policy instruments that could be used
in addressing agri-environmental externalities to harmonize the interactions between social 
and ecological systems. 
1.1.2 Institutional and Policy Responses to Agri-environmental Externalities 
As explained above, agricultural activities impose costs and generate benefits to third 
parties who don’t pay for them (in the case of benefits) or are not compensated (in the case of 
negative effects). Therefore, this creates a need for policy interventions to help internalize 
such externalities and yield near social optimality solutions. Addressing externalities 
generally has been a policy concern in many societies Bruce (2000) uses the examples of the 
Refuse Act of 1899 and the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955 to show that the United States 
of America has had a long history of using regulations to control water and air pollution 
through regulation. 
According to Bruce (2000) the policies that can be used to control externalities can be 
categorized into either correcting policies or internalization policies. Correcting policies 
create penalties and rewards such as taxes, fines and subsidies to adjust externality creating 
activities. Internalization policies on the other hand adjust externality creating activities by 
changing the institutional arrangements which had created the externalities in the first place. 
This is usually achieved by making the external costs or benefits internal to those who create 
them. Creation of property rights and markets for pollution are examples of internalizing 
policy instruments. Another categorization of policy instruments relevant to natural resources 
management in agriculture is offered by Orr & Colby (2004). These authors distinguish three 
principal categories of policy instruments namely, command-and-control (CAC) instruments, 
incentive-based economic instruments, and cooperative/suasive strategies. These instruments 
can be delivered through three matching principal institutional arrangements namely:
government agencies, markets, and user organizations respectively (Meinzen-Dick 2007). 
Command and control instruments on agri-environmental externalities are instruments 
where an authoritarian government gives directives to regulate economic activities that cause 
externalities. The government may prohibit an activity that causes negative externalities or 
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make an activity that creates a positive externality mandatory. For example in the European 
situation, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) implemented after the Second World War 
encouraged agricultural intensification leading to many cases of agri-environmental 
degradation. To respond to these challenges, the European Union (EU)  embarked on agri-
environmental policies to regulate nitrate pollution, pesticide pollution and application of 
animal manure on land through regulatory instruments such as the EC Drinking Water 
Directive of 1980 (ECC 80/778), the Nitrate Directive (EEC 91/676) of 1991 and the 1992
Agri-environmental regulation (ECC 2078/92) (Latacz-Lohmann & Hodge 2003). Command 
and control instruments require that the government invests in monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms to enhance monitoring and enforcement and ensure compliance.  The success of 
such instruments will therefore depend on the legal and financial muscle of the governments 
which facilitates implementation, monitoring and enforcement. In both low and high income 
countries, implementation process of CAC instruments is usually hampered by high 
transaction costs since it is costly to detect infractions and impose penalties. One of the main 
sources of such failure is the presence of several monitoring points which make it difficult to
identify and quantify the contribution of individual polluters. This is usually the case with 
non-point agri-environmental pollution (Dinar et al. 1997). CAC instruments fail because they  
are susceptible to elite capture, rent seeking/corruption, government discretion and low 
accountability (Acheson 2006).
Market based instruments can be defined as those instruments that regulate behaviour 
through market signals as opposed to government directives on pollution levels and control 
methods  (Stavins 2000). Instruments such as pollution charges (taxes) and tradable permits 
which are mostly used in cap-and-trade programmes and credit programmes belong to this 
category. Market based instruments usually allow flexibility and can be achieved at relatively 
low social costs since they encourage firms/farms to adopt low cost and more effective 
pollution control techniques (Stavins 2000). Environmental taxes help to internalize 
externalities originating from economic activities following the mechanisms identified by 
Pigou (1920). Some examples of market instruments that can be used to deal with agri-
environmental externalities can be found in Lankoski & Ollikainen (2003). The author 
explores the effect of a fertilizer tax to mitigate nutrient run-off and a subsidy to encourage 
implementation of conservation riparian buffer strips. However, market based instruments can 
offer solutions in cases where the cause of the problem is incomplete markets rather than
complete market failure (Merlo & Briales 2000). Market instruments will fail to work where 
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there are no well defined property rights, information asymmetries exist and transaction costs 
are high.
Cooperative/suasive solutions such as voluntary bargaining, education programmes 
and cooperative agreements among resource user groups often emerge out of informal 
arrangements among actors in a collective action dilemma. The dilemma makes it necessary 
for actors to cooperate in establishing mechanisms to deal with a common problem (or share a 
common resource), drafting of rules to govern their relationships and establishing sanctions to 
deal with non compliance (Ostrom 1990). Conflicts arising from violations of the established 
and collectively agreed rules are frequently settled through compromise, social coercion and 
social exclusion other than through penal punishment. In a cooperative situation, sometimes 
hybrid forms of coordination such as contracts are used to encourage provision of ecosystem 
services (North 1990). A high level of trust between participants helps to minimize 
transaction costs in cooperation situations. However, there are a number of issues that 
planners must deal with to ensure success of cooperation especially where large spatial areas 
are involved. Setting up such cooperation would involve substantial transaction costs whereas 
the benefits from such coordination will be shared among all the actors, regardless of their 
individual contribution. This creates an incentive for free riding. As observed by Ostrom 
(1990) the process of providing new institutions “is an equivalent of providing another public 
good” therefore creating a second-order collective dilemma. This can only be overcome by 
establishing trust and a sense of community. However, after institutions have been 
established, appropriators still have to deal with the challenge of creating incentives for actors 
to commit to the rules and mechanisms for monitoring the adherence to rules. Cooperation 
solves the monitoring and enforcement challenges since low cost mechanisms such as peer 
monitoring and social coercion can be used to encourage compliance. Agri-environmental 
cooperatives belong to this category of instruments. However, examples of successful agri-
environmental cooperation in both low and high income countries are not very common in 
literature. While many studies exist on the use of collective action in management of natural 
resources, evidence of collective action to address agri-environmental externalities is scanty. 
Some examples of successful cooperation for environmental management are presented by 
Ayer (1997) who presents  successful cases of grass root collective action initiatives that were 
initiated to deal with externalities caused by pesticide application and washing of manure, 
inorganic fertilizers and eroded soils into water courses in the USA. Other successful 
examples of cooperative arrangements to deal with agri-environmental externalities 
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especially those affecting drinking water quality can be found in Germany, Austria, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands (Brouwer et al. 2002). For example in the Germany 
case, voluntary agreements between farmers and water companies have resulted to substantial 
reduction in water pollution by nitrates and pesticides (Brouwer et al. 2002). However, 
literature on agri-environmental cooperation beyond experimental field laboratories in low 
income countries is scanty. 
The choice of the appropriate instruments to use among the three types of 
instruments that can be used to address externalities will depend on specific factors related to 
the type of externality and the nature of actors involved. Command and control instruments 
have so far been the most widely used instruments to address agricultural pollution. However, 
the experience with the EU Nitrates directive indicates that achieving water quality targets 
through CAC instruments is a taxing task (Brouwer et al. 2002). Some researchers, for 
example Meinzen-Dick (2007) recommend a modest complementary combination of the three 
instruments. Voluntary cooperative agreements around agri-environmental pollution are 
currently gaining popularity as a complementary instrument to CAC in dealing with 
agricultural pollution (Amblard 2012; Brouwer et al. 2002; Polman & Slagen 2002; Slagen & 
Polman 2002). The literature on agri-environmental cooperation in low income is at emergent 
stages. This thesis aims at contributing to literature on this area by analyzing agri-
environmental interactions in a low income country situation. The study is set in the Lake 
Naivasha basin, situated in Rural Kenya within Kenya’s Rift Valley. In the next section we 
describe the Lake Naivasha basin and identify agri-environmental externalities experienced in 
the basin and basin attributes which could be relevant for institutional development to deal 
with these agri-environmental externalities. 
1.2 Description of the Study Area 
1.2.1 Location, Physical Features and Climate
Lake Naivasha is the second largest fresh water lake in Kenya and the only fresh water 
Lake located in Kenya’s Rift Valley. Located at  0o30' S - 0o55' S & 36o09' E - 36o24' E, the 
Lake Naivasha basin is approximately 3400 Km2 bordered by Mau escarpment (3100 m.a.s.l) 
to the South -West and the Aberdare ranges (3,990 m.a.s.l) to the North-East (Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1: Physical features and rivers in Lake Naivasha basin  
Source: Adapted from Meins (2013)
Lake Naivasha is an endorheic fresh water Lake Ecosystem, with a main Lake, a semi-
separated sodic extension (Oloiden Lake) and a separate sodic Crater Lake (Sonachi). The 
inflow of the Lake is contributed by two rivers: Malewa and Gilgil which contribute 80% and 
20% of the inflows respectively. The rivers enter the Lake through a riverine floodplain which 
was initially dominated by papyrus but has undergone substantial degradation in the recent 
past (Mavuti & Harper 2006; Onywere et al. 2012). 
Lake Naivasha basin receives a bimodal 
rainfall pattern linked to seasonal 
migration of the Inter-Tropical 
Convergence Zone (ITCZ) (Stoof-
Leichsenring et al. 2011). The long rain 
season is experienced in March/April
while the short rains start in 
October/November (Figure 1.2). 
Figure 1.2: Rainfall profile of Lake Naivasha
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The wettest month of the year is April while January and February are the driest months. The 
average annual rainfall around the Lake is approximately 670 mm while in the higher altitude 
parts of the catchment rainfall averages at 2400 mm (Meins 2013; Stoof-Leichsenring et al. 
2011). This huge difference in rainfall can be attributed to the wide altitude variations within 
the basin which ranges from 1890 meters above sea level (m.a.s.l) around the Lake area to 
3,990 m.a.s.l in the Aberdare ranges. Rainfall variability has also been a historical 
phenomenon in the Lake Naivasha basin as indicated by Verschuren et al., (2000) who also 
notes that the historical drought and rainfall events had an important influence on cultural, 
political and agricultural development. 
1.2.2 Ecological Description 
Lake Naivasha was declared a Ramsar site, designating it as a wetland of international 
importance in 2005 (RAMSAR convention 2011). This important Lake ecosystem supports 
many terrestrial, riparian and littoral plants mainly Papyrus (Cyperus papyrus) and 
Potamogeton (Potamogeton coloratus). The lake also provides foraging and breeding ground 
for many resident and migrant bird species. The main Lake is a freshwater wetland with 
fringing shoreline vegetation dominated by swamp species, Cyperus papyrus (Harper & 
Mavuti 2004) and many other floating wetland plants and submerged species. The river delta 
vegetation plays an important role in regulating incoming materials such as dissolved and/or 
suspended nutrients and sediments. The separate sodic Lake is dominated by blue-green algae 
and soda-tolerant plants. The upper catchment ecosystem is dominated by humid Afro-
montane vegetation and bamboo in the Aberdare forest while the Kinangop plateau is 
dominated by crop land, grassland and scattered fast growing exotic trees (Mavuti & Harper 
2006).   
Recent trends indicate that some alien invasive species especially water hyacinth
(Eichhornia crassipes) have emerged in the Lake and colonized some parts.The emergence of 
these invasive species is attributable to changes in the ecosystem associated with 
anthropogenic disturbances, especially those linked to agricultural input use and land use 
change in favour of farming activities. As Kitaka et al. (2002) indicate, the Lake has recently
degraded into a eutrophic status, a change that the authors attribute to continuous deposition 
of nutrients, specifically Nitrogen and Phosphorous leachates into the Lake. These dynamics 
correspond to the land use changes in the upper catchment where horticultural and irrigated 
agricultural farms increased by 103% between 1986 and 2007 (Onywere et al. 2012). Besides 
interfering with the natural lake chemistry, oxygen dynamics and other important bio-
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chemical attributes, eeutrophication causes high turbidity which leads to poor light 
penetration. Anthropogenic impacts on the ecosystem are also associated with a rise in 
sediment  yield in the past 5 decades, from 1.3 tonnes ha-1 year-1 in 1947 to 8.9 tonnes ha-1
year-1 in 2006 (Stoof-Leichsenring et al. 2011). Within a 50 year period, approximately 3.4 
million tonnes of sediment have been deposited into the Lake. Given the shallow nature of the 
Lake, it is obvious that although siltation may not cause an alarming impact on the lake depth, 
it is has significantly affected the turbidity of the lake water with indirect influences on water 
use for domestic uses, fisheries, tourism and agriculture. Poor light penetration, together with 
the introduction of alien species such as Cray fish, is also responsible for extinction of benthic 
flora (Macrophytes) which were an important component of the ecosystem (Becht 2007). A
study by Mavuti & Harper (2006) indicated a substantial decline in natural vegetation in the 
catchment. More recently, Onywere et al. (2012) indicated that papyrus and wetland grassland 
around the Lake Naivasha had declined by 37.6% between 1986 and 2007.
1.2.3 Socio-Economic Attributes 
The Lake Naivasha basin supports multiple economic activities including horticulture, 
floriculture, commercial vegetable and 
food crop production, tourism, fisheries, 
and pastoralism. Subsistence food crop
production is also a dominant activity 
especially in the upper catchment. Two 
distinct agricultural systems can be 
identified in the Lake Naivasha basin. In 
the Upper catchment, we have mainly 
small-scale farms, engaged in the 
production of semi-commercial food crops 
and vegetables. In contrast, agriculture in 
the Lower catchment is dominated by 
large scale floriculture and horticulture 
commercial farms which are highly 
capital and technology intensive
Figure 1. 3 : Main economic activities in the basin
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The history of intensive commercial floriculture and horticulture in the Lake Naivasha 
region dates back to the early 1980s when a vegetable grower successfully introduced flower 
growing in the area. Since then, a vibrant commercial horticulture and floriculture industry 
has thrived along the shores of Lake Naivasha. Irrigated indoor and outdoor floriculture and 
horticulture around the lake currently occupy approximately 5025 ha (Reta 2011). The 
industry is favored by the fresh water Lake and underground aquifers providing reliable water 
for irrigation through-out the year and good all year-round climatic conditions. Proximity to 
the city of Nairobi also favours the industry by providing access to an international airport 
linking producers with international vegetable and cut flower markets. The Naivasha 
floriculture industry is also a key contributor to Kenya’s economic growth and livelihood 
support since it generates about Ksh. 27.8 Billion (or 278 Million Euro) in foreign exchange 
annually (WWF 2011). The sector also employs approximately 25,000 people directly while
supporting over 70,000 indirectly through dependency and employment in service sectors 
such as agro-chemicals, retail business, transport and other related services. The flower 
industry is however a major water user and has a great influence on the Lake  levels (Becht et 
al. 2005; Chiramba et al. 2011).
Farming in the upper catchment is dominated by smallholder farm settlements where 
farm households draw livelihood support by engaging in smallholder semi-subsistence 
farming. The average farm size in the basin is 2.45 Hectares. In the past 50 years, there has 
been rapid land use and land cover changes involving conversion of forest land to crop land 
hence exerting direct pressure on the environment (WWF 2011). Currently, crop land is
estimated at 210,000 hectares where small holder farmers grow food and commercial crops 
such as cereals – maize and wheat; pulses – beans, garden peas and snow peas; vegetables-
potatoes, cabbages, kales and carrots. Livestock production, both indigenous and mainly 
exotic beef and dairy cattle, sheep and goats and poultry also provide a substantial proportion 
of income to the households. Although crop production in the upper catchment is mainly rain 
fed, supplementary irrigation is done on approximately 8% of the total crop land. Irrigation 
water is drawn from multiple water abstraction points on the main rivers (Malewa and Gilgil), 
their tributaries and underground aquifers. These are also sources of supply of domestic water 
to over 300,000 people and over 40,000 livestock. The catchment population also depends on 
public and private forests for biomass fuel -mainly firewood and charcoal- livestock grazing, 
building materials and other non-wood forest products. Because of the seasonal cropping 
patterns and continuous land fragmentation caused by population pressure and land 
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inheritance cultural practices, land in the region is subjected to frequent tillage making the soil 
loose and susceptible to erosion. Soil erosion and accelerated land degradation is also abetted  
by poor agricultural practices in the upper catchment and has contributed to the siltation of the 
lake through the increased sediment load  (Becht et al., 2005; Stoof-Leichsenring et al. 2011). 
The growth of the horticulture industry was accompanied by an average annual 
population growth of 6.6%  from  237,902 people in 1979 (WWF 2011) to 551,245  in 2009 
(KNBS 2010). According to a national population census conducted in 2009 by the Kenya 
National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), an estimated 490,000 people, approximately 75% of 
the total basin population were living in the upper catchment (KNBS 2010;WWF 2011).
Figure 1.4 presents the population distribution in different sub-catchments of the Lake 
Naivasha basin as per the 2009 population census. 
Figure 1.4: Population distribution in the Lake Naivasha Basin
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1.2.4 Institutional, Policy and Regulatory Framework in the Lake Naivasha Basin
The legal and regulatory framework governing management of natural resources and 
other environmental issues in Lake Naivasha basin is mainly composed of national 
legislations. Further, local organizations composed of resources user groups and other
interested stakeholders such as NGOs and lobby groups have designed other institutional 
arrangements also used in governing resources in the basin. The major legal legislations and 
institutional arrangements that are relevant for regulating agri-environmental activities in the 
Lake Naivasha Basin are summarized below. 
1.2.4.1 The Water Act, 2002
This act provides a legal framework for the management of water resources and 
regulation of right to use water in Kenya. The Act was established in 2002 to repeal a 
previously existing law, the Water Act, CAP 372 laws of Kenya. A synthesis of the Act by
Mumma (2007) reveals that the act introduced comprehensive reforms in the management of 
the water sector in Kenya. The major reforms introduced by the act were: (i) separation of the 
management of water resources from the provision of water services; (ii) separation of policy 
making from day-to-day administration and regulation; (iii) decentralization of functions to 
lower-level state organs; and (iv) the involvement of non-government entities in both the 
management of water resources and the provision of water services. The Act set up a formal 
framework of institutions that govern the management of water resources in Kenya. Section 7 
of the Act created the Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA).  The authority was 
mandated to, among others; “develop principles, guidelines and procedures for allocation of 
water resources, regulate and protect water resources quality from adverse impacts; and to 
manage and protect water catchments’’ (GoK 2002), including development of water 
allocation plans. The act also introduced non-tradable water permits and block rate water 
pricing as instruments for regulating water use in Kenya (GoK 2002). The instruments are 
monitored and enforced by WRMA, a state department established by the same law. Further, 
section 15 (5) created a provision for development of Catchment Management Strategies 
(CMS) and mandated WRMA to facilitate the formation of Water Resource User Associations
(WRUAs). These are explained briefly in the next section. 
1.2.4.2 Water Resources User Associations (WRUAs) 
WRUAs are local collective action initiatives with a legal mandate to assist WRMA in 
catchment water monitoring, rule enforcement and conflict resolution. The WRUAs were 
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created through a provision in the Water Act, 2002 which recognized informal institutions 
through which these community organizations are formed. In the Lake Naivasha basin, 12 
such WRUAs were established in 2005, each commanding jurisdiction of a sub-catchment
(Figure 1. 5). Since their introduction, WRUAs have been involved in water management 
issues and development of sub-catchment management plans. 
Figure 1. 5: Map of Lake Naivasha Basin showing the 12 WRUAs
1.2.4.3 Lake Naivasha Management Plan
The Lake Naivasha Management Plan was developed as a community based initiative 
to promote sustainable development, wise use of resources and voluntary adoption of sectoral 
codes of conduct with a key objective of coordinating human activities around the lake for 
sustainability (Enniskillen 2002). The plan addressed sustainable management issues of the 
Lake Naivasha environment and the natural resources within the declared Lake Naivasha 
Ramsar site and the wider catchment (GoK 2004), taking an approach that allows the local 
community to benefit from the natural resources as they take care of it. The management plan 
provided broad guidelines for: (i) Water allocation and abstraction and monitoring of the 
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water balance; (ii) Catchment/riparian rehabilitation and protection, habitat management and 
nature conservation; (iii) Enhancing sustainability on economic activities around the lake such 
as tourism, horticulture, floriculture and fisheries; (iv) Minimizing negative externalities on 
the lake and its environment especially from chemical pollution, solid and sewerage wastes; 
(v) Research priorities, dissemination of information and monitoring & evaluation of the lake. 
Implementation of the Lake Naivasha Management Plan was however impended by some 
concerns raised by stakeholders leading to a legal tussle that halted its implementation. A new 
plan, the Lake Naivasha Basin Integrated Management Plan (LNBIMP), 2012-2022 was 
drafted in 2012. The LNBIMP sought to address the shortcomings that were in the earlier 
plan. However, the draft is still awaiting approval and adoption as a formal document 
recognized by law. 
1.2.4.4 The Environmental Management and Coordination Act (EMCA), 1999 
This Act came to force in the year 2000 and provides a legal and institutional 
framework for management of the environment. The Act gives every person in Kenya a right 
to a clean and healthy environment and confers upon every person the duty to protect and 
safeguard the environment. EMCA established the National Environmental Management 
Authority (NEMA) to coordinate and oversee environment management and protection; a 
Public Complains Committee to investigate complaints against any person or NEMA and to 
forward recommendations to the National Environmental Council (NEC); a National 
Environmental Tribunal (NET) for arbitration of allegations and complains. The act also 
provides for individual citizens to seek redress in courts for violation of environment 
regulation and to be involved in Environmental Impact Assessment and Audit (EIA) process. 
Section 42 provides a framework for the protection of rivers, lakes and wetlands and 
subsection 4 empowers NEMA to issue guidelines for the management of environments for 
lakes, rivers and wetlands (GoK 1999). The traditional interests of customary communities 
living around a river, lake, wetland or forest may be incorporated in management plans of 
such resources, through the provisions in sections 42 (2a), 43 and 48(2).
1.2.4.5 The Forest Act, 2005
The Forest Act 2005 provides for the establishment, development and sustainable 
management, including conservation and rational utilization of forest resources for the socio-
economic development of the country (GoK 2005). The government supports inter-sectoral 
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development, sustainable use of forestry resources and bio-diversity conservation. Section 27 
prohibits variation of state or local authority forest boundaries unless approved by local forest 
conservation committee and does not impart negatively on the environment after conducting 
an independent Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Part IV provides for community 
participation in state or local authority forest management through Community Forest 
Association (CFA) registered under the societies Act. The section also specifies the activities 
that the CFA members may conduct on the forests, and the products that the community may 
extract there from. The act is relevant for agri-environmental issues since all the tributaries of 
the major rivers in the Lake Naivasha basin originate from forests. 
1.2.4.6 Participatory Forest Management Plans (PFMPs)
Four PFMPs have been developed within the lake Naivasha basin, covering North 
Kinangop, South Kinangop, GETA and Eburu forest blocks. These plans were developed 
through participatory efforts by all key stakeholders involved in management of the covered 
forest blocks, which are part of the larger Aberdare forest. The management plans are in line 
with the provisions of the Forest Act, 2005, Section 34(1), which stipulates that every state, 
local authority or provincial forest must be managed in accordance with a management plan 
(GoK 2005). The forest blocks covered under the management plans are the sources of about 
11 tributaries of the Malewa River. The management plans seek to achieve a goal of 
“enhancing suitable management and utilization of natural resources by all stakeholders 
including the local communities, with particular focus on environmental conservation and 
improved livelihoods for the present and future generations” (KFS 2010). The plans, which 
seek to complement other environmental legislations in the area, give a road map for a 
comprehensive resource management plan within the forest blocks in the basin. The activities 
prioritized in the management plans have been categorized into nine programmes: (i) natural 
forest management; (ii) Plantation forest development; (iii) Water resources development; (iv) 
wildlife and ecotourism development; (v) community participation and development; (vi) 
infrastructure and equipment development (vii) human resources development (viii) 
protection and security and (ix) research and monitoring.
1.2.4.7 The Water Allocation Plan (WAP)
At the turn of the 21st century, it was observed that the then existing water institutions 
were not explicitly dealing with the volatile nature of water availability in the region and 
water scarcity situations were becoming very frequent. There were no mechanisms to limit the 
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total water abstractions and therefore perpetual water scarcity was the norm. Diminishing 
river flows, falling Lake levels and declining ground water levels were common issues in the 
entire basin. It was clear that water abstractions were beyond the capacity of the resource. 
This was the major motivation for development of the WAP, which was envisioned to be able 
to sufficiently deal with the challenge of unregulated water abstraction. The WAP was 
developed by the Lake Naivasha Growers Group (LNGG) an organization representing the 
horticultural industry around Lake Naivasha, in consultation with WRMA and other key 
stakeholders. The WAP had an objective of encouraging sustainable use of water resources in 
the entire basin. Figure 1.6 demonstrates the basic concept of the WAP, which established
thresholds using the traffic light system. 
Figure 1.6: Long-term Lake levels and thresholds of the Water Allocation Plan 
The black region, lying below 1882 m.a.s.l indicates extreme scarcity, where water 
should be used for reserve purposes and only basic needs, ruling out surface water use for 
irrigation. Within the black/reserve region, only water abstraction by domestic users and 
public water suppliers are is allowed at the rate of 25 liters per person (or per livestock unit) 
per day. During this period irrigators may however abstract 50 % of their water use from 
ground water reservoirs. The red region lies between 1882.5 and 1885.5 m.a.s.l and indicates
that water resources are at ‘scarce’ status. During this period, severe abstraction limits are 
Chapter 1 : Introduction 
17
imposed where surface and ground water abstraction is allowed only up to 50-75% of normal 
water requirements as indicated in the permits. At that time pumping water from rivers is 
completely prohibited. The amber zone (1884.5-1885.3 m.a.s.l) indicates that water resources 
are at a ‘stress’ status and therefore slight restrictions are imposed. Domestic water users and 
public water suppliers are allowed 100% of their requirements while other users can only 
abstract up to 75% of their permitted quantities. The green zone (>1885.3 m.a.s.l), indicates
that water resources are at a satisfactory status. In this zone, water abstraction restrictions are 
not imposed and all water users are allowed to abstract water up to the maximum daily 
allowable abstractions as per the water permits.  
An informal sanctioning mechanism to identify and punish violators was also 
established that uses a mix of fines, peer monitoring and social sanctions. Any person in the 
basin is required to identify and report rule breakers.  Once reported, violators are given three 
warnings by the WRUAs. If they don’t change their behavior after the third warning, their 
names are circulated among all the people in the WRUA and also published in national 
newspapers. This ‘name-and-shame’ process is then followed by the appropriate punishment 
which could be a fine, revocation of water permits or temporary disconnection of water 
depending on the nature of the offense.
1.3 Statement of the Problem
The description of Lake Naivasha basin reveals a number of issues that are of 
institutional and policy relevance. In the wake of increased human activity around the Lake 
and in the catchment, the Lake Naivasha basin faces several environmental challenges that are 
a threat to its sustainability and resilience. First, the riparian vegetation along the shores of 
Lake Naivasha has declined as a result of expanded human activities including establishment 
of crop land and permanent structures on riparian land. Secondly, unsuitable farming practices 
in the upper catchment such as rapid conversion of forested land into crop land, farming on 
steep slopes and fragile ecosystems such as riparian land and poor soil conservation have led 
to escalated soil erosion and siltation in water bodies. Third, fertilizer run-off originating from 
farms in the catchment and around the Lake is the major cause of eutrophication in the Lake.
This has encouraged emergence of invasive species such as water hyacinth (Eichhornia 
crassipes), algae blooms and other associated issues such as occasional oxygen depletion 
leading to fish kills, the latest having occurred in 2011. The major cause of eutrophication 
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documented so far is fertilizer run-off from the upper catchment. Finally, water abstraction 
remains highly unregulated. A water abstraction survey conducted in 2010 by WRMA 
revealed that illegal water abstraction is ubiquitous, since only 8% of water abstraction points 
accounting for about 50% of the total water abstracted had acquired updated permits (de Jong 
2011; WRMA 2009;WRMA 2010). The low compliance to rules has been attributed to 
challenges in monitoring of water use and low enforcement of existing rules and legislations 
by the state organs as a result of logistical and technological challenges and the nature of 
environmental problems (Willy et al. 2012; Willy et al. 2011). 
The presence of these environmental challenges in the Lake Naivasha basin implies
that the capacity of the ecosystem to continue supporting the myriad human activities 
especially the economic activities is at stake. Finding solutions to these challenges is a 
complex and multi-faceted daunting task that needs a mix of strategies. One of these strategies
could be designing institutional innovations that encourage sustainable farming activities and 
resource use in the Lake Naivasha basin. The current thesis seeks to contribute to this goal. In 
the next section the overall and specific objectives of the thesis are outlined. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to make a contribution to sustainable 
management of Lake Naivasha basin through analyzing the interactions between social and 
ecological systems in the basin. The analysis seeks to identify the institutional challenges 
encountered while seeking solutions to agri-environmental externalities and during the 
diffusion process of technologies and techniques to mitigate these agri-environmental 
externalities.  
Specifically, the study seeks to achieve the five objectives. The guiding research questions are 
listed under each objective. 
I. To characterize sampled households in the Lake Naivasha basin
What are the socio-economic and demographic attributes of sampled 
households?
What are the water use activities and trends among the sampled households?
What are the attitudes and perceptions of sampled households on resource 
management, externalities and rules governing resource use?  
II. To assess the potential for cooperative instruments in addressing three agri-
environmental externalities: siltation, eutrophication and water over abstraction. 
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What are the existing opportunities to cooperate in the upper Lake Naivasha 
Basin?
What are the tendencies of sample households to cooperate in the Lake 
Naivasha basin considering their participation in the existing collective action 
initiatives?
What are the determinants of the decision to participate in cooperation or to 
defect?
III. To estimate the returns to multiple soil conservation practices (MSCPs) in-terms of 
their effects on the value of crop production among sample small scale farmers in the 
Lake Naivasha basin.
To what extent do farmers in the Lake Naivasha basin implement multiple soil 
conservation practices? 
Does implementation of multiple soil conservation practices generate 
additional positive benefits in terms of enhanced value of crop productivity? 
What is the value of crop production per ha that can be attributed to multiple 
soil conservation practices?
IV. To analyze adoption and diffusion of soil conservation practices as a private effort to 
mitigate siltation and nutrient run-off. 
How does participation in collective action influence farm level soil 
conservation effort in the Lake Naivasha Basin? 
How does social influence which is manifested through neighbourhood social 
influences and subjective norms affect farm level soil conservation efforts. 
Does social control that may emerge from social networks within a community 
substitute for pure economic incentives to undertake individual action on soil 
conservation?
V. To analyze the effect of rainfall variability and household attributes on the diffusion of 
rain water harvesting techniques as mechanisms for water conservation and solving 
household water supply in the Lake Naivasha basin. 
What are the trends in the diffusion of roof-catchment and run-off harvesting  
techniques in the Lake Naivasha basin between 1960 and 2011? 
How does rainfall variability influence the diffusion path of the two rain water 
harvesting techniques over the study period? Does this sensitivity of 
individuals to rainfall variability change over time?
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Does the household water demand influence the household strategies towards 
securing water supply?
What are the individual and farm attributes that influence the diffusion of rain 
water harvesting techniques? 
1.5 Sampling and Data Collection Procedures
The studies in this thesis are based on primary cross-sectional data that was collected 
within the “Resilience, Collapse and Reorganization in socio-ecological systems of African 
Savannas” (RCR) project funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The data was 
collected through structured interview schedules administered to 308 randomly selected farm 
households during a household survey.  
A stratified random sampling technique was used to select the respondents with Water 
Resource User’s Associations used as the strata. A number of steps were followed in the 
sampling process. In the first step, eight Water Resources Users associations were selected 
purposively by the fact that they were located at the Upper Lake Naivasha basin. After 
selecting the WRUAs, a sampling frame was prepared for each village within the WRUAs
with the help of village elders and WRUA officials. In the next step a sample of 308 farm 
households was drawn from all the WRUAs such that the contribution of each WRUA was 
proportional to its size. Table 1.1 presents details on the distribution of the sample to 
individual WRUAs. 
Table 1.1 : Contribution of individual WRUAs to total sample size 
Name of 
WRUA
Population Number of 
households
Size 
(Km2)
Households
in WRUA as 
a %  of total
Expected 
sample 
size
Actual 
sample 
size
Sample 
adjustment*
Kianjogu 25,186 5,037 143.6 8.5 26 36 +10
Lower Malewa    19,378 3,875 149.4 8.9 27 32 +5
Middle Malewa    50,547 10,109 287.2 17.1 53 58 +5
Upper Malewa  21,689 4,338 146.4 8.7 27 34 +7
Mkungi Kitiri  62,434 12,487 370.3 22.0 68 34 -34
Upper Gilgil  22,842 4,568 106.0 6.3 19 37 +18
Upper Turasha  61,306 12,261 295.8 17.6 54 41 -13
Wanjohi  30,524 6,105 181.5 10.8 33 36 +3
Total 293,906 58,781 1680.1 308 308
*the sample size in each WRUA was adjusted for logistical purposes
A pretested interview schedule was then administered to the sample households.  The 
targeted respondents, who were mostly household heads and/or their spouses were 
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interviewed face-to-face by the researcher assisted by trained enumerators. The interview 
schedule had ten sections under which the following data was gathered: household water use 
trends; soil and water conservation practices; land use and crop production; Irrigation 
practices; livestock production; credit access; social capital (trust, membership and 
participation in groups, social networks); perceptions and awareness on water management 
and rules; asset ownership; household demographic information and access to main 
infrastructure. Figure 1. 7 shows the distribution of the sample households in the study area. 
Figure 1. 7: Map of Lake Naivasha Basin showing location of sampled households
1.6 Thesis Organization 
The current Chapter has presented background information on the research by 
discussing the concepts of Socio-Ecological systems and agri-environmental externalities. 
Further, the typology of policy and institutional instruments that are normally used to address 
interactions between social and ecological systems and the external effects which emerge 
from such interactions were discussed. A description of the Lake Naivasha basin, the research 
area, was offered in detail with an aim of revealing the problematic situation and therefore the 
research problem. Next, the research objectives were presented accompanied by the research 
questions that guided the execution of each objective. Finally the sampling and data collection 
procedures are described in detail. Chapter two presents a conceptual framework which 
shows the link between the different ideas tackled in different Chapters. Chapters three -
seven take up a single objective each and present comprehensive assessments, complete with 
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a background, literature review, theoretical, conceptual and analytical frameworks, results and 
discussions and conclusions and policy implications. 
Chapter three presents descriptive statics on different aspects of the sampled farmers 
that are relevant to the issue of agri-environmental externalities. The household attributes 
presented under the chapter include: socio-economic attributes, demographic characteristics, 
crop and livestock production aspects, social capital and welfare. 
Chapter four addresses the issue of Cooperation as an option for dealing with agri-
environmental externalities. The chapter begins by elaborating on the special attributes of 
agri-environmental externalities which cause monitoring and enforcement difficulties, making 
some instruments not suitable. Further, a theoretical framework is developed to explain why 
individuals cooperate or defect. The sampled farmers are then characterized based on the 
tendencies to participate in collective action initiatives. Finally the factors determining the 
decision to cooperate or defect are identified. 
Since soil erosion is the major cause of siltation externality in the research area, 
private efforts to engage in soil conservation to control soil erosion are analyzed in Chapters 5 
and 6. Chapter five explores whether implementing a soil conservation package consisting of 
multiple soil conservation practices (MSCPs) yields private economic benefits. In this 
chapter, the returns to MSCPs are estimated using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and 
exogenous switching regression. These methods were used to identify the effect on value of 
crop production that could be attributed only to soil conservation eliminating effects from
other observable attributes among implementers (treated) and non-implementers (non-
treated).  Chapter six further explores motivations of soil conservation beyond private 
economic benefits. Specifically, the chapter presents findings on the effect of social influence 
and participation in collective action on individual soil conservation efforts. The chapter 
begins with a background on previous studies identifying important determinants of adoption 
of soil conservation practices. A theoretical framework, adapting a modified agricultural 
household model is used to explain the motivation behind participation in collective action 
and investment in soil conservation by farmers. An analytical framework which consists of a 
binary and ordered probit regression models is presented followed by regression analysis 
results.
Technology adoption and diffusion is not just driven by economic, personal and social 
factors, but also the natural environment plays a role. Further, the externalities that water 
users in common pool resources situation inflict on each other could be improved or worsened 
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if households seek alternative household water supply stabilization mechanisms such as rain 
water harvesting. In Chapter seven, this issue is pursued by exploring the effect of rainfall 
variability, household attributes and household water demand on the diffusion path of two 
rain water harvesting techniques: run-off harvesting and Roof catchment rain water 
harvesting. The chapter also seeks to assess whether the sensitivity of individuals to changes 
in climatic conditions changes over time. 
Finally Chapter eight offers an overall summary and draws general conclusions of the 
thesis. The important aspects that are relevant for policy are summarized in a Policy 
Implication sub-section. The Chapter also highlights areas where we foresee potential for 
future research focus. 
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CHAPTER TWO
2 Conceptual Framework
This chapter presents a conceptual framework of the thesis. First, a broad 
conceptualization of the spatial relationship of farmers within a basin is presented. Then a 
schematic representation and description of the relationships between dependent and 
independent variables is offered. The objective of presenting the conceptual framework is to 
show how the key ideas addressed in this thesis are related and the key determinants of 
farmers’ activities and decisions that relate to crop production and the outputs from this 
activity. Outputs from cropping activities are either commodity outputs or non-commodity 
outputs such as negative externality causing pollutants. 
2.1 Conceptualizing Spatial Relationships between Farmers in a Lake Basin 
Figure 2.1 shows the spatial location of farmers in a Lake basin. The position of each
farmer in a basin determines their exposure to agri-environmental externalities and also how 
they affect others. Some farmers (A1-A4) are located in the upper catchment while others are 
located in the lower catchment (B1-B4). The up-streamness or down-streamness of a farmer 
depends on their location relative to other farmers. All farmers in the lower catchment are
downstream to those in the upper catchment. At the same time, some farmers in the upper 
catchment are downstream to others located in the same region. For example farmer A2 is 
downstream to A1, A3 to A2 and A4 to A3. Each farmer has jurisdiction over a specific 
parcel of land (they might have security of tenure or not) and they independently choose the 
technology to use in their farm. Farms in group A are located adjacent to a river which runs 
across the basin, feeding into a reservoir at the extreme downstream. Farms in group B are
located around the reservoir, and therefore face a real common pool resource dilemma. Each 
farmer is assumed to have different technology at their disposal and depending on their 
personal attributes and orientation; they choose the type of cropping enterprises. Besides 
affecting the production and cost functions, differences in technology and type of crops have 
implications on a number of other aspects. The type of crop determines the water demand 
from farming activities. For example, Mekonnen & Hoekstra (2010) estimated that the water 
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footprint1 for cut-flowers in Lake Naivasha basin was 367 M3/Tonne while that of vegetables 
grown in the upper catchment was 222 M3/Tonne and that of Potatoes another common crop 
in the upper catchment was 190 M3/Tonne.
Figure 2.1: Spatial relations between farmers in an Interdependent situation 
The type of crop also determines the marginal value of water which may also 
influence the price that people are willing to pay for water. Further, the irrigation technology 
used also influences the amount of water used for irrigation and also the quality and quantity 
of return flows and therefore would also influence the externalities emerging from cropping 
activities. Given this background, the next section identifies key factors that might influence 
the quantity of commodity and non commodity outputs that emerge from crop production 
activity. Further, the section identifies key factors that relate to solutions that farmers might 
implement to deal with the externalities.   
1 The water foot print concept originated from Hoekstra & Hung (2002) and refers to the amount of water that is 
required for a person or commodity for a time unit. In the concept, water used in human activities can come from 
three main sources: blue, green and grey water.  Blue water refers to surface of ground water while green water 
refers to capillary water stored in the soil or in plants, mainly from rain and grey water refers to water that is 
contaminated and possibly recycled in crop production.  
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2.2 Relationships Between Variables in Agri-environmental Situations 
The conceptual framework used in this study is presented in Figure 2.2. Crop 
production activity is at the centre of decision making. Crop production is an activity that 
produces two outputs: Commodity outputs and non-commodity outputs. First the commodity 
outputs are discussed. Assume farmers are maximizing their agricultural output subject to 
technology and physical constraints. Technology in this case refers to inputs such as 
fertilizers, seeds and other output enhancing techniques such as irrigation and soil 
conservation practices. Physical constraints relate to farm attributes such as slope, altitude and 
soil type. The level of inputs is further influenced by personal attributes such as age, gender 
and education level, which determine the farmers’ experience, skills and capability. The effect 
of these factors on output may also be mediated by exogenous factors such as access to 
extension advisory services, credit and market prices for inputs and outputs. In Chapter four, 
the influence of soil conservation practices on commodity output is assessed controlling for 
all the other factors that influence commodity outputs. Based on findings from previous 
studies, (for example  Kassie et al. 2008; Araya & Asafu-Adjaye 1999; Bekele 2005; Otsuki 
2010; Nyangena & Köhlin 2009) it was hypothesized that enhanced soil conservation is 
associated with higher crop productivity.
As mentioned earlier, crop production also generates non-commodity outputs. These 
include negative externality causing pollutants such as silt and nutrient leachates from farms.   
The non commodity outputs emerge because of non separability between production of 
agricultural commodities and non commodity outputs. Once fertilizers are applied on the 
farms, the farmers have no control of what happens thereafter (Hagedorn 2008). The nutrients 
from the fertilizers are converted to forms that can easily mix with surface run-off and 
eventually end up in surface and ground water. Nitrogen is usually converted into soluble 
forms such as nitrate (ܱܰଷ-) and nitrite (ܱܰଶ-) while phosphorous is usually transported
imbibed in soil particles or dissolved in run-off water. These processes could however be 
mitigated through environmental friendly soil conservation practices such as soil 
conservation. It was therefore important in the current study to assess the determinants of soil 
conservation effort at farm level as a way of mitigating agri-environmental externalities.  The 
process of adoption of soil conservation practices is a complex process and is hypothesized to 
be influenced by several factors.  Some of the important hypothesized determinants of  soil 
conservation include personal characteristics such as age, gender and education level (Napier 
et al. 1984 ; Doss and Morris, 2001), economic factors such as income, farm size and 
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household asset ownership (Ervin & Ervin, 1982; Kabubo-Mariara et al., 2006;  Marenya & 
Barrett, 2007 and Nkonya et al., 2008); physical factors such as slope, altitude, and soil 
quality (Kabubo-Mariara, 2012);  social  and institutional factors such as credit, access to 
extension services, land tenure and perceptions on existence of soil erosion problem and the 
perceived and actualized benefits of engaging in soil conservation (Ervin & Ervin, 1982; 
Kabubo-Mariara, 2012; 2007; Meinzen-Dick & Di Gregorio, 2004 ; Migot-Adholla et al., 
1991; Place & Swallow 2000; Rogers, 1995 and Shiferaw & Holden, 1998). Further, social 
factors such as subjective norms and social capital may also determine the soil conservation 
effort by individuals. Therefore, other than economic and personal attributes, whether 
individuals engage in soil conservation and the effort of soil conservation may depend on the 
level of social control from peers and engagement in collective action. 
Figure 2.2: Agri-environmental externalities: A conceptual framework
Source: Author’s conceptualization
Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework
28
Besides regulatory and market instruments2, collective action/cooperation is one of the 
instruments that can be used to address agri-environmental externalities   Collective action is 
relevant for agri-environmental externalities because most environmental bads (externalities) 
such as silt and nutrient runoff are usually ‘non-point’ and therefore are hard to monitor and 
link to a particular farm/individual. Due to the difficulty in monitoring and detecting 
individual liability, there is an incentive to over produce agri-environmental externalities and 
avoid abatement. Further, ecosystem services are usually produced privately by individuals 
but their benefits are enjoyed beyond their production localities. As such, individual farmers 
who produce environmental benefits cannot individually determine who else will use them 
and therefore they have no incentives to generate such benefits. Due to the public good nature 
of these agri-environmental externalities they would be better managed through collective 
action to help bring their production closer to Pareto optimum levels. Ostrom (1990) proves 
that resource users in a common pool resource situation can come up with self organized 
mechanisms to deal with the problem and avoid the tragedy of the commons that was 
predicted by Hardin (1968). 
The other reason why collective action in necessary is that by the virtue of the spatial 
location of farmers in the basin (see illustration on Figure 2.1), we have a unidirectional 
upstream-downstream externality since only those upstream can impose an externality to 
those downstream. The externalities result from upstream crop production activities and end 
up affecting the crop production activities for the downstream farmers. Therefore since the 
externalities create interdependence between farmers located in different spatial areas, 
collective action would be ideal. However, collective action will be more attractive if done 
not just to solve downstream problems but rather to solve the problems of those upstream as 
well. Creating such collective action will however depend on the incentives for cooperation 
that exist for the upstream farmers. For example, it could be at the interest of upstream
farmers to improve their farms in order to avoid the loss of long term crop productivity 
associated with soil erosion and land degradation. However, such a collective solution might 
require the upstream farmers to forego their current benefits for the sake of creating both 
private and social benefits. There must therefore be some sort of incentives to compensate 
them for the loss in income associated with this sacrifice. Such incentives might come from 
direct benefits associated the activities which farmers engage in to mitigate their negative 
2 The regulatory instruments and market based instruments are beyond the scope of this Thesis. However, an 
overview of the instruments is offered in Chapter one. 
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effects or other selective benefits offered by the group. Selective incentives are benefits that 
are accessible only to members of a certain group and therefore might motivate individuals 
into participation. Such benefits include training opportunities and exclusive access to advice 
or credit that may boost farming activities. Participation in cooperation is hypothesized to be 
influenced by norms of trust and reciprocity which help to form credible commitments and 
cement relationships. Also mechanisms for information sharing are very important since 
communication helps to solve prisoners’ dilemma. Finally, farmers must perceive that such 
cooperation is beneficial and that the costs of cooperating are lower than the benefits. Since 
cooperation needs governance structures and mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of 
rules, the presence of social sanctioning and peer monitoring might also be important 
determinants of cooperation. 
Finally, in situations where farmers are abstracting water from a common source, 
individual extraction behaviour may exert external effects on other users. An example is when 
water over abstraction drives the ground water levels very low such that marginal pumping 
costs also increase. This may also be the case in the situation where some of the water users 
have asymmetric access3 to water like in a watershed or Lake Basin. The flows of water into 
the shared reservoir can be greatly affected by the water abstraction behaviour by the 
upstream farmers. The amount of water used by each farm depends on factors such as the 
nature of farm enterprises (e.g. the type of crops produced), production and irrigation 
technologies used and weather conditions among other factors. Whether the amount of water 
abstracted leads to externalities will further depend on the conservation status of the farm/firm 
(e.g. whether there are water saving technologies) and the degree of dependence on common 
versus individual water supply system4. This aspect if addressed in chapter seven where it is 
hypothesized that rain water harvesting and storage at household level is influenced by both 
exogenous natural factors such as rainfall variability and endogenous factors such as 
household socio-economic/demographic attributes. 
3 Asymmetry in water access occurs because of the vertical nature of the river, where upstream water users are
privileged to decide on how much water to abstract before their downstream counterparts. Consequently, water 
use by each upstream water user contributes to externalities for the downstream water users and the entire 
system. However, at the reservoir (lake), all users have equal access to water.
4 This would include run-off and roof catchment rain water harvesting. 
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CHAPTER THREE
3 Attributes of Sample Farmers and their Activities in Upper 
Lake Naivasha Basin
This chapter presents descriptive statistics on the sampled households in the upper 
Lake Naivasha basin. Particularly, the chapter presents descriptive statistics on attributes of 
the sampled households and activities that they engage in that may have implications on their 
interactions with natural resources.  
3.1 Socio-Demographic characteristics
Table 3.1 summarizes the socio-demographic attributes of the sampled households. Out 
of the 308 households interviewed, 13.3% were female headed while the average age of the 
household heads was 54.8 (SD=14.1) years. The average household education level was 7 
years. The average education level for each household was computed by summing up the 
years of schooling completed for all household members and dividing the sum by the total 
number of household members who had attained school going age. The education level of the 
household head was also captured. Majority of the household heads (46%) had attained 
primary level of education, followed by secondary level of education5. The average household 
size for the sample was 5.0 members of whom   61.2% were adults over 18 years of age. The 
average household size in terms of adult equivalents6 was 4.4. 
Table 3.1: Household socio-demographic characteristics
Mean Std. Deviation
Age of household head (years) 54.8 14.1
Household size (adult equivalents) 4.4 2.0
Household size ( numbers) 5.0 2.0
Average  household education level (years) 7.3 3.4
Farming experience (years) 24.27 13.9
5 In the Kenyan education system primary level of education takes eight years while the secondary level takes 
four years.
6 This is an aggregate indicator of household sizes that is computed taking into consideration the attributes of 
household members such as age and gender to derive a figure that is comparable across households.  
Chapter 3:  Characteristics of Sampled Farmers in Upper Lake Naivasha Basin 
31
Table 3.1 Continued 
Frequency Percentage 
Gender
Male 267 86.7
Female 41 13.3
Household head education level 
None 61 19.9
Adult literacy education 4 1.3
Primary 142 46.3
Secondary 83 27.0
Tertiary college 15 4.9
University 2 0.7
Source: Author’s household survey data, 2011
3.2 Socio Economic Characteristics 
The sampled households were generating their income from two main sources: farming 
activities (crops and livestock) and off farm activities (employment and non-employment 
sources). Minor income sources included remittances and rental income (Table 3. 2). On 
average, off farm sources provided significantly higher incomes (mean = Kshs. 227, 619/year) 
compared to agricultural activities (mean= Kshs. 154, 956/year; t(307) = -2.33; p= 0.02, r
7 = 
0.13).
The main off-farm 
income generating activities 
among the sampled households 
were non agricultural trade 
(17%), employment in the 
service industry (16%) and 
engagement in local artisan jobs 
(tailoring, carpentry and 
masonry) (16%) and 
employment in the service 
sectors (17%) (Figure 3.1).
7 Where r is the effect size showing the importance of the effect, computed using the following formula (Field 
2009): 
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Figure 3.1: Off-farm income generating activities
About 10% were earning their off-farm income from pension while 5 % were 
generating their income directly from natural resources (Figure 3.1). The direct resource 
dependent activities include lumbering, charcoal burning and selling of wooden poles.
Table 3. 2: Annual household income by source 
Income source Mean SD
Net return from agricultural activities(Kshs) 154, 956 153,770
Mean annual  income from off-farm activities (Kshs) 227,619 118,283
Average total annual household income a 241,226 259,375
Average total annual household income b 205,608 242,909
Remittances 17,760 58,389
Rental Income (buildings) 8,538 55,124
Rental Income (Land) 1,836 10,242
a. Including value of own produced commodities consumed at home 
b. Excluding value of own produced commodities consumed at home 
Source: Household survey data
3.3 Cropping Activities, Land Ownership and Use 
Farming activities among the sampled farmers included crop and animal production. 
On average, households own 2.67 ha of land, ranging from 0.2 ha to 38.5 ha. The land is 
mainly used for growing crops (38%), pastures/grassland (39%), woodlots/farm forests 
(2.3%), homesteads (8.1%) and unusable/degraded land (2.3%).  About 62.3% of the 
respondents reported that they had secure rights to land (have title deeds to land).  Table 3. 3
summarizes the crops produced in the upper catchment of the Lake Naivasha basin. Roots and 
tubers, mainly Irish potatoes and carrots are the major crops grown in the area. Maize and 
pulses take second and third positions respectively. Pulses included those produced for home 
consumption and local markets such as beans and green peas and those produced for the 
export market such as French beans, sugar snaps and snow peas.
Chapter 3:  Characteristics of Sampled Farmers in Upper Lake Naivasha Basin 
33
Table 3. 3 : Crops produced by sampled households in the catchment
Crop Acreage (Ha) % of  crop land occupied by the crop
Roots and Tubers 145.3 37.4
Maize 89.4 23.0
Pulses (Long Season) 35.4 9.1
Fodder (perennial) 33.5 8.6
Vegetables (Rainfed) 27.6 7.1
Pulses (Short season) 19.8 5.1
Fodder(Long Season) 18.5 4.8
Vegetables(Irrigated) 9.3 2.4
Fodder (Short season) 6.6 1.7
Other cereals 3.3 0.9
Other crops 1.4 0.4
Total 390.1
About 23.4% of the sampled farmers indicated that they were engaged in irrigation
within the reference year. The irrigated area was about 7.2% of the total crop land.  On 
average, irrigators had significantly higher incomes from cropping activities with a mean 
income of Kshs. 95,508 annually compared to the Ksh. 30, 696, generated by non-irrigators 
(t(233) = -3.627; p= .000, r = 0.23). A commercialization index was computed to assess the 
degree of market orientation of the sampled households.  The index was computed for each 
household following the formula:   
Commercialization index = ୚ୟ୪୳ୣ ୭୤ ୟ୥୰୧ୡ୳୪୲୳୰ୟ୪ ୭୳୲୮୳୲ ୱ୭୪ୢ୚ୟ୪୳ୣ ୭୤ ୲୭୲ୟ୪ ୭୳୲୮୳୲ ୮୰୭ୢ୳ୡୣୢ ୧୬ ୲୦ୣ ୦୭୳ୱୣ୦୭୪ୢ (3.1)
The average commercialization index was 0.46, indicating that most of the households 
were engaged in production for own consumption. As expected, farmers involved in irrigation 
had a higher commercialization index ( തܺ=0.64 SE= 0.026) compared to those who were not 
engaged in irrigation ( തܺ=0.40 SE= 0.019); t(305) = -6.336, p = 0.000; r = 0.34).
To estimate the profitability of different crop enterprises, the gross margins of selected 
crops were computed.  As indicated in Table 3. 4, vegetables (cabbages and carrots) had the 
highest gross margins as a percentage of gross revenues followed by cereals (Maize and 
beans). Other vegetables-Kales, Green peas- and Potatoes ranked last. 
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Table 3. 4: Gross margins of major crop enterprises 
Crop Enterprises
Maize Beans Potato Green 
peas
Carrots Cabbages Kales 
Output
Output (Kg/ha) 2973 874 7547 943 11733 11329 4394
Selling price 
(Ksh/Kg)
18 48.36 13 57.67 8.92 14.95 14.79
Sales (Kshs/ha) 53514 42267 98111 54383 104658 169369 64987
Variable costs 
Seeds Quantity Kg/ha 30 60 1592 42 7 0,75 7,5
Price (Ksh/ Kg) 132 86 22 265 3000 24000 2300
Seed  cost 3960 5160 35024 11130 21000 18000 17250
Basal Fertilizer (BF) Quantity Kg/ha 173 30 156 48 41 102 49
Price (Ksh/ Kg) 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
BF cost 11591 2010 10452 3216 2747 6834 3283
Top dressing Fertilizer 
(TDF)
Quantity Kg/ha 16 4 5 14 5 10 10
Price (Ksh/ Kg) 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
TDF cost 800 200 250 700 250 500 500
Farm yard manure FYM (Kg/ha) 2209 449 956 547 1229 1527 1263
Price per Kga 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Manure cost 1104.5 224.5 478 273.5 614.5 763.5 631.5
Labour Persondays/ha 127 106 154 120 180 150 150
Wage rate 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Labour cost 19050 15900 23100 18000 27000 22500 22500
Pestcides Pestcide costs/ha 0 0 1500 4500 1500 3000 2000
Other variable costs Land 
preparation 
4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000
Total Variable cost 
(Kshs/ha)
40505 27494 74804 41819 57111 55597 50164 
Gross margin 
(Kshs/ha)
13009 14772 23307 12563 47547 113771 14823
GM as a % of revenue 0.243 0.349 0.238 0.231 0.454 0.672 0.228
a. Since there is no proper market for manure in the research area, this was an imputed price
Since the amount of fertilizers used in farms have a direct relationship with the   
concentrations of nitrates (ܱܰଷ-), nitrites (ܱܰଶ-) and phosphates in the soil, a follow-up was 
made on the types and amount of fertilizer used by the sampled households. Di-Ammonium 
Phosphate (DAP) and livestock manure were the main fertilizers applied on the farms. 
Manure is easily accessible because 92.8% of the households own livestock. The average 
manure production per household was 10 tonnes (wet-weight) per year. Table 3. 5 presents 
the amount of nutrients (Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Potassium) that were applied per hectare 
depending on the fertilizers applied. 
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Table 3. 5: Fertilizer use among sample farmers 
Type of fertilizer 
Average 
amount
Applied-Ia
(Kgs/ha)
Average 
amount
Applied-IIb
(Kgs/ha Amount of Nutrients Applied 
(Kg/Ha)c
Nitrogen Phosphorous Potassium 
Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN) 7.37 36.9 9.28 0 0
Di-Ammonium Phosphate (DAP) 99.0 117.4 21.13 23.48 0
NPK(20:20:0) 6.1 50.8 10.16 10.16 0
NPK (17:17:0) 1.3 26.5 4.505 4.505 0
Urea 1.4 28.5 13.11 0 0
Farm Yard Manure (FYM) 2541 3940 9.85 2.36 7.88
a. Average for entire sample
b. Average for only those who applied the fertilizer
c. The manure conversions are based on Pimentel (1997) where the nutrient content is given as: N(0.25%), P(0.06%) and K(0.2%). 
3.4 Water Use Trends 
Households used water mainly for domestic purposes (washing, cooking and bathing), 
livestock watering and irrigation. The average domestic water use was 47.5 M3 per household 
(or 13 M3 per adult equivalent) per year. Irrigation water averaged at 300 M3 per household 
per year while livestock watering consumed an average of 67 M3 per household annually. 
Table 3. 6 presents statistics on the proportion of water obtained from the different 
sources. Majority of the household source their water from rivers either directly or conveyed 
to their homes through piping system. Ground water is mainly used for domestic but only a 
small percentage of households use ground water for irrigation. The limited use of ground 
water for irrigation can be attributed to technology constraints since most households do not 
have water pumps but use improvised mechanisms to draw ground water by hand. 
Table 3. 6 : Proportions of household water use from different sources 
River Roof 
catchment
Borehole Well Spring Wetland Piped 
water 
Pond
Domestic .10 .15 .05 .16 .04 .03 .49 .02
Irrigation .02 .03 0 .06 .03 .01 .77 .07
Livestock .14 .08 .013 .14 .03 0 .47 .13
Livestock production, mainly dairy cattle, is a key farm enterprise in the catchment, and 
just like many rural areas in Kenya, it plays an important role in easing household’s cash 
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inflow constraints. The average livestock holding was 6.5 (SD=4.7) Tropical Livestock Units 
per household.  Livestock income is generated mainly from sale of milk, eggs and live 
animals. Livestock watering used on average 67.2 M3/household/ year, which considering that 
approximately 90% of the households keep some sort of livestock, could have substantial 
impacts on water resources at basin level. 
3.5 Irrigation Practices among the Sampled Households 
About 23.4% of the households interviewed reported having practiced irrigation within 
the year 2010. Three WRUAs in the upper catchment accounted for over 80 % of all the total 
irrigation: Upper Malewa (40.2%), Wanjohi (29.3%) and Lower Malewa (13.0%). Irrigated 
land was about 7.2 % of the total crop land cultivated by the sampled households in the upper 
catchment. Irrigation water use averaged at around 45.5 M3Ha-1day-1. However, the amount of 
water used for irrigation per hectare per day did not differ significantly between the three 
WRUAs, F(2,133) = 1.307; MSE=1.23 , p> .05.
The respondents were asked to indicate the months when they irrigated intensively and   
when irrigation was moderate. These responses were plotted together with the monthly 
rainfall recordings to assess whether there was a correlation between the intensity of irrigation 
and the amount of rainfall. Figure 3. 2 indicates that intensive irrigation is normally done 
between the months of January and March, which also happen to be the driest months of the 
year. On the other hand, moderate irrigation, which is mainly done for supplementary 
purposes, is done through-out the year depending on the precipitation, but mainly between 
September and December. The number of months during which the crops were irrigated 
differed significantly between the January-March irrigation season ( തܺ=2.8; SE=.08) and the 
September-December irrigation season ( തܺ=2.1; SE= 0.19); t (182) = 3.107; p< 0.01; r = .22).
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Figure 3. 2 : Figure: Intensity of irrigation in different months of the year
As indicated in Figure 3. 3, export and domestic vegetables and roots/tubers are 
irrigated in both seasons, while pulses are irrigated only during the January-March irrigation 
season.  Further, roots and tubers occupy the largest irrigated land followed by domestic 
vegetables and export vegetables in that order.
*Season 1 is the January-March irrigation season while season 2 is the September-December irrigation season.              
Figure 3. 3 : Area irrigated by crop and season. 
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Figure 3. 4 reveals that domestic vegetables (Kales, Spinach and cabbages) use 
relatively more water per hectare per day compared to the other crops. They also require more 
supplementary irrigation than all other crops, as indicated by the increase in amount of water 
between season 1 and season 2.  Although pulses (mainly green peas) seem to have used more 
irrigation water per hectare per day, the crop still used least water cumulatively. This is 
because they are irrigated for the least number of months (2.77) per year. 
*Season 1 is the January-March irrigation season while season 2 is the September-December irrigation season.              
Figure 3. 4: Amount of water used for irrigation by crop and season 
3.6 Household Asset Ownership, Welfare and Poverty 
The physical capital endowment for each household was estimated using asset indices 
for five categories of assets: crop related assets, livestock related assets, farm structures, and 
water/irrigation related assets and transport assets. An overall asset index was also computed.   
The asset indices were computed following the principle components analysis (PCA) 
approach suggested by Filmer & Pritchett (2001).  The   PCA approach   aggregates several 
binary asset ownership variables into a single dimension. The variables representing the single 
dimensions were then normalized to a 0-1 scale using the formula: 
(3.2) 
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where x is the initial value of observation, xmin is the minimum observation and xmax is the 
maximum observation. Normalization generates values ranging from 0 to 1 and therefore 
comparisons can be made across all the assets and across individuals. Using the total 
household annual income, a poverty indicator was developed by computing the daily per 
capita income. Based on the per capita income, 57.1% of the households were living on less 
than US$ 1.25/person/day8. There was a high correlation between household income /poverty 
level and asset ownership. As indicated in Figure 3. 5, households living below the poverty 
line had generally lower asset indices compared to those living above the poverty line (total 
asset index mean difference = 0.073, t(305) = 5.47, p<0.01). Only the index for crop assets 
which are composed of farm tools and implements was almost equal for both groups. This can 
be attributed to the fact that the poor households are mostly engaged in agricultural activities 
and therefore are likely to have many farm implements. 
Figure 3. 5 : Household asset ownership indices  
Wealth and income inequality among the sampled households was assessed using the 
Lorenz curves and the Gini coefficient. The Lorenz curve is used to assess the proportion of 
income or assets that is controlled by different sections of the population, while the Gini 
coefficient is an index that ranges between 0 and 1, and measures the extent to which the 
distribution of income is unequal. A Gini coefficient of 0 implies perfect equality while that 
8 This corresponds to the current world bank poverty line for Kenya ( http://data.worldbank.org/topic/poverty)
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of 1 implies perfect inequality. Generally, income and assets were moderately distributed. 
Three variables were used in constructing the Lorenz curves (Figure 3.6). First the total 
annual household income including the value of home produced commodities that are 
consumed at home (Inclusive income) was used. Using this variable, the Gini coefficient was 
estimated at 47.8% and the poorest 10%, 20% and 30% of the households commanded 
approximately 2%, 3% and 5% of the income respectively. When the value of home 
consumption of own produced commodities was excluded (exclusive income), the inequality 
widened slightly with the Gini coefficient increasing to 51.5%. The other variable used in 
constructing the Lorenz curves was the total assets owned by each household in the sample. 
This variable displayed a huge inequality with a Gini coefficient of 82.0% with 10% of the 
richest households in the sample controlling over 60% of the assets. 
Figure 3.6 : Distribution of income and assets among sampled households: Lorenz curve 
3.7 Social Capital Endowments 
The concept of social capital is used repeatedly in different chapters of this thesis. In 
the respective chapters, contextual explanations are offered on the relationship between social 
capital and different issues tackled in the chapters. This section offers a detailed discussion on 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
A
ss
et
/In
co
m
e 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Cumulative population proportion
Lorenz (Inclusive income) Lorenz (Exclusive income)
Lorenz (Assets) Line of perfect equality
Chapter 3:  Characteristics of Sampled Farmers in Upper Lake Naivasha Basin 
41
how the level of social capital for each household and for different Water Resource User 
Associations was estimated. The section further presents descriptive statistics on the estimated 
social capital at household level and at WRUA level. Social capital is a concept that has 
become widely used in many disciplines such as education (Coleman 1988); civic 
participation (Putnam 2000), natural resources management (Pretty & Ward 2001) and 
agricultural innovations (van Rijn et al. 2012). Although there is no a generally agreed 
definition of the concept, what is unanimously agreed is that social capital is all about social 
networks, the horizontal bonds that exist between relatively homogenous people (bonding 
social capital) and the vertical bridges that link diverse people (bridging social capital) 
(Putnam 2000). Uphoff (1999) further breaks social capital down into cognitive and structural 
components. According to this categorization, social capital can be viewed to be established 
based on shared norms of trust, norms of reciprocity and is facilitated by shared values. 
Further, Social capital can be viewed to be a composite of networks, relationships and 
institutional structures which link individuals. Therefore, social capital is an important asset in 
any community because it is the lubricant that oils social relationships in a community hence 
facilitating collective action (Ostrom & Ahn 2009). Social capital also enhances the capacity 
of a household to access other forms of capital, access information and also avoid 
opportunistic behavior. 
Social capital can be looked at as a composite concept that can be disaggregated into 
many components. In the current study five components of social capital were estimated 
namely: social participation, social networks, social support, reciprocity and trustworthiness.
Indices were developed for each of these components using principal components analysis 
(PCA) approach. PCA was conducted in three steps: First, respondents were asked specific 
questions that were used as indicators of each of the 5 components of social capital. Second, 
PCA with orthogonal rotation was carried out on these items. Sampling adequacy for the 
analysis was verified using Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO)9 statistic while Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity10 was used to test whether correlations between items were large enough for PCA.
Third, the components obtained from step 2 with Eigenvalues greater than 1 were selected for 
further analysis. The factor scores in each PCA component were summed up for each social 
capital component to obtain a single score and normalized on a 0-1 scale. The higher the score 
9 This statistic is used to compare the observed correlation coefficients in relation to the partial correlation 
coefficients. Large KMO values are preferred because they indicate that potential factors can be explained by the 
other variables.
10 This statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix. The variables 
should be highly correlated if they belong to the same factor. 
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(closer to 1) the better. Normalization was done using the formula presented in Equation (3.2).
The final indices were taken to represent the level of each of the 5 social capital components. 
These are later used as explanatory variables in other Chapters. To compute an overall social 
capital index, all the items used in the construction of the indices for the individual social 
capital components were entered into factor analysis at the same time and one indicator, also 
ranging from 0-1 generated using the same procedure explained above. Next, the descriptive 
statistics for the individual components of social capital are presented. 
3.7.1 Descriptive Statistics on Social Participation
In the context of the current study, social participation is used to imply the intensity of 
group membership and participation. It is a measure of how individuals interact socially with 
fellow community members within groups. Social participation was captured through the 
items listed in Table 3.7. Three components had Eigene values above Kaiser’s criteria of 1. 
These components explained 65% of the variance in the nine (9) original variables.  
Considering the correlations between these factor loadings and the individual variables, 
component 1 represents involvement in groups, component 2 represents participation in water 
management while component 3 represents participation in communal activities. The KMO 
statistic was 0.7 which is above the acceptable limit of 0.5 which is the minimum required to 
confirm that factor analysis objectives have been achieved. 
The three components were aggregated, rescaled and then averaged to obtain a mean 
social participation index for each sub-catchment in the Lake Naivasha basin. The mean 
values are as shown in Figure 3. 7. Upper Malewa WRUA had the highest level of social 
participation. This could be because most of the farmers in the WRUA are irrigators and 
therefore participation in water projects boosted their social participation. Further, most of the 
farmers there also grow carrots. These are labour intensive crops especially during first stages 
of crop establishment and during harvesting. Therefore rotating labour saving groups are 
common in the area to facilitate pooling of labour. 
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Table 3.7: Principal component analysis results on social participation
Components 
Variables Involvement 
in groups
Participation in  
water 
management
Participation in 
communal 
activities
At least one person in the household is a member of 
a group
.820 .103 .077
Holds leadership position in the group .869 .119 .057
Frequency of active involvement in a group  .559 .096 -.042
No of household members  in groups .923 .051 .023
Membership in WRUA .178 .709 .044
Membership in Community water project -.079 -.773 -.102
Participation in communal water management    .056 .739 .120
Time spent in communal activities (hrs/year) .066 -.018 .896
Participation in communal activities -.016 .362 .751
Summary statistics
Eigenvalues 2.97 1.80 1.09
% of variance explained 32.99 20.00 12.08 
Total % of variance explained 65.07 
Average overall score (0-1 scale) 0.31 
KMO statistic 0.70  
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity
(36) 885.08 
p 0.000
Figure 3. 7 : Average social participation indeces for different WRUAs
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3.7.2 Descriptive Statistics on Social Networks
Social networks refer to the interconnectedness between individuals, their family 
members, friends and other community members through which formal and informal 
interactions occur. Coined by Barnes (1954) the concept has been used widely to imply nodes 
of individuals, groups or organizations that tie in different forms of interdependencies such as 
shared values and norms, kinship and friendship ties and in-cash and in kind exchanges 
(Serrat 2010). Social networks are fostered through social participation since involvement in 
groups helps to strengthen individuals’ social interactions and consequently networks. Four 
items were used in the current study to capture social networks. 
The results in Table 3.8 indicate that two components had eigenvalues greater that 1 
and explained 65% of the variation in the original variables. The two extracted components 
represent local networks and external networks. Local networks are those that occur within a 
small span within the community. External networks however span within wide areas beyond 
the physical boundaries of the community. Both KMO statistics and Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity gave satisfactory results. 
Table 3.8: Principal component analysis results on social networks
Rotated Factor loadings
Local networks External networks
Years of household membership in groups  .827 .074
Intensity of  social interactions (people contacted) .829 .039
Number of household members working outside village .011 .794
Number of months spend away from home  .098 .771
Summary statistics
Eigenvalues 1.499 1.114
Cumulative  % of variance 65.33
Average score (0-1 scale) 0.19
KMO statistic 0.533
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity
߯ଶ (6) 71.11 
p 0.000
As indicated in Figure 3.8 the WRUA average social networks index ranged between 
0.12 and 0.23 which is generally low. Lower Malewa WRUA which also had the lowest 
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social participation index also had the lowest social networks. This is because the two 
components of social capital are somehow complementary. 
Figure 3.8: Average social networks index for different WRUAs
3.7.3 Descriptive Statistics on Social Support 
Social support as used in this study refers to the ability of individuals to secure 
assistance from different quarters in the community especially in times of need or to perceive 
that they would receive help in times of distress. The concept therefore has both perception 
and actual components. The perception components relate to the feeling that an individual is 
cared for and that in the event of a misfortune, assistance will be available. The actual 
component is related to evidence that actually assistance has already been accorded to the 
person during times of distress or need. These two components are what Barrera, Jr (1986)
refers to as perceived social support and enacted social support respectively. Social support 
could be sourced from different quarters including friends, family, neighbours, the 
government and even humanitarian organizations. Some questions capturing both perceived 
and received social support were included in the survey instrument and are summarized in 
Table 3. 9.
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Table 3. 9: Principal component analysis results on social support 
Rotated Factor loadings
Variables Perceived 
community 
support
Actual 
support
Perceived 
organization 
support
Perceive
d family 
support
Social support   available from close family members .179 .221 -.284 .758
Social support  available from close relatives .192 .324 -.276 -.681
Social support   available from neighbours .686 .038 .075 -.005
Social support   available from mutual support groups -.766 -.042 -.024 -.016
Social support   available from religious groups -.229 .665 .495 .079
Receives remittances .183 .769 -.164 -.048
Social support  available from NGOs .176 -.047 .817 -.052
Summary statistics
Eigenvalues 1.366 1.134 1.053 1.035
% of variance explained 17.757 17.038 15.755 14.988
Total % of variance explained 65.54
Average overall score (0-1 scale) 0.22
KMO statistic 0.513
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity
߯ଶ (45) 42.838
p .003
Results in Table 3. 9 indicate that three components capturing perceived social 
support and one capturing actual social support were extracted. All these components met the 
criteria of eigenvalues greater that 1 and explained 65% of the variation in the individual 
variables. Figure 3. 9 presents the average social support scores for the eight WRUAs where 
the study was conducted. The average social support index ranged between 0.14 and 0.23. 
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Figure 3. 9: Average social support index for different WRUAs
3.7.4 Descriptive Statistics on Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness can be conceptualized as value judgment that people place on others 
based on the belief that they can be trusted or not. Trustworthiness facilitates the formation of 
trust which is an important determinant of collective action. In the current study, estimation of 
trustworthiness was deemed important because establishing collective action on agri-
environmental issues depends to a very large extent on the trustworthiness in the community 
which helps to establish trust. After factor analysis, two components which had eigenvalues 
greater than 1 were extracted (Table 3. 10). These components were named perceived trust 
and proven trust depending on the variables which they were highly correlated with. The two 
components explained approximately 60% of the total variation in the original four variables. 
The analysis also satisfied the required criteria based on the KMO statistics and the Bartlett's 
test of sphericity.  
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Table 3. 10: Principal component analysis on trustworthiness 
Rotated Factor loadings
Perceived Trust Proven 
trust
A misplaced purse in the community is likely to be returned 0.808 .091
Community members more trusted than non community members 0.818 -.013
I can trust most people in my community with a loan .002 .731
I have engaged in mutual exchanges with other community 
members   
.068 .727
Summary statistics 
Eigenvalues 1.369 1.029 
% of variance 34.224 25.716 
Cumulative  % of variance 59.939
Average  score (0-1 scale) 0.47
KMO statistic .508
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity
߯ଶ (6) 40.225
p .000
On average Mkungi Kitiri WRUA had the highest trustworthiness index while Lower 
Malewa had the least (Figure 3.10). Combining these indeces and the social participation and 
social networks indices can be used to predict where in the basin collective action is likely to 
emerge and succeed. An interesting result was however to see that in Upper Malewa, the level 
of trust is very low although this was the WRUA with the highest level of social participation. 
This could imply that a basic level of trust is sufficient for collective action to emerge. 
Chapter 3:  Characteristics of Sampled Farmers in Upper Lake Naivasha Basin 
49
Figure 3.10: Average social trustworthiness index for different WRUAs
3.7.5 Descriptive Statistics on Reciprocity 
Reciprocity is a concept that is closely related to trust. In the current study it is used to 
refer to free exchange of materials such as planting materials and labour. An individual 
engaged in a reciprocate exchange does so under the assumption that the other parties will do 
so in the future. This could be through returning exactly what they were given (simultaneous 
reciprocity) or returning the favour in another way (diffuse reciprocity). What is important 
though is that at the end, all the parties are left satisfied. Collective action and social 
cooperation are mainly embedded within the principle of reciprocity. Six items (variables) 
were used to estimate reciprocity components. Out of these, two components with eigenvalues 
greater than 1 were extracted explaining approximately 52% of the variation. The two 
components were named simultaneous reciprocity and diffuse reciprocity (Table 3. 11).
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Table 3. 11: Principal component analysis on reciprocity 
Rotated Factor loadings
Diffuse 
reciprocity
Simultaneous 
reciprocity
I get mutual benefit from communal water management activities  .762 .154
I benefit  by being a member of the water project .813 -.115
I benefit by being a member of a  WRUA .652 -.294
I don't benefit by  participating in communal activities .539 .354
My villagers  help one another  -.081 .685
I have exchanged planting materials with other farmers in the past -.053 -.672
Summary statistics
Eigenvalues 1.965 1.170
% of variance explained 32.757 19.495
Cumulative  % of variance explained 52.252
Average  score (0-1 scale) 0.44
KMO statistic .630
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity
߯ଶ (21) 204.345
p .000
The two components were used to estimate the reciprocity index used in mapping 
reciprocity in the Lake Naivasha basin (Figure 3. 11). Spatial variation in the degree of 
reciprocity was observed in the Lake Naivasha basin. Wanjohi WRUA had the highest level 
of reciprocity while the least levels of reciprocity were found in Kianjogu. It was also 
observed that mostly the WRUAs which had high levels of trustworthiness also had relatively 
high incidences of reciprocate exchanges.  
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Figure 3. 11: Average social trustworthiness index for different WRUAs
3.7.6 Overall Social Capital Index 
After computing the individual social capital components, an overall social capital 
index was also computed. As indicated in Figure 3.12, social capital scores differed spatially 
across the eight WRUAs, ranging from 0.34 (Lower Malewa) to 0.59 (Kianjogu). The average 
social capital index for the entire basin was 0.44. Assessing the social capital of every WRUA 
can be a good indicator to show where collective action is likely to succeed. However, there is 
a caveat to this statement. It has to be noted that social capital is only one of the major but not 
the sole determinants of collective action. Therefore, when assessing the possibility of 
forming collective action in the Lake Naivasha basin all the community attributes that are 
relevant for collective action formation have to be assessed. 
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Figure 3.12: Overall social capital index measures for WRUAs in the Basin
3.8 Attitudes and Perceptions among Sampled Farmers 
The perception of sampled farmers on a number of aspects related to water 
management, water use, water rules and status of environmental problems such as water 
scarcity and soil erosion was assessed using a five point likert scale questions. The survey 
sought to capture respondent’s perceptions on five key elements:  (1) Spatial interrelationship 
between downstream and upstream water users (2) Government water management (3) 
Communal water management (4) Water rules formulated by the community (5) Water rules 
formulated by the government. The descriptive statistics for each element are explained next.  
3.8.1 Perceptions on Spatial Interrelationship between Water Users
The questions under this category aimed at assessing the extent to which the 
interviewed individuals perceived the link between their activities and the welfare of others in 
the basin.  The objective was to gauge whether the sample farmers perceived that their 
farming activities had a negative impact on the environment. Table 3.12 presents the 
responses obtained during the survey. Generally, the sampled farmers did not strongly 
perceive that agri-environmental externalities are a problem in the area as indicated by the 
responses. Majority of the respondents were for the opinion that their farming activities were 
not related to the status of water resources in the area. Further, majority did not feel that their 
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activities were affecting those downstream neither did they feel that they were being affected 
by those upstream to their farms.
Table 3.12: Perceptions on externalities
Statement Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree
My farming activities affect the people 
who are located downstream from my 
farm
99(.32) 123(.40 ) 3(.01) 48(.16 ) 35(.11 )
There is no relationship between my 
individual farming activities and the status 
of water resources in my area
26(.8 ) 68(.22 ) 3(.01 ) 139(.45 ) 72(.23 )
The quality of the water I get is affected 
by the activities of the people who are 
upstream
57(.19 ) 106(.34 ) 11(.4 ) 46(.15 ) 88(.29 )
The figures in parentheses are percentages 
3.8.2 Perceptions on Government Water Management
Public water management in the Lake Naivasha basin is done by the Water Resources 
Management Authority (WRMA). The perception of respondents on the performance of the 
public water administrators was assessed using the statements in Table 3. 13. It emerged that 
although majority of the respondents were not for the opinion that public water administrators 
were more efficient than communal ones, they still had confidence in them and satisfaction in 
the public water management system.  However, the split among the respondents on these 
statements were almost 50-50. This could be because that majority believed that the 
government had played an important role in streamlining water management issues. The 
formation of WRUAs to assist WRMA in water management could have enhanced this 
perception. Ideally WRUAs are supposed to be bottom up initiatives but because of the 
manner in which they were introduced in the Lake Naivasha basin, they are widely perceived 
to be government initiatives (top down).  
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Table 3. 13 : Perceptions on public water management 
Statement Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree
Government water administrators are more 
efficient than the communal water 
administrators
69 (.22) 108(.35) 33 (.11) 57(.19) 41(.13)
The government has been playing an 
important role in water management issues
54 (.18) 61 (.20) 25(.08) 98(.32) 70(.23)
Generally speaking I have confidence in 
government officials managing water issues
45(.15) 76(.25) 33 (.11) 92(.30) 62(.20)
Satisfaction with government water 
management system
35 (.11) 88 (.29) 33 (.11) 105(.34) 47(.15)
The figures in parentheses are percentages 
3.8.3 Perception on Communal Water Management
Respondents were asked to indicate their responses to some statements that were used 
to gauge their perception on communal water management (Table 3. 14). Majority agreed that 
after 2005, water management in their area had improved. That is the year when most 
WRUAs in the watershed were established and therefore started assisting WRMA in water 
management. Respondents overwhelmingly agreed to the statement that they had confidence 
in communal water management leadership. They also indicated satisfaction in WRUAs in 
managing water issues and also in communal water management systems such as community 
water projects. 
Table 3. 14: Perceptions on communal water management 
Statement Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Water management in my area 
improved after 2005
44(0.14) 82(0.27) 21(0.07) 106(0.34) 55(0.18)
Satisfaction on local water 
management systems
22(0.07) 53(0.17) 39(0.13) 102(0.33) 92(0.30)
I have confidence in the 
Community water management 
leadership
27(0.09) 29(0.09) 36(0.12) 89(0.29) 127(0.41)
Satisfaction on performance of 
the WRUAs in managing water
23(0.07) 44(0.14) 92(0.30) 76(0.25) 73(0.24)
The figures in parentheses are percentages 
3.8.4 Perception on Water Rules Formulated by the Community
In the Lake Naivasha basin, both formal and informal rules on water abstraction and 
use have been implemented. Community water rules are mainly established by community 
water projects to govern the conduct of its members. Some of these are summarized by Willy 
Chapter 3:  Characteristics of Sampled Farmers in Upper Lake Naivasha Basin 
55
et al. (2012). The statements in Table 3. 15 were used to gauge the perception of respondents 
on the design of communal rules and fairness in their enforcement and sanctioning 
mechanisms.  Majority of the respondents showed satisfaction in the communal rules and also 
the way in which rule breakers are punished. The respondents were also strongly of the 
opinion that peer monitoring was existing in the community given that majority indicated that 
people could report rule breakers. However, we note that a substantial number of respondents 
were in the neutral category which could be an indicator of low awareness of the communal 
rules. This would be true especially for respondents who were not members of any 
community water project.  Most of the respondents indicated satisfaction in the flat rate water 
prices they were paying at the time of the survey where a monthly fee of Ksh. 100 (Approx. 1 
Euro) was charged regardless of the amount of water used. However, the Water Act 2002 
introduced block rate pricing which is yet to be implemented in most parts of the watershed. 
Table 3. 15: Perceptions on communal water rules and their sanctioning mechanisms
Statement Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
The communal methods of 
punishing those who break rules 
on water are fair to all
11(0.04) 42(0.14) 62(0.20) 96(0.31) 97(0.31)
I am satisfied with the communal 
rules governing water use in this 
area
19(0.06) 26(0.08) 66(0.21) 92(0.30) 105(0.34)
In this area, anybody can report 
another person if they are 
breaking water rules
22(0.07) 43(0.14) 50(0.16) 82(0.27) 111(0.36)
I am satisfied with the prices of 
water we are paying
20(0.06) 40(0.13) 82(0.27) 100(0.32) 66(0.21)
The figures in parentheses are percentages 
3.8.5 Perception on Water Rules Formulated by the Government
Government rules governing water management are mainly found in the water Act 
2002 (GoK 2002) and the water resources management rules, 2006 (GoK 2006). Some of the 
rules are summarized by Willy et al. (2012). Just like in the case of communal rules, it can be 
noted that the neutral category also had many respondents, even more than those in the 
communal rules case (Table 3. 16). This could also be an indication of low awareness of 
water management rules which was even lower for the government rules compared to the 
communal rules. The response to the second statement was meant to capture satisfaction in 
water permits. However, since majority of the respondents were not even aware of the permit 
requirement, their responses could have been referring to the method used by the community 
water projects to allow access to water. 
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Table 3. 16: Perceptions on government water rules and their sanctioning mechanisms
Statement Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree
The government  ways of punishing 
those who break rules on water are 
fair to all
32(0.10) 61(0.20) 64(0.21) 82(0.27) 69(0.22)
I am satisfied with the method used 
in this area to allow people to use 
water for irrigation
46(0.15) 44(0.14) 76(0.25) 63(0.20) 79(0.26)
I am satisfied with the government 
rules governing water use in this area
41(0.13) 54(0.18) 72(0.23) 76(0.25) 65(0.21)
Satisfaction on government rules on 
water access and use
20(0.06) 85(0.28) 55(0.18) 99(0.32) 49(0.16)
3.8.6 Reliability Analysis on Perception Statements 
Reliability analysis (RA) was done to assess the internal consistency of the statements 
in all the above perception elements using the Cronbach’s alpha statistic. Reliability analysis 
is used to determine how closely related the statements are and how well they collectively 
measure the underlying (latent) construct that the items seek to measure, in this case, 
perception. Further, dimensionality of the scale was assessed using exploratory factor 
analysis. Results for factor and reliability analyses are presented in Table 3. 17 . Considering 
the Cronbach’s alpha values elements B-( KDG KLJK UHOLDELOLW\ &URQEDFK¶V Į !  ZKLOH
only element A had relatively low reliability (CronbDFK¶VĮ 
Table 3. 17: Results for reliability and factor analysis
Descriptive statistics Reliability 
analysis
Factor (Dimensionality) analysis
Perception 
element
Number 
of items
Mean 
perception 
score 
Mode 
perception 
score
Cronbach’s 
alpha
KMO p Variance 
explained 
(%)a
A 3 7.82 6 0.557 0.597 0.000 53.3
B 4 12.17 10 0.731 0.736 0.000 56.3
C 4 14.04 16 0.777 0.76 0.000 60.4
D 4 14.87 17 0.744 0.76 0.000 57.0
E 4 5.79 6 0.736 0.726 0.000 56.2
a. This is the percentage of the total variance in all variables that is explained by the extracted component(s). 
A = Perceptions on Spatial interrelationship between downstream and upstream water users
B = Perceptions on Government Water Management
C = Perception on communal water management
D = Perception on water rules formulated by the community
E = Perception on water rules formulated by the government
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CHAPTER FOUR
4 Assessing the Potential for Agri-Environmental Cooperation 
in Lake Naivasha Basin11
4.1 Introduction 
The problem of agri-environmental externalities has been a challenge to policy makers 
for a long time in both low and high income countries.  The externalities emanate from the 
fact that agriculture draws most of the major inputs and natural services from nature, therefore 
creating direct interdependence between agriculture and the environment (Power 2010). 
Because of this interdependence, agriculture is usually associated with processes that impact 
the environment negatively such as deforestation, land degradation, greenhouse gas 
emissions, soil erosion, water pollution and biodiversity loss. In seeking effective mechanisms 
for resolving environmental problems emanating from agriculture, researchers have in the 
recent past increasingly   assessed the potential for using cooperative/suasive instruments to 
deal with agri-environmental externalities. Some of the most studied cooperative initiatives 
touching on agriculture and the environment include agri-environmental cooperatives, 
watershed management programmes, ground water management programmes, communal 
irrigation schemes and voluntary land diversion schemes (Ostrom 1990; White & Runge 
1994; Cárdenas et al. 2009; Goldman et al. 2007).
Most of the case studies mentioned here have identified agri-environmental 
cooperation initiatives as one of the possible instruments to successfully mediate interactions 
between agriculture and the environment. It has been found that agri-environmental 
cooperation can help to achieve near Pareto optimal solutions especially where markets and 
government regulatory instruments have limited success (Lubell et al. 2002). Agri-
environmental cooperation is defined as a voluntary collective action initiative that involves a 
continuum of commitment ranging from awareness creation and information sharing to 
collaboration of heterogeneous individuals who have shared goals and anticipate benefits 
from their cooperative efforts (Polman & Slagen 2002). In the current text, collective action 
and cooperation have similar connotation and therefore these two terms will be used 
11 This chapter is based on: 
Willy, D.K., Kuhn, A., Holm-Mueller, K., Mitigating Unilateral Agri-Environmental Externalities through 
Cooperation: An Assessment of Determinants of Participation in Collective Action Initiatives in a Low 
Income Country (Manuscript ready for Submission).
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synonymously. Agri-environmental cooperation entails horizontal non market coordination 
mechanisms where individuals voluntarily and collectively engage in action selection and 
implementation, information gathering and sharing, organizational adjustments and conflict 
resolution (Hagedorn et al. 2002).  Action selection in agricultural externalities’ context 
involves collective choice of activities and technologies which involve both generation of 
environmental goods and services and mitigation of negative externalities produced jointly 
with agricultural commodities.
Esteban & Dinar (2013) demonstrate that cooperation in management of ground water 
where externalities are present can yield a Pareto improvement.  The study finds that farmers 
were better off with cooperation than without. Ayer (1997) presents some successful cases of 
grass root collective action initiatives that were initiated to deal with externalities caused by 
pesticide application and washing of manure, inorganic fertilizers and eroded soils into water 
courses in the USA. The author identifies grass root collective action as one of the options for 
addressing agri-environmental problems that have the potential of moving production closer 
to a Pareto optimum than would the uncoordinated self-interest decisions of individuals and 
firms. White & Runge (1994) also present a case   of successful cooperation in managing a 
watershed in Haiti, within a society that had historically been branded incapable of self 
organization. 
From these case studies we identify some fundamental aspects. First, since agri-
environmental externalities create collective action dilemmas they would best be addressed 
using collective solutions (Ayer 1997; Ostrom 1990). Second, due to the large number of 
individual farmers involved, and the need for economies of scale, generation of ecosystem 
services will succeed if coordinated at landscape level. Third, coordination mechanisms 
would succeed if designed to encourage the participation of as many land owners as possible. 
What we note however, is that empirical studies on the area of agri-environmental 
externalities in the low income countries are very scanty. Except a few cases (e.g. White & 
Runge 1994), most of the existing empirical studies on agri-environmental schemes are from 
high income countries. At the same time, agriculture continues to be a dominant sector in 
most low income countries and therefore agricultural sustainability is no longer an optional 
but a priority focal area. Therefore studies in the area of agri-environmental interactions may 
play a key role in informing policy to guide sustainability in agriculture. 
The current study seeks to contribute to the understanding of how collective action 
around agri-environmental externalities can work in a low income country setting. Using 
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empirical household survey data from a watershed located in rural Kenya, the current study 
sets out to assess the potential for agri-environmental cooperation in addressing agricultural 
externalities. The externalities considered in the case study are the unilateral non-point 
sources of agricultural pollution - siltation and eutrophication - and water scarcity that is 
attributable to water over-abstraction. The broad goal of the study is achieved in two steps. 
First, a two step cluster analysis approach is used to identify the cooperative behavior of 
sample households in the Lake Naivasha basin by assessing their degree of participation in 
activities involving voluntary provision of public goods in the community. Through this, 
households are categorized either as cooperators or defectors. Second, the study utilizes a 
logistic regression model to identify factors that make individuals more likely to cooperate. 
The next section describes the research area and the existing collective action 
opportunities. Section 4.3 presents a theoretical framework to answer the question of why 
people cooperate and identify theoretically important variables and their hypothesized 
influence on cooperation. Section 4.4 presents the research methodology, including 
description of data types and collection methods and empirical framework. Results are 
presented and discussed in section 4.5 and finally section 4.6 presents a summary, conclusions 
and policy implications emerging from the study.  
4.2 The Need and Opportunities for Cooperation in the Lake Naivasha Basin
The Lake basin is located in the Kenyan Rift Valley at 0º30’ S-0055' and 360 09' E-
36024' E. The basin supports a vibrant commercial horticulture and floriculture industry, 
whose growth has accelerated greatly in the past two decades due to good climatic conditions 
and existing links to local and international markets for vegetables and cut flowers. The 
industry promotes economic growth and livelihood support in the basin by offering 
employment and income opportunities and engagement of small holder farmers in out-grower 
schemes. Further, the basin supports tourism, fisheries, and pastoral and small holder 
subsistence food production. Irrigated floriculture occupies about 5025 ha around the Lake 
(Reta 2011) while small scale farms occupy approximately 210,000 ha, with an average 2.5 ha 
per farm household. 
Expansion of crop land into fragile areas such as steep-slopes and riparian land has been 
identified as a major cause of increased soil erosion leading to siltation/sedimentation in the 
water bodies (Becht 2007; Stoof-Leichsenring et al. 2011). Sediment  yield in the lake has 
risen in the past 5 decades, from 1.3 tonnes ha-1 year-1 in 1947 to 8.9 tonnes ha-1 year-1 in 2006 
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(Stoof-Leichsenring et al. 2011) a trend that has been attributed to anthropogenic influences. 
Although siltation has not caused an alarming impact on the lake depth, it has affected water 
quality through increased turbidity. This has in return had direct and indirect effects on water
quality limiting its use for human activities, fisheries, tourism and agriculture besides causing 
biodiversity loss (Willy et al. 2012). Over the same period, Kitaka et al. (2002) show that due 
to continuous nutrient (N and P) deposition, the Lake has degraded into a eutrophic status. 
Eutrophication and siltation cause poor light penetration, restricting water use for fisheries, 
drinking and recreation. Poor light penetration associated with eutrophication is also 
responsible for extinction of benthic flora (Macrophytes) which were an important component 
of the ecosystem (Becht 2007). 
Expansion of agriculture has also had a negative impact on the quantity of water resources 
in the basin. Becht & Harper (2002) demonstrate the impact of water abstractions on the Lake 
level. Their model shows a deviation of observed lake level from the simulated level since the 
onset of intensive flower industry around the Lake in the early 1980’s and estimated a drop in 
the long term average Lake level by 3-4 M as a result of abstractions. This observation is 
echoed by a number of other studies who confirm the string linkages between the long term 
equilibrium in water levels and anthropogenic effects (see for example Becht & Harper 2002; 
Mpusia 2006; Yihdego 2005). Given that the water users share a common pool resource in the 
form of ground water aquifers and surface water reservoirs, over-abstraction by one user is 
definitely likely to impose an externality to the other water users. Also, water over-abstraction 
by upstream users may reduce the downstream flows therefore reducing the amount of water 
available to the downstream users. 
Addressing these agri-environmental externalities has been an institutional challenge 
in the research area. The nature of the problem implies that any institutional innovation that   
addresses the upstream-downstream dimensions of the problem will be beneficial for the 
environment in the Lake and for the growers around the Lake. Since there are no possibilities 
to enforce measures on upstream users that are beneficial to downstream users and because 
there exists significant barriers to bargaining between downstream and upstream resource 
users, any measures implemented to mitigate the negative impacts must be win-win (see
Willy et al. 2012) . Mitigating negative externalities emanating from upstream activities is 
obviously at the interest of the downstream farmers. Also, if the measures are win-win, then 
they may also be in the self-interest of small-holder cooperatives in the upper catchment.
Undertaking them through collective action further improves efficiency and creates 
Chapter 4:  Assessment of the Potential for Agri-Environmental Cooperation 
61
substantial private and social benefits. This approach therefore creates a link between the 
environmental problems at the lake and the collective action in the catchment that is not 
directly aimed at improving lake water quality or availability.
However, cooperation by individuals is conditional on availability of opportunities to 
cooperate in the community. In the Lake Naivasha Basin, opportunities to cooperate have 
been created through community water projects (CWPs), Water resource Users Associations 
(WRUAs) and community based organizations (CBOs). These collective community 
initiatives have been organizing various activities which required the participation of 
community members. Table 4. 1 presents information on the main activities that were 
organized in different sub-catchments. These activities are used later to assess the tendencies 
of households to cooperate based on their participation in these activities. 
Table 4. 1: Opportunities for cooperation in the Lake Naivasha basin 
WRUA
Activities  organized in the community requiring cooperation
Construction of 
soil conservation 
structures
Communal 
tree planting
Communal 
water 
management
Construction of 
community 
facilities
Maintenance 
of access 
roads
Kianjogu  X ü ü ü ü
Lower Malewa   X ü X X X
Middle Malewa    ü ü ü X ü
Upper Malewa  ü ü ü ü ü
Mkungi Kitiri X ü ü X ü
Upper Gilgil  X ü X X ü
Upper Turasha  X ü ü ü X
Wanjohi  ü ü ü ü ü
ü Means that the activity was organized in that particular WRUA
X   Means that the activity was not organized in that WRUA
The main communal soil conservation activities in the basin are construction of soil 
conservation structures and volunteer community tree planting. Soil erosion control structures 
include gabions and check dams at public areas such as road-sides and public land to prevent 
soil erosion and degradation of such areas. Communal tree planting is also aimed at 
reforestation of cleared public areas and sometimes on private land. Community water 
projects represent the most prominent form of collective action in the research area. 
Communities in most the WRUAs, especially those located close to the Aberdare forest 
established communal water distribution infrastructure which involved establishing a water 
intake point and setting up a water distribution piping  and storage system.  Collective action 
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was needed at the beginning when establishing the water distribution infrastructure. 
Cooperation is also necessary throughout to maintain the infrastructure and also to facilitate 
running of the water projects and monitoring and enforcement of rules. 
The quality of most rural access roads in the research area is poor, which greatly 
affects transportation of agricultural output from the farms and therefore increases transport 
costs for agricultural output. Maintaining such roads requires volunteering of manpower from 
community members. This is therefore one of the collective action activities organized 
occasionally in most WRUAs in the research area.   
4.3 Theoretical Framework, Variables and Hypotheses
4.3.1 The Theory of Collective Action: Why Do People Co-operate?
The understanding of why people cooperate or fail to cooperate in the provision of 
public goods has increased tremendously in the past decades. As we generally know it, co-
operation entails creation of collective benefits which are shared by all people involved 
regardless of their individual share in the costs of providing the benefits. Because of this 
nature of collective goods, everyone has an incentive to free ride on the efforts of others. 
However, if everyone free rides then the benefits are not produced and therefore there will be 
nothing to free ride on (King & Walker 1992). Given this fact, it is important for theory to 
answer the question of why people cooperate or fail to do so. This is synonymous to 
understanding why some individuals would overcome the temptation to pursue self interest 
goals while others would choose to free ride on the efforts of others. Individual cooperation 
may be viewed to be motivated by utility maximization, where each person’s utility depends 
on how they value the collective good (Reuben 2003). Given that each individual weighs out 
the costs and benefits of cooperating differently, a rational self interested individual will only 
cooperate if the marginal benefits of cooperating will equal the marginal costs (Reuben 2003). 
At the end, it is unlikely that rational individuals will generate outcomes that are socially 
optimal since individuals do not necessarily consider the interest of others in the group. This 
section highlights some important theoretical aspects that could help to explain the behavior 
of individuals in a collective dilemma. We identify the theoretical explanations to help 
explain the circumstances under which some individuals will cooperate while others defect. 
In the book ‘The Logic of Collective Action’,  Mancur Olson (1965) offers a clear 
explanation on  group and organizational behavior, showing when it will be at the best interest 
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of individuals to contribute individual efforts towards the provision of a collective good. 
Olson considers individuals engaged in the production of a collective good. In his model, the 
utility that each individual generates from the collective good is assumed to be depended on 
the total amount of the good produced. Further, the total amount of the collective good 
produced depends on the contribution from each individual. Olson identifies three conditions 
under which rational individuals will cooperate: (1) if there is substantial coercion, (2) if free 
riding is easily noticeable within the group and (3) when there are selective incentives. 
Coercion could either come from social pressure or a legal requirement. The ability to notice 
free riding depends on the extent to which each person’s actions are visible and are likely to 
affect the utility of others. If the group is too large to the extent that free riding can go un-
noticed then collective action is unlikely to occur. Visibility depends on (but is not limited to) 
the size of the group. Selective benefits on the other hand relate to the question of whether the 
group offers additional incentives to its members that would not be available to non-members. 
According to Olson, there will be no substantial participation in collective action unless 
members are enticed with such selective benefits (p51). However, Olson (1965) also 
recognizes the possibility of having a privileged group. In a privileged group, one individual 
or small group of individuals is willing to bear disproportionately larger share of the cost of 
providing a collective good. This could be because they receive higher utility from the 
collective good compared to the rest. A good example would be a wealthy resident in a 
neighbourhood who sole-handedly invests in a security or street lighting system, which also 
benefits all the neighbours who do not necessarily incur any cost.
4.3.2 Other Theoretical Considerations on Collective Action 
Although Olson’s theory greatly improved the understanding on cooperation in 
collective good situations, it did not offer answers to all theoretical questions relating to 
explaining why collective action emerges and understanding the behavior of individuals in a 
collective goods situation. It has emerged from a number of other studies that Olson’s model 
can only explain some groups but may fail to explain why collective action emerges even in 
the absence of coercion and selective benefits.   
Oliver (1984) finds that sometimes people will be willing to cooperate if no one else 
is willing to cooperate. This indicates that either there are some altruistic individuals in the 
society who will be willing to take the burden of providing a public good even when no one 
else is willing to do so or some individuals value the collective good more than others. 
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Studying cooperation in interest groups, King &Walker (1992) find that people are likely to 
cooperate if they are mobilizing against a collective bad that would threaten a common good. 
If individuals are convinced that a collective bad (or an externality) is a common threat, they 
will be willing to self organize towards solving the problem and protect group interests. The 
study draws a sharp contradiction to the selective incentives condition by Olson (1965).
Rather, King & Walker (1992) conclude that under certain circumstances, the collective 
action dilemma can be overcome without necessarily having the groups provide pure private 
goods to individual members. 
Another framework developed by Hagedorn et al. (2002) introduces the premise that 
the attributes of individuals and the transactions emanating from their activities are important 
in situations involving agri-environmental cooperation. The objectives of actors, their 
resource endowments, value systems, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions play a major role in 
determining their willingness and ability to cooperate with others and comply with 
collectively established rules  (Hagedorn et al. 2002). Physical, social and human resources 
facilitate cooperation since they enable individuals to access information, power and social 
networks which help them to safeguard their interests, whether collective or individual. 
Ostrom & Ahn (2009) also emphasize the importance of social capital in emergence 
and success of collective action. Individual social capital will enable individuals to establish 
trust and credible commitments which help to overcome collective dilemmas. Gillinson 
(2004) looks at social capital as both a private and a public good because establishing social 
networks helps individuals to benefit both privately and collectively. For example, social 
networks help people to access employment and business opportunities and at the same time 
build trust that may be very important for collective action in a community. 
The position of an individual in a cooperation situation will also influence their 
incentives to cooperate or defect. Position could either be physical location or social status. 
Physical location influences the exposure of an individual to an externality and therefore 
determines the expected benefits from cooperation.  For example in a basin, those upstream 
discharge pollutants on rivers hence inflicting harm on those downstream while the actions of 
those downstream do not affect those upstream (Quiggin 2001; Van Oel et al. 2009).
Exposure and vulnerability to externalities therefore depends on the position of individual 
farms within the basin. Those extremely downstream may have the highest impacts while 
those upstream will have to bear the highest abatement costs.  Those downstream are facing 
two different kinds of incentives. On the one hand, if those upstream undertake any efforts 
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there is an incentive for those downstream not to engage in cooperation and free ride. On the 
other hand, since they are the ones exposed to more harm, they have an incentive to cooperate 
towards reducing the harm and also to initiate cooperation whereas those upstream under 
certain circumstances may not have incentives to initiate. However, as discussed earlier, if 
cooperation creates a win-win such that there are also selective benefits, then the upstream 
users may have an incentive to initiate a cooperation so as to solve their own prisoners’ 
dilemma. Positions in terms of social status might also influence participation. Opinion 
leaders and other influential individuals in a community have a higher level of social coercion 
that will prompt them towards cooperation. 
Finally, property rights are important in natural resources situations (Meinzen-Dick & 
Di Gregorio 2004). Particularly, the degree to which rights over nature components (land for 
example) are decentralized will affect the motivation to participate in collective initiatives by 
farmers (Hagedorn 2008). This is so because whether collective action is necessary or not 
may depend on the nature of property rights. For instance collectively owned resources will 
be better managed through collective action.
In the next section the key variables influencing cooperative behavior among 
individuals and their hypothesized signs are identified and explained.   
4.3.3 Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses   
The degree of participation in collective action is likely to be influenced by both 
endogenous and exogenous factors. In Table 4.2 the variables that are important determinants 
of individual participation in collective action are listed and will therefore be used in the
analysis. These factors are grouped into seven categories and discussed below.   
4.3.3.1 Expected Benefits from Cooperation 
Individuals are expected to participate in collective activities if the benefits of 
participation exceed the costs of engaging in such cooperation. As argued by Olson, (1965)
direct economic benefits are likely to encourage individuals to participate in collective 
initiatives. The benefits that someone expects are likely to be determined by either the nature 
of activities that they are engaged in or their location in the watershed. For example, farmers 
who are located at the extreme upstream are not likely to be exposed to externalities compared 
to those midstream and downstream (White & Runge 1994). The theoretical prediction is that 
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those who stand to gain more are the ones who have the greatest incentives to cooperate.  
Therefore, in the absence of other incentives, upstream farmers will be more likely to defect 
than cooperate with those downstream while those midstream and downstream have highest 
incentives to cooperate. It is therefore hypothesized that households located upstream are less 
likely to cooperate. 
However, if such cooperation will yield other benefits, then individuals will cooperate 
regardless of their position.  Cooperation will be win-win if through cooperation individuals 
are likely to access selective private benefits, some of which might not be necessarily direct 
incentives from the group. For example if cooperation is likely to enhance the capacity of the 
household to generate private income, then cooperation will be the most attractive strategy. 
The following variables are hypothesized to have an influence on the cooperative behavior of 
individuals: the slope of the farm (SLOPE), whether a household is practicing irrigation or not
(IRR), location of a farm within a watershed (HHLOC) and ownership of a borehole/well
(BHOLE). Farms on steep slopes are more vulnerable to erosion. Therefore, since cooperation 
is viewed as a way of improving the conservation of individual farms and therefore generating 
individual benefits, farmers on such farms are more likely to cooperate. Farmers engaging in 
soil conservation to minimize siltation will also improve the quality of their land and 
consequently their crop yields. In the same way, farmers who engage in soil fertility 
management practices such as crop rotation and mixed cropping also end up saving their 
fertilizer costs while improving yields and reducing water pollution from nutrients.  
Ownership of a borehole indicates that the household has managed to solve its water scarcity 
problems privately and therefore stands to benefit less by co-operating with others especially 
in matters to do with communal water provision. Therefore this variable is hypothesized to 
have a negative effect on co-operation.  
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Table 4. 2: Factors hypothesized to influence cooperation
Variable 
name
Explanatory variable Measure 
Hypothesiz
ed effect on 
cooperation
LANDTEN Holds land title deed Dummy (1=Yes) +
IRR Practicing irrigation Dummy (1=Yes) +
SLOPE Farm located in extremely sloping area Dummy (1=Yes) +
HHEDUC Household education Years +
EXTN Perceives externality exists Dummy (1=Yes) +
OFFARM Engagement in off farm activity Dummy (1=Yes) -
ASSET Value of assets owned Index (0-1) -
COPBEN Perception that cooperation is beneficial Dummy (1=Yes) +
HHSIZE Household size Number +
TAMK Distance to nearest tarmak road Kms +
AWARE Awarenes of government water rules Dummy (1=Yes) +
CRITZ Believe that defectors will be criticized Dummy (1=Yes) +
TRUST Trusts other community members Dummy (1=Yes) +
EXCH Exchanged farm inputs previously Dummy (1=Yes) +
PEERMON Existence of community peer monitoring Dummy (1=Yes) +
SCARC Perception that water scarcity is a problem Dummy (1=Yes) +
HHLOC Location of the household Dummy (1=Extreme Upstream ) -
BHOLE Owns borehole/well Dummy (1=Yes) -
COMME Proportion of marketed output Number (0-1) +
4.3.3.2 Household Capital Endowment 
The level of capital that a household is endowed with will facilitate formation and 
running of agri-environmental cooperation. Capital is important since it helps individuals to 
overcome transaction costs associated with many agricultural externalities (Lubell et al. 
2002). Two types of capital were considered in the current study as explanatory variables:  
level of education (HHEDUC) representing human capital and total assets owned (ASSET) 
representing physical capital. Physical assets   are hypothesized to have an inverted U shaped 
relationship with cooperation. The very poor households may not raise the basic resources 
needed for cooperation but as wealth increases, households may tend to be more cooperative. 
However, the relative importance of potential benefits accruing from cooperation may decline 
with an increase in wealth and therefore at very high assets values cooperation will decline 
(White & Runge 1994). Finally, human capital was captured through education is
hypothesized to be positively correlated with   cooperation. Education facilitates access to 
information and therefore enhancing people’s prospects to cooperate with others.
Social capital is an important concept which incorporates density of social networks, 
the degree of social participation, trustworthiness and norms (Putnam 2000). Social capital 
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has been identified as a key determinant of cooperation within communities. As Janssens 
(2007) and Ostrom & Ahn (2009) social capital is important for collective action since it 
enhances the propensity of individual to cooperate. Social participation which involves 
membership and active participation in community groups enhances formation of social
networks. Social network externalities combined with trust enhance the ability of individuals 
to act collectively with others towards achieving a common goal. In the current study, social 
capital was not used as an explanatory variable. This was because most of the social capital 
indicators were also the same variables used in determining the cooperation tendencies. 
Because social capital also defines cooperation, social capital is highly endogenous and 
therefore was excluded from the explanatory variables. 
4.3.3.3 Trust and Reciprocity
Trust and trustworthiness are complementary to social capital in facilitating 
cooperation. According to Ostrom & Ahn (2009), trust is the fundamental link between social 
capital and collective action. Trust is usually enhanced when trustworthy individuals network 
with one another and they exist within a society where there is fairness in rewarding good 
behavior and punishing deviance. The level of trust that farmers have on people from both 
within and outside the community will determine their willingness to cooperate with them at 
landscape level towards joint provision of ecosystem services. Trust and norms of reciprocity 
and history of credible commitments between members of a community lowers the cost of 
cooperation, making establishment of agri-environmental cooperation easier. Reciprocity 
creates assurance that others will return a kind gesture in future and is based on trust. Trust 
and faith in the local leadership also creates an assurance that appropriation of benefits will be 
done in a way that ensures equity and fairness.
4.3.3.4 Property Rights Institutions 
Theory has established that security of tenure has a profound effect on investment in 
natural resources improvement. Land tenure is usually seen as an assurance that individuals 
can appropriate benefits from their long term investment on land (Kabubo-Mariara et al.
2010; Shiferaw & Holden 2001). In the same way, investment of individual resources in 
community cooperation and collective action is likely to be influenced by the security of 
tenure. Individuals will be hesitant to make social investment in community initiatives if they 
Chapter 4:  Assessment of the Potential for Agri-Environmental Cooperation 
69
are not assured that they will be able to appropriate their benefits in the future. Therefore in 
the current study it is hypothesized that security of tenure on land is positively correlated with 
cooperation. 
4.3.3.5 Attitudes and Perceptions
Attitudes and perceptions reflect people’s social constructs about situations and are 
likely to reflect their behavior and influence their tendencies to cooperate with others. 
Cooperation may be either a consequence or a determinant of attitudes and perceptions. For 
instance, perceptions on potential benefits from cooperation may be a pulling factor towards 
cooperation (Yaffee 1998). Conversely, once individuals are involved in cooperation, they 
form attitudes about their fellow members which may help to further strengthen the 
cooperation or break it.  All the different measures of attitudes and perceptions listed in
Table 4. 2 are hypothesized to have a positive effect on cooperation. Successful agri-
environmental cooperation will only occur if there is an existing well defined environmental 
good and service or bad. However, unless these externalities are perceived by those involved 
to be a real problem, then cooperation around such problems will be unlikely to succeed.  
Unless the participants feel that there is a well defined ecosystem service there will be no 
motivations for participation. For instance, downstream victims, who are also potential 
beneficiaries from the ecosystem services to be generated through cooperation, will only be 
willing to cooperate with upstream actors if they perceive that the action of those upstream 
inflicts a damage on them that warrants action.
Social sanctions are also important as mechanisms for enforcing local institutions. 
Therefore, the extent to which the community members believe in the effectiveness of peer 
monitoring and social sanctioning mechanisms will drive them towards or away from 
cooperation. To capture this, respondents were asked to respond to the statement: ‘‘How is it 
likely that those who do not participate in communal activities will be criticized?’’.
Perceptions on whether it is beneficial to participate in collective action activities and whether
water scarcity is a problem were also considered and hypothesized to have a positive 
correlation with cooperation. 
Chapter 4:  Assessment of the Potential for Agri-Environmental Cooperation 
70
4.3.3.6 Communication, Information Sharing and Transaction Costs 
Successful agri-environmental cooperation will depend on the existence of 
mechanisms for communication and information sharing. In many situations involving 
common pool resources and public goods, establishing effective solutions is usually hindered 
by high information asymmetry and transaction costs. Cooperation facilitates communication 
and therefore minimizes information asymmetry through screening, signaling and self 
selection conditions associated with group memberships (Brouwer et al. 2002). Local 
cooperation for the environment also helps to  facilitate cost effective information gathering 
from locals who usually have substantial knowledge about local resources that can be used to 
enhance their management (Hodge & McNally 2000).  
Cooperation may also help individuals achieve goals collectively in cases where 
individual solutions would involve huge costs. Individuals who are likely to be faced by high 
proportional transaction are also more likely to cooperate so as to overcome the challenge. For 
example, farmers who are faced by poor road quality are likely to face difficulties while 
marketing their commodities. Therefore they have an incentive to cooperate since such 
cooperation is likely to generate private benefits. Road accessibility and quality has commonly 
been used as a proxy for proportional transaction costs (for example see Vakis et al. 2003). In 
the current study, the distance to the nearest tarmac road was used as a measure for road 
quality and therefore a proxy for proportional transaction costs. Access to information was 
captured using awareness of at least one government rule (AWARE) on water management as 
a proxy. Both variables were hypothesized to have a positive correlation with cooperation.
4.4 Data and Empirical Framework 
4.4.1 Data 
The current study utilizes primary data that was collected through a household survey 
conducted among 30712 households in the Lake Naivasha basin in April-July, 2011. A 
multistage stratified random sampling procedure was used to select households included in 
the sample. In the first stage, 8 Water Resource Users Associations (WRUAs) were 
purposively selected forming the sampling strata. For each stratum a sampling frame was 
generated with the help of WRUA officials and village elders. A random sample of 
households was then drawn from each WRUA, proportional to size. A semi-structured 
interview schedule was then administered through personal interviews with household heads 
12 However, seven cases were regarded as outliers in the cluster analysis and therefore were dropped from the 
logistic regression analysis.
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and/or their spouses as respondents. A semi-structured and pretested interview schedule was 
administered through face-to-face interviews on the household heads and/or their spouses.  
During the survey, respondents were asked questions with regard to their previous 
participation in activities organized at community level and requiring participation from 
community members. Data was also captured on their individual attributes such as socio-
economic attributes, capital endowments (physical, natural, social and human capital), 
perceptions and attitudes. The household data was complemented by information gathered 
during focus group discussions involving key informants drawn from each WRUA.
4.4.2 Empirical Framework 
4.4.2.1 The Two Step Cluster Analysis Approach
Cluster analysis is an approach that groups similar items together based on 
information contained in the data on characteristics of the subjects. Observations are allocated 
into groups such that statistical association is high within a group but low across the groups
(Mooi & Sarstedt, 2011). Cluster analysis was used to assess the tendencies to cooperate or 
defect among sampled farmers in the Lake Naivasha basin. The first step in this process was 
to select ideal variables that would be used in clustering. Since the objective was to cluster 
households based on their co-cooperativeness, variables which captured previous participation 
of households in activities involving voluntary contribution to collective efforts were used. 
The different forms of participation indicated in Table 4.1 were considered in selecting the
variables. In most rural areas, collective action may not be a solution to a single problem but 
rather solves different problems for different people (White & Runge 1994). To avoid 
assigning individual to the wrong category, the availability of cooperation opportunities 
within each WRUA was also considered so that those who did not participate in a certain 
activity because it was simply not organized within their locality were not regarded as 
defectors. 
After selecting the variables, selection of a clustering method was necessary. The two 
step cluster analysis procedure developed by Chiu et al. (2001) was preferred over other 
traditional clustering methods since it is the most appropriate method when there are both 
categorical and continuous variables among the clustering variables. The two step cluster 
analysis is an explorative tool that can help to reveal natural groupings that would otherwise 
not be apparent (IBM Corp. 2012). Using this procedure, the sampled households were 
clustered into cooperators and defectors. The Cluster analysis results were validated by 
Chapter 4:  Assessment of the Potential for Agri-Environmental Cooperation 
72
splitting the data into two and carrying our cluster analysis on each data segment to see if the 
results were similar.  Further, cluster analysis is usually sensitive to the ordering of the data. 
To control for the possible ordering bias, the data was sorted by the last digit in ascending 
order. 
4.4.2.2 The Logistic Regression Model 
Having assigned every respondent to either the cooperators’ or defectors’ category,   
the next task was to identify a model that could be used to assess the influence of different 
covariates on the cooperative behavior of the sampled households. Given that the dependent 
variable is binary in nature the logistic model was chosen. A logistic model is used to model 
the choice between two discrete alternatives. It is assumed that the choice to cooperate or to 
defect is based on a latent variable, which represents the utility difference between 
cooperating and defecting. The utility difference is assumed to be dependent on the benefits 
expected from cooperation and other individual characteristics. For every individual the utility 
difference between cooperation and defection is represented by equation (4.1) (Verbeek 
2012): 
ݕ௜כ = ݔ௜ᇱߚ + ߝ௜ (4.1)
where ݕ௜כ is the unobserved latent variable representing the utility difference between 
cooperation and defection, ݔ௜ are the observed characteristics, ߚ is a vector of regression 
coefficients and ߝ௜ are the unobserved characteristics which are independent of all xis.  What 
can be observed however is the decision to cooperate (ݕ௜) such that ݕ௜ = 1 if an individual 
cooperates or ݕ௜ = 0 otherwise. An individual will choose to cooperate if  ݕ௜כ exceeds a 
threshold level, say 0 such that:   
ݕ௜ = ൜1 ݂݅ ݕ௜כ > 00 ݂݅ݕ௜כ ൑ 0  (4.2)
The general form of the logit model can therefore be given by: 
ܲ[ݕ௜ = 1|ݔ௜] = ܩ(ݔ௜,ߚ) (4.3)
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where ܩ(ȉ) is the standard logistic distribution function which takes values between 0 and 1 
(Verbeek 2012). Equation (4.3) can be re-written in terms of odds ratios as shown in equation 
(1.4):  
݈݋݃ ݌௜1െ ݌௜ = ݔ௜ᇱߚ ݋ݎ ݌௜1െ ݌௜ = ݁ݔ݌(ݔ௜ᇱߚ) (4.4)
where pi is the probability of observing the outcome ݕ௜ = 1 (cooperation) and pi /1-pi is the 
odds ratio which is equivalent to Exponentiated coefficients. The odds ratio can be interpreted 
as the number of times by which the odds of the outcome ݕ௜ = 1 will be higher than the odds 
of the outcome ݕ௜ = 0 (defection) if the jth predictor increases by one unit.  However, to see 
the effect of an explanatory variable on the probability of being a co-operator (݌௜), the 
marginal effects are estimated. From equation (4.4) we can solve for the probability pi
yielding the equation: 
݌௜ = exp (ݔ௜ᇱߚ)1 + exp (ݔ௜ᇱߚ) (4.5)
The marginal effects are estimated by taking derivatives of (4.5) with respect to xi. The 
average marginal effects are preferred over the usual marginal effects computed at means. 
The marginal effects at means are criticized for the following reasons: (a) in ideal situations, 
no individual is likely to have mean values for all covariates, (b) for categorical variables, 
means are not an appropriate measure of central tendency, and (c) this approach computes 
effects for only one set of values, the means. To overcome these shortcomings, Average 
marginal effects (AMEs) are used. Average marginal effects are generated by computing a 
marginal effect for each individual and then averaging all the computed effects. The empirical 
formulation of the model used in the analysis was: 
ܥܱܱ ௜ܲ = ߚଵܵܮܱܲܧ + ߚଶܥܱܲܤܧܰ + ߚଷܪܪܧܦܷܥ + ߚସܪܪܵܫܼܧ + ߚହܮܣܰܦܶܧܰ+ ߚ଺ܲܧܧܴܯܱܰ + ߚ଻ܱܨܨܣܴܯ + ߚ଼ܥܴܫܼܶ + ߚଽܪܪܮܱܥ + ߚଵ଴ܫܴܴ+ ߚଵଵܵܥܣܴܥ + ߚଵଶܣܹܣܴܧ + ߚଵଷܧܺܶܰ + ߚଵସܶܣܯܭ + ߚଵହܤܪܱܮܧ+ ߚଵ଺ܧܺܥܪ + ߚଵ଻ܥܱܯܯܧ + ߚଵ଼ܣܵܵܧܶ + ߚଵଽܴܷܶܵܶ+ ߝ௜
(4.6)
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COOP was the dependent variable taking the value of 1 if individual i was a co-operator and 0 
if a defector. The explanatory variables are as described in Table 4. 2. Equation (4.6) was 
estimated using logistic command in STATA 12 after which the average marginal effects 
were obtained using the margins post estimation command.
4.5 Results and Discussions 
4.5.1 Cluster Analysis Results: Cluster Membership
Using cluster analysis, each household was categorized either as a cooperator or a 
defector. Cooperators are individuals who voluntarily contribute to community collective 
efforts towards achieving shared goals regardless of what others do. Defectors on the other 
hand are individuals who despite the existence of opportunities to cooperate choose not to 
abide by the rules of cooperation but free ride on the efforts of others. 
Cluster analysis results indicate that there were 181 households (60.3%) in the 
defectors category and 119 (39.7%) in the cooperators category. The cooperative behavior 
differed spatially across the WRUAs. The highest cooperation rates were found in Upper 
Turasha and Upper Malewa WRUAs while defection was more among households in Lower 
Malewa and Upper Gilgil WRUAs (߯ଶ =49.35, p<0.001).  
Table 4. 3 presents percentages of households in each of the category based on the 
variables used to the generate clusters. Note that the percentages in the table should be 
compared horizontally. Chi-square (߯ଶ) statistic was used to test the null hypotheses that the 
percentages of individuals in the two categories are not statistically different. For most of the 
variables, the null hypotheses were strongly rejected and therefore there are significant
differences in the percentage of individuals falling under the two categories. 
The households in the cooperators category are those who participated in all activities 
that were organized in the community that required communal participation in terms of 
contribution of household time and finances. On average the cooperators spend 37.1 
(SD=60.83) hours on communal activities ranging from 1 to 384 hours within 2010. 
Cooperators made an average financial contribution of Kshs. 1,152 ranging from zero 
contribution to Kshs. 11,000. As shown in Table 3 group membership and membership in 
Water Resource User Associations (WRUAs) was dominated by cooperators while 
membership in community water projects (CWPs) was dominated by defectors. About 55% of 
all those who indicated membership in WRUAs were cooperators while 51.4% of CWPs
members were defectors. Despite this dominance in CWP membership, defectors did not 
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participate in any of the activities that required voluntary contribution; neither did they 
contribute finances towards collective initiatives. A large percentage of the households in the 
defectors category showed incidences of free riding. For example none of the defectors had
participated in a water related communal activity that is required for all CWP members. Also, 
only 62% of the defectors had made financial contributions towards communal water 
management activities. Majority of those who had exchanged planting materials with other 
farmers were defectors. Exchange of planting materials is based on the expectation that 
individual efforts will be reciprocated by their exchange partners. Defectors also had majority 
of the group memberships (58.2% against 41.8% of cooperators). Membership in groups such 
as rotating savings and credit associations (commonly called Merry-Go-Round) are also based 
on reciprocate assurance since they are formed by people with close social ties and 
friendships and therefore once a member contributes their finances or time, they are assured 
that they will recover their contribution later or benefit in another way.
Table 4. 3: Attributes of cooperators and defectors
Defector Cooperator ߯ଶ statistic
WRUA membership No 75.3% 24.7% 29.72***
Yes 44.5% 55.5%
Financial contribution towards water management No 72.9% 27.1% 27.17***
Yes 46.9% 53.1%
Time commitment towards communal activities None 100% 0.0% 300.01***
Moderate 0.0% 100.0%
High 0.0% 100.0%
Exchanged planting materials with other farmers No 71.4% 28.6% 2.03 
Yes 58.9% 41.1%
At least one household member has membership in a group No 65.5% 34.5% 191.03 
Yes 58.2% 41.8%
Membership in community water project No 81.1% 18.9% 23.19***
Yes 51.4% 48.6%
Participation in water related communal activity No 84.6% 15.4% 183.37***
Yes 0.0% 100.0%
Involvement in communal tree planting exercise No 66.5% 33.5% 46.972***
Yes 0.0% 100.0%
Involvement in communal soil conservation exercise No 61.6% 38.4% 9.312***
Yes 0.0% 100.0%
Involvement in construction of communal facility No 61.6% 38.4% 9.312***
Yes 0.0% 100.0%
Involvement in maintenance of communal access roads No 62.2% 37.8% 14.112***
Yes 0.0% 100.0%
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
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4.5.2 Determinants of the Probability of Being a Co-operator
Table 4. 4 presents the odds ratios and average marginal effects obtained using logistic   
regression model. Considering the model summary statistics and their significance levels 
given at the bottom of Table 4. 4, we can reject the null hypothesis that all the regression 
coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. The   McFadden’s pseudo R2 is 0.21 which is 
satisfactory. 
Table 4. 4: Odds ratios and marginal effects of determinants of tendencies to cooperate
Explanatory variable 
Odds Ratio Std. Err.
Average 
marginal 
effects
Std. Err.
Holds land title deed 1.12 0.347 0.02 0.056
Practicing irrigation 1.97** 0.690 0.12 0.062
Farm located in extremely sloping area 2.87** 1.415 0.19 0.086
Household education 1.17*** 0.063 0.03 0.009
Perceives externality exists 1.34 0.432 0.05 0.058
Engangement in off farm activity 1.03 0.426 0.01 0.074
Value of assets owned 0.21 0.279 -0.28 0.240
Perception that cooperation is beneficial 2.44*** 0.825 0.16 0.058
Household size 1.21*** 0.083 0.03 0.012
Distance to nearest tarmak road 1.00 0.038 0.00 0.007
Awarenes of government water rules 1.37 0.421 0.06 0.055
Believe that defectors will be criticized 2.52*** 0.953 0.17 0.066
Trusts other community members 2.46** 0.973 0.16 0.069
Enganged in exchange of inputs 1.19 0.550 0.03 0.083
Existence of community peer monitoring 1.49 0.471 0.07 0.056
Perception that water scarcity is a problem 1.50 0.448 0.07 0.053
Location of the household 2.29*** 0.774 0.15 0.058
Owns borehole/well 0.84 0.341 -0.03 0.073
Proportion of marketed output 0.38*** 0.207 -0.17 0.096
Model summary statistics 
Number of observations 299
LR chi2(19) 82.84***
Log likelihood -159.56
Pseudo R2 0.21
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively
The average marginal effects are the values by which the probability of an individual 
being a cooperator increases or decrease when a continuous explanatory variable increases by 
one unit. For a dummy explanatory variable, the average marginal effect represents the effect 
of a discrete change of an explanatory variable from 0 to 1. On the other hand, the odds ratios 
represent the multiplicative factor of the odds of being a defector relative to that of being a 
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cooperator when an explanatory variable increases by one unit.  For example, an odds ratio of 
1.2 associated with the household size variable implies that with an increase of household size 
by one person, the odd ratio of being a cooperator will be 1.2 times higher than that of being a 
defector. That implies that an increase in household size makes someone more likely to be a 
cooperator. 
In Figure 4. 1 the average marginal affects presented in Table 4. 4 are graphed to 
visualize the relative importance of different covariates in predicting the probability of 
cooperation. The positive marginal effects are those that encourage cooperation while the 
negative ones are those that discourage cooperation. 
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively
Figure 4. 1: Graphical presentation of the AMEs of the unconditional cooperator model 
Eight covariates had a positive significant influence on the probability of being a 
cooperator while one had a negative significant influence. These factors can be placed in four 
distinct categories: household endowments, expected benefits, trust, attitudes and perceptions. 
In the first category, household size and average household education level had 
positive significant effects on the probability of being a cooperator. Household size represents 
labour availability and therefore households who have more labour resources have less labour 
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constraints and therefore can allocate part of their labour to cooperative initiatives. The 
average household level of education is a measure of human capital. Human capital enhances 
cooperation due to the skills that individuals acquire through education which enable them to 
engage with other parties in the community. However, the fact that households who lack 
substantial skills  tend to defect has the intuitive implication that cooperation may fuel 
marginalization and benefits associated with cooperation may accrue to those who are already 
better off as also observed by Lubell et al. (2002). Our results fail to reject the hypothesis that 
the trust that an individual has on other community members enhances cooperation.  Since 
trust is the thread that ties people together, if an individual has high trust on fellow community 
members, then they will have confidence in the good will of others and will be assured that 
others will keep their part of the agreement in the cooperation. Trust makes cooperation easier 
since it minimizes transaction costs that people may incur when searching for credible 
cooperation partners and also reduces the need for costly enforcement since individuals 
depend on credible commitments established through previous experiences with others. Our 
results are in agreement with those of previous studies such as those of Baland & Platteau 
(1996). 
In the expected benefits category, three variables had a positive significant effect on 
the probability of being a cooperator. Households who were practicing irrigation in the Lake 
Naivasha were more likely to cooperate. Water for irrigation can be seen as a selective benefit 
that only water project members can access, therefore an individual is likely to benefit 
privately through cooperating with others. Therefore there is an incentive for irrigators to 
participate in collective action so as to maintain a flow of these benefits. Farmers who have 
alternative access to water for example through ownership of a private borehole or well were 
found to be less likely to cooperate. However, the effect of this factor was insignificant. The 
slope of the farm had a positive significant effect on cooperation confirming our hypothesis.
Extreme slope makes cooperation attractive since the expected benefits from cooperation are 
higher. It could also be that in such areas, the problem of extreme soil erosion is more visible 
and therefore farmers in these areas will be willing to cooperate to solve the common 
problem. Our results strongly reject the hypothesis that farmers located upstream are likely to 
defect. A possible explanation to this finding is that since most cooperation generates other 
selective benefits, this is a win-win for the farmers located in extreme upstream and therefore 
an incentive for them to cooperate. Being located in the extreme upstream WRUAs also 
implies that the households are closer to the sources of rivers from where most community 
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water projects have their points of common water intake. Therefore, by virtual of it being 
technically easier to tap water and distribute among its members without additional pumping 
costs makes it attractive to cooperate and establish a common water distribution system. 
Cooperation may further be boosted by the fact that most of extremely upstream households 
are also located in extremely sloped areas. 
Two variables representing attitudes and perceptions were found to significantly 
influence cooperation.  For obvious reasons, individuals who perceived that participating in 
communal activities is beneficial were also more likely to cooperate. The second factor was 
the belief that those who defect are likely to face social ridicule. Those who responded to the 
positive were found to be also more likely to cooperate. This result can be used to infer that 
informal constraints and internal sanctions such as fear of social exclusion and public ridicule 
are effective tools that facilitate cooperation in a society. These instruments work through 
guilt and fear of loss of self respect. However, their effectiveness will depend on the extent to 
which an individual identifies with others in the community (Bardhan 1993).
Finally, against our hypotheses, the proportion of marketed output had a negative 
influence on cooperation. This result implies that agricultural commercialization works 
against environmental cooperation in the research area. This could be explained by 
competition between different cooperation options in the community. Majority of the 
commercial farmers such as those engaged in production of export crops and other high value 
commodities such as dairy indicated that they had memberships in farmer groups and 
cooperatives. Therefore, it could be that their engagement in enterprise specific cooperation 
prevented them from participating in environmental cooperation.  
4.6 Summary, Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The objectives of this study were twofold. First the study sought to identify the 
cooperative behavior of sample households in the Lake Naivasha basin by assessing their 
degree of participation in activities involving voluntary provision of public goods in the 
community. Second, the study sought to identify the factors that make some individuals to 
either be cooperate or defect when required to participate in community collective initiatives. 
The first objective was achieved through a two step cluster analysis procedure which was 
used to identify the category where each household belonged to given the observed previous 
degree of participation. Logistic regression was then used to identify the factors determined 
the probability of cooperation. 
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Results indicate that majority of the sampled households in the Lake Naivasha basin 
were defectors (61%). In line with theoretical expectations free riding was the dominant 
strategy in the Lake Naivasha basin case study just like in any other prisoner’s dilemma 
situation. This is because self interested iindividuals tend to pursue strategies which seem to 
yield higher individual expected pay-offs. However such decisions might not be socially 
optimal.  Results from the logistic regression model indicate that the choice of the decision to 
cooperate or defect was significantly influenced by expected benefits, human capital and 
labour endowments. Further, informal sanctions, norms of trust and attitudes/perceptions 
emerged as significant factors that are positively correlated with cooperation. These factors 
can be seen as catalysts that can be used to enhance cooperativeness and discourage defection 
in the study area and in other watersheds facing a similar challenge. 
From these results, a number of implications that are relevant for policy can be drawn.  
First, given that defection was the dominant strategy in the basin, there is need for strategies 
to encourage cooperation so as to address agri-environmental issues effectively in the Lake 
Naivasha basin or any other similar watershed. This will also help to achieve economies of 
scale in provision of ecosystem services. Second, perceptions of watershed farmers could be 
boosted through campaigns and community education programmes that help to create 
awareness on environmental externalities associated with agriculture. Farmers should be made 
aware of the relationship between conservation and the long term productivity of their land, so 
that they can perceive that cooperation for the environment also creates private benefits. 
Third, social sanctions can be encouraged by increased local participation in planning and 
resource management. This is a tool that should be used to achieve effective rule monitoring 
and enforcement at substantially low transaction costs. 
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CHAPTER FIVE
5 Estimating Returns to Multiple Soil Conservation Practices 
in Lake Naivasha Basin13
5.1 Introduction 
Land degradation is a major threat to agricultural productivity and food security in 
many developing countries (Bewket 2007; Kassie et al. 2008; Mazvimavi & Twomlow 2009). 
Land degradation is mainly attributed to inappropriate agricultural practices and other 
activities and processes that reduce the economic and ecological productivity of land (OECD 
2012). Soil erosion is one of such processes. Besides the on-site effect of reducing the 
productivity of land, soil erosion also causes off-site effects such as eutrophication and
siltation (Mbaga-Semgalawe & Folmer 2000). Soil erosion also threatens species in both 
terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems through the degradation and pollution of their habitats. Due 
to the myriad negative effects caused by soil erosion, soil conservation can undoubtedly 
generate both private and social benefits. Private gains emerge from increased crop 
productivity while social benefits emerge from better ecology and reduced water treatment 
costs, longer life of reservoirs, and many other benefits (Miller et al. 2008). For this reason, 
significant efforts have been made by governments and development agencies to promote soil 
and water conservation technologies among farmers in developing countries (Bekele 2005; 
Kassie et al. 2008). However, despite these efforts, the adoption of soil conservation practices 
has been below expectations (Khisa et al. 2007; van Rijn et al. 2012). This raises the question 
of whether and to what extent soil conservation practices can generate economic benefits 
substantial enough to motivate farmers into adopting and maintaining them.
Whether soil conservation practices are win-win has been an important research focus 
in the past, generating mixed findings. While some studies (for example Bekele, 2005; Kassie 
et al., 2008; Otsuki, 2010; Pender and Gebremedhin, 2007; Shively, 1998; Vancampenhout et 
al., 2006) conclude that  soil conservation practices help to enhance cropland productivity on 
degraded lands, other studies (for example Kassie et al., 2011 and Shiferaw and Holden 2001) 
found that under certain circumstances, some soil conservation   may not necessarily be ‘win-
13 This chapter is based on the paper: 
Willy, D.K., Zhunusova, E., Holm-Mueller, K., Forthcoming. Estimating Effects of Multiple Soil Conservation 
Practices on Crop Productivity: A Case Study of Smallholder Farmers in the Lake Naivasha Basin, 
Kenya. Land Use Policy (Revised manuscript submitted). 
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win’. What we observe from these studies is that evaluation of conservation practices should 
be context specific. On the one hand, if appropriately selected and given sufficient time, soil 
conservation practices (SCPs) are expected to reduce soil erosion rates, improve agricultural 
land quality and enhance crop yields (Lutz et al. 1994; Shively 1998).  On the other hand due 
to their land requirements soil conservation practices may lead to a decline in crop yields. 
Pagiola, (1994) finds that this was an important issue for the Kitui and Machakos regions of 
Kenya where he finds that the effective production area falls faster that the increase in yields 
therefore leading to an overall production decline.  From a private optimization point of view, 
adoption rates are likely to be low if costs exceed the benefits (Lutz et al.1994 ; Pagiola, 
1994). Farmers are particularly concerned with high labor and land requirements for 
implementation and maintenance of some soil conservation technologies since these resources 
are usually the most limiting among low-income farmers (Shiferaw & Holden 2001).
Due to the varied potential effects of soil conservation practices, it is necessary 
sometimes to combine multiple soil conservation technologies within the same farm so as to 
generate substantial benefits. However, literature on the assessment of complementary effect 
of multiple soil conservation practices (MSCPs) is currently scanty. 
In the current study it is hypothesized that implementing multiple soil conservation 
practices as a conservation package can generate substantial private benefits in-terms of 
higher crop productivity. Therefore, the research question that is explored here is whether the 
net value of crop production for farmers who have implemented multiple soil conservation 
practices are higher than those of the farmers who have not. This is motivated by the tenet that 
farmers are likely to sustain conservation practices on their farms partly if   benefits exceed 
costs (Shiferaw & Holden 2001). The main goal of this study is to estimate the  effect of 
implementing multiple soil conservation practices (MSCPs) on the value of crop production 
among smallholder farmers in the lake Naivasha basin, Kenya. This helps us to generate 
information that can be used in evaluating the returns to a soil conservation package as 
opposed to assessing returns to individual soil conservation practices. Six practices were 
considered in this study namely: Tree Planting, Fanya Juu Terraces, Grass Strips, Napier 
Grass, Contour farming and Cover crops.  The study uses Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
to analyze matched observations of farmers who have implemented multiple soil conservation 
practices and those who have not.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section summarizes previous 
research on returns to soil conservation practices. Section 5.3 then describes the methodology 
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employed in this study, including data collection and sampling methods and analytical 
techniques. Results and discussions are presented in section 5.4, while section 5.5 concludes 
and draws policy implications.
5.2 Literature on Returns to Soil Conservation Practices 
As has already been mentioned, despite the unanimous agreement in literature that 
most soil conservation technologies control erosion and generate off-site positive effects, such 
technologies remain poorly adopted14 in many developing countries (Khisa et al. 2007; Pretty 
et al. 1995; van Rijn et al. 2012). This state of affairs has been the driving force behind many 
government efforts to promote soil conservation and has also received substantial focus in 
research. Studies in this area have focused on assessing the effect of soil conservation 
practices on crop productivity using either econometric approaches (for example Bekele, 
2005; Kassie et al., 2008; Nyangena and Köhlin, 2009; Otsuki, 2010; Pender and 
Gebremedhin, 2007; Shively, 1998) or Cost Benefit Analysis(CBA) (for example Araya and 
Asafu-Adjaye, 1999; Ellis-Jones and Tengberg, 2000; Lutz et al., 1994; Posthumus and De 
Graaff, 2005; Shiferaw and Holden, 2001; Tenge, 2005). Regardless of the method used, most 
findings converge to one agreement that the effect of soil conservation on crop productivity is 
context specific and depends on various factors. The current study seeks to advance the debate 
by looking at how the combination of multiple soil conservation practices may influence the 
value of crop production. 
A study by Kassie et al. (2008) analyzed the impact of stone bunds on the value of 
crop production in Ethiopia and revealed that their effects on crop productivity differed with 
agro-ecological settings. Implementing stone bunds increased crop productivity in low rainfall 
areas whereas in the high rainfall areas this was not the case. Beside the agro-ecological 
conditions, studies conducted in Kenya by Nyangena and Köhlin (2009) and Otsuki (2010)
found that the erosion status of the farm was a major determinant of the effect of agro 
forestry, bunds and  terracing on crop productivity.  
A study by Araya and Asafu-Adjaye (1999) in Eritrea found that plots where stone and 
soil bunds, Fanya Juu terraces and double ditches were implemented yielded negative net 
present values (NPVs) . However, when the authors accounted for social benefits, the NPVs 
were positive, emphasizing on the fact that even when SCTs are not economically viable for 
14 There is however some exceptions found in literature. For example Pagiola & Dixon (1998) find high adoption 
rates in El-Salvador than it is commonly assumed.
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individual farmers, the net gain to the society can be positive. This finding is confirmed by 
Shiferaw and Holden (2001) who applied a different approach to Ethiopian small-holder 
farms  and concluded that SCPs only yielded positive benefits at very low discount rates. A 
similar study  conducted by Tenge (2005) among smallholder farmers in the West Usambara 
Highlands in Tanzania estimated the financial efficiency of bench terraces, Fanya Juu
terraces and Grass Strips and revealed that profitability of these SCPs depended on soil type, 
slope and opportunity costs of labor and farmers’ subjective discount rates. For instance, 
Fanya Juu terraces constructed on both moderate and steep slopes were economically viable 
only for farmers with low opportunity costs of labor, whereas farmers with high opportunity 
costs could only benefit from the practice if it was constructed on gentle slopes. Similarly, 
implementation of grass strips on steep slopes with both stable and unstable soils for farmers 
with high opportunity costs would yield negative NPVs and Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
below the market discount rate (Tenge 2005). However, soil erosion is often present on steep 
slopes with unstable soils that accelerate soil surface movement and run-off. Consequently, 
smallholder farmers with farms located on extremely sloped areas would need additional 
incentives to make soil conservation practices economically attractive for them. A study by 
Posthumus and De Graaff, (2005) among Peruvian farmers arrives at similar findings, and 
also finds the type of crop enterprise an important determinant of the profitability of soil 
conservation practices. 
Most of the studies highlighted here analyze soil conservation practices in isolation not 
taking into account the possible effect that may result from integrating more than one soil 
conservation practices in one farm/plot. Further, as Kassie et al., (2011), Kassie et al. (2008) 
and Shively, (1998) indicate, any analysis on the effect of  soil conservation practices on the 
value of crop production that ignores the presence of self selection may yield biased 
estimates. Self-selection problem arises because farmers are not randomly assigned to the 
groups of adopters and non-adopters, but they choose themselves to adopt a soil conservation 
technology based on their individual attributes which influence adoption behavior and the
attributes of their farm, and of the individual plots on their farm. Consequently the 
counterfactual effect, that is, the production level that farmers would have achieved had they 
not implemented multiple soil conservation practices is not observable (Kassie et al. 2011).  
Therefore, a mere comparison of the difference in crop productivity between implementers 
and non-implementers of multiple soil conservation technologies would yield biased estimates 
of the effect of MSCPs on crop production, because this effect is likely to be correlated with 
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farm- and farmer-specific unobserved characteristics (Shively 1998). Further, unobservable 
variables that simultaneously affect the technology choice variable (level of implementing 
multiple soil conservation practices) and the outcome variable (value of crop production) may 
cause hidden bias (Rosenbaum 2002). Following Kassie et al., (2008), the current study seeks 
to address the two problems by analyzing the effect of multiple soil conservation practices on 
the value of crop production using the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and exogenous 
switching regression approach. 
5.3 Methods, Data Types and Description of Variables
5.3.1Analytical Framework
This chapter utilized Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique to assess the effect 
of implementing multiple soil conservation practices on the value of crop production. 
Exogenous switching regression was then applied to check the robustness of the PSM results 
following Kassie et al., (2008).
5.3.1.1 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Technique
The idea of estimating propensity scores was initiated by Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
(1983) who proved that self-selection bias can be removed through adjustment using
propensity scores of treated and non-treated groups. The method has then found wide 
application in medical and economic research (Caliendo & Kopeinig 2008; Dehejia & Wahba 
2002) to address self-selection problems. Self-selection bias is likely in the current study 
because assignment of treatment (whether to implement multiple soil conservation or not) is
not random. Rather, individuals choose themselves to receive a treatment or not based on 
various farm- and farmer-specific characteristics, economic and institutional factors. 
Therefore, those who implement multiple soil conservation technologies might be 
systematically different from each other and from those who do not implement. To calculate 
the effect of soil conservation practices on crop productivity (treatment effect), this self-
selection problem has to be addressed (Kassie et al. 2008; Mendola 2007). PSM, which 
involves computation of a propensity score for each individual helps to achieve this objective. 
A propensity score is the conditional probability of taking a treatment given a vector of 
explanatory variables as indicated in equation (5.1) (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983).
݌(ݔ) = ܲݎ[ܦ = 1|ܺ = ݔ] (5.1)
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where p(x) is a propensity score, and Pr is the probability of implementing multiple soil 
conservation efforts (taking a treatment, D=1) conditional on the vector of observed 
covariates, x. In our case the dummy variable indicating the treatment effect takes the value of 
1 if a farmer has implemented at least two soil conservation practices and 0 if the farmer has
implemented only one soil conservation practice. The explanations on how the treatment 
variable was generated are offered in the next section.
A probit model was applied to estimate the predicted probabilities (propensity scores) 
of implementing multiple soil conservation efforts. The probit model is as specified in 
Equation (5.2) (Greene, 2003 and Verbeek, 2008):
Pr(ܦ = 1|ܺ) = ܩ(ݖ) = න ˗(ݖ)ܼ݀௑ᇲఉ
ିஶ
= Ȱ (ܺᇱߚ)
(5.2)
where ܩ(ݖ) is a function taking values between 0 and 1, ʣ(ݖ) is the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function, z is the vector of covariates and ˗(ݖ) is the standard normal 
density function. The probabilities were estimated using the method of maximum likelihood 
which maximizes the log-likelihood function:
ln ܮ = ෍ ݈݊ൣ1െĭ൫ ௜ܺƍߚ൯൧+ ෍ ݈݊ ĭ൫X୧ƍȕ൯
௬೔ୀଵ௬೔ୀ଴ (5.3)
The empirical probit model estimated is specified in Equation (5.4):
௜ܻכ = ௜ܺߚ௜ + ݑ௜ , ݑ௜~ܰ(0,1), ݅ = 1, … ,ܰ and ௜ܻ = ൜1 ݂݅ ௜ܻכ > 00 ݂݅ ௜ܻכ < 0 (5.4)
where ௜ܻכ is a latent variable representing the decision to implement multiple soil 
conservation practices and ௜ܻ is observed status of implementing multiple soil conservation 
technologies for each household, X is a matrix of explanatory variables which include farmer 
and farm characteristics, institutional and socio-economic factors, the ߚݏ are the parameters to 
be estimated and ݑ௜ is a normally distributed error term. 
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The predicted probabilities obtained by estimating equation (5.4) are used as 
propensity scores for matching the samples of implementers of multiple soil conservation 
practices and non implementers. After propensity score estimation, a matching algorithm to 
match each adopter with a non-adopter with similar propensity scores is used.  In this study, 
the nearest neighbor matching (NNM) method with caliper after imposing non replacement 
and common support conditions was used. A caliper or a tolerance level on the maximum 
propensity score distance allowed was imposed to improve the matching quality  (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig 2008).The no replacement condition - where every untreated observation is 
considered only once- was made to avoid an increase in the estimator variance that occurs 
when replacement is allowed. The common support condition implies that only comparable 
observations from the treated and non-treated groups are entered into the analysis, for which a 
researcher has to define the region of common support (Caliendo & Kopeinig 2008). The 
region of common support can be determined by excluding all observations among the control 
individuals whose values of the outcome variable are lower than the minimum value among 
the treated individuals or higher than the value of the outcome variable among the treated 
individuals (Dehejia & Wahba 2002).  All the observations that are outside the common 
support are excluded from the analysis. It was also necessary to check the balancing property 
of the sample, which ensures that households within the treated and control groups have 
similar propensity score, that is, they should have the same distribution of covariates 
(Mendola 2007). The balancing property shows how well the samples were matched 
(matching quality). In this study, the quality of matching was checked using the standardized 
bias method. This method calculates bias in mean differences of covariates for treated and 
control groups after matching. An average bias in mean difference less than 5% is considered 
tolerable (Caliendo & Kopeinig 2008). After estimating the propensity scores, the causal 
effect of multiple soil conservation on crop productivity can be calculated. This effect is 
called Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) and is represented as follows (Grilli & 
Rampichini 2011).
ܣܶܶ = ܧ[ܻ(1)െ ܻ(0)| ܦ = 1] (5.5)
where Y is the outcome variable on which the technology effect has to be estimated. In our 
case, this is the value of crop production per hectare. Y(1)|D=1 is the observed value of crop 
production for treated and Y(0)| D=1 indicates what would happen to the treated had they not 
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received the treatment (counterfactual). In reality, Y(0)| D=1 is not observed, so the best 
substitute - the control group of non-treated that are similar in distribution of covariates to the 
adopters is used (Mendola 2007). ATT is then calculated as the difference in outcome 
variables between groups of treated and non-treated that are matched according to their 
propensity to implement multiple soil conservation technologies. Thus, PSM ensures that the 
estimated technology effect is only due to the treatment and not because of other covariates by 
taking care of self-selection bias. However, the estimated treatment effect could have hidden 
bias as a result of unobserved heterogeneity. To test the sensitivity of the ATT to unobserved 
heterogeneity, the Rosenbaum, (2002) bounds test was used. The bounds test establishes the 
point at which the estimated results would no longer hold or in other words how the ATT is 
robust to unobserved heterogeneity.  PSM techniques might yield inconsistent estimates 
especially due to unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, to ensure consistency and robustness 
of the PSM results, exogenous switching regression as complementary method to PSM was 
used following Kassie et al (2008).
5.3.1.2 The Exogenous Switching Regression Model 
After running PSM, two samples are generated and used in estimating the exogenous 
switching regression models. One sample consists of treated individuals who are within the 
region of common support and for whom a match was found among the untreated individuals. 
The other sample consists of untreated individuals who are both on common support and are 
also matching those in the treated sample. In a switching regression model, the outcome 
equations depend on the regime, that is, the treatment condition. The general exogenous 
switching regression model can be described in equations (5.6-5.8).
݈݊ ௜ܼଵ = ௜ܹߚ௜ଵ + ݒ௜ଵ ( ݂݅ ௜ܻ = 1) (5.6)
݈݊ ௜ܼ଴ = ௜ܹߚ௜଴ + ݒ௜଴ ( ݂݅ ௜ܻ = 0) (5.7)
௜ܻכ = ܺߙ + ݑ௜ ܽ݊݀ ௜ܻ = ൜1 ݂݅ ௜ܻכ > 00 ݂݅ ௜ܻכ < 0  (5.8)
where ܼ௜ is the value crop production per ha for each household i, ௜ܹ is a vector of 
explanatory variables that are hypothesized to influence the value of crop production; ߚ௜ and 
ߙ are vectors of regression coefficients, and ݑ௜ and ݒ௜ are the random unobserved attributes. 
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Note that ௜ܻכ is the selection equation signifying whether a farmer has implemented MSCPs or 
not and is the same equation used in estimating propensity scores. The unobserved 
characteristics affecting ܼ௜ଵ (or ܼ௜଴) are uncorrelated with those affecting ௜ܻכ, that is, the error 
terms of the outcome equations are independent from those of the selection equation , hence 
the use of exogenous switching regression.
5.3.2 Description of Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics of dependent and explanatory variables used in 
the binary probit model that was used to estimate propensity scores.  Construction of the 
dependent variable was done considering the fact that most of the soil conservation practices
require certain time period and need to be implemented on substantial area of land for their 
effect on crop productivity to be visible. De Graaff et al. (2008) claimed that “actual 
adopters” are those farmers undertaking significant amount of efforts to conserve their land 
from degradation. The following composite criterion was developed and used to determine 
who qualified to be implementers of MSCPs and those who did not.
The first criterion was that each of the six soil conservation practices considered in the 
study must have been consistently implemented for at least 2 years. Second, the soil 
conservation practices must have been implemented at a substantial extent, a criteria also used 
by Willy and Holm-Mueller (2013) and third, a farmer will count as having implemented 
multiple soil conservation practices if (s)he had implemented two or more of the soil 
conservation practices. The choice of explanatory variables was based on literature review on 
adoption of soil conservation practices.  
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Table 5.1: Description of covariates used in generating propensity scores 
Variable Implementers of MSCPs
(N= 203)
Non implementers of 
MSCPs  (N=92)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Gender of household head (Male=1) 0.88 0.324 0.82 0.390
Age of household head (years) 56.55 13.908 52.07 13.821
Farm size (ha) 2.41 2.889 3.26 5.462
Square of farm size (ha) 14.12 50.206 40.16 172.597
Dummy for primary   education1 (1=Yes) 0.45 0.499 0.48 0.502
Dummy for secondary   education1 (1=Yes) 0.26 0.438 0.28 0.453
Dummy for post secondary  education1 (1=Yes) 0.06 0.245 0.03 0.179
Number of adults in the household 3.29 1.506 3.30 1.765
Dummy for attending training (1=Yes) 0.28 0.448 0.26 0.442
Distance to the river (Kms) 2.27 3.377 1.75 2.325
Household asset ownership (value) 0.37 0.120 0.31 0.114
Proportion of marketed output (%) 0.46 0.291 0.47 0.299
Perceives soil erosion as a problem in the region (1=Yes) 0.53 0.500 0.45 0.500
Dummy for cattle ownership (1=Yes) 0.95 0.217 0.87 0.339
Dummy for secure land tenure (1=Yes) 0.67 0.471 0.54 0.501
Dummy for access to extension (1=Yes) 0.47 0.500 0.42 0.497
Dummy for location in Kianjogu WRUA3 (1=Yes) 0.15 0.356 0.07 0.248
Dummy for location in Lower Malewa WRUA3 (1=Yes) 0.10 0.305 0.10 0.299
Dummy for location in Middle MalewaWRUA3 (1=Yes) 0.19 0.395 0.18 0.390
Dummy for location in Upper Malewa WRUA3 (1=Yes) 0.11 0.318 0.11 0.313
Dummy for location in Mkungi Kitiri WRUA3 (1=Yes) 0.11 0.312 0.13 0.339
Dummy for location in Upper Gilgil WRUA3(1=Yes) 0.10 0.305 0.15 0.361
Dummy for location in Upper Turasha WRUA3 (1=Yes) 0.14 0.351 0.11 0.313
Log of off-farm income per year 4.72 5.094 3.06 4.963
2. No education is the reference category 3. Wanjohi WRUA is the reference category. 
Descriptive statistics of the outcome variable and covariates used in the exogenous 
switching regression models are presented in Table 5. 2. The dependent variable was 
computed by multiplying the output (in Kgs) of each commodity produced at the farm with 
the final price of that commodity that was paid to individual farmers. The value of crop 
production per hectare for each household was then computed by aggregating the values of all 
commodities produced and dividing the outcome with the total land under crops. For 
statistical reasons (skewed distribution of the outcome variable) the natural log of the value of 
crop production was used as a dependent variable in the exogenous switching regression 
models.
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Table 5. 2: Summary statistics of variables used for exogenous switching regression
Variable Treated sample (N=82) Control sample 
(N=93)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. 
Dev.
Value of crop production in Ksh. per ha 192,344 166,222 169,612 157,833
Log of Value of crop production per ha 11.85 0.837 11.34 2.050
Number of adults in the household 3.26 1.497 3.29 1.761
Years of living in the community 31.10 13.121 24.88 15.187
Number of credit sources accessed   1.21 0.797 1.24 0.772
Land under crops (ha) 1.07 0.701 1.24 1.931
Distance to the river (kms) 1.59 2.678 1.74 2.315
Dummy for farm experiencing erosion (1=Yes) 0.72 0.452 0.63 0.484
Dummy for engagement in exchange of  materials (1=Yes) 0.89 0.315 0.85 0.360
Dummy for membership in farmers group(1=Yes) 0.17 0.379 0.17 0.379
Dummy for attainment of primary   education(1=Yes) 0.51 0.503 0.48 0.502
Dummy for secondary education(1=Yes) 0.22 0.416 0.28 0.451
Dummy for post secondary education(1=Yes) 0.01 0.110 0.03 0.178
Dummy for subjective norms(1=Yes) 0.57 0.498 0.57 0.498
Dummy for ownership of mobile phone(1=Yes) 0.94 0.241 0.94 0.247
Dummy for ownership of radio(1=Yes) 0.93 0.262 0.92 0.265
Dummy for membership in religious  group(1=Yes) 0.02 0.155 0.03 0.178
Dummy for membership in village group(1=Yes) 0.23 0.425 0.23 0.420
Dummy for membership in water project 0.73 0.446 0.62 0.487
Age of household head (years) 54.06 13.845 52.31 13.950
Log of off-farm income per year 3.39 4.690 3.15 5.004
Dummy for manure application 0.43 0.498 0.35 0.481
Dummy for use of hired labour 0.39 0.491 0.26 0.440
Log of fertilizer cost per year 8.84 2.921 8.67 2.853
Household located in the Kinangop plateau 0.44 0.499 0.39 0.490
Distance to nearest tarmac road (kms) 7.27 22.484 4.54 3.866
5.4 Results and Discussions 
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Opportunity Costs of Soil Conservation Practices
Figure 5.1 presents some descriptive statistics on implementation of multiple soil 
conservation practices in the Lake Naivasha basin. The most popular type of combination of 
soil conservation practices observed in the study area was that combining terraces, Napier 
grass and contour farming, which had been implemented by close to 16% of the sample 
households. Only a small proportion (1.6%) had implemented the entire package of soil 
conservation practices.
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TRE=Tree planting; GRA=Grass strips; CONT=Contour farming; NAP=Nappier grass; TERR= Terraces 
Figure 5.1: The major combinations of soil conservation practices 
The choice by each farmer on the specific combination of practices to implement is 
usually determined by farmer and farm attributes. Farmers choose the combination of soil 
conservation practices that suits their local conditions such as topography and soil types 
which vary considerably between farms and sometimes within the same farm. In that case, the 
efficiency of soil conservation practices will depend on the overall soil conservation package. 
As reported by the interviewed farmers, the choice of the soil conservation practices to be 
implemented was based on information sourced from formal sources (56%), informal sources 
(42%) and the media (2%). The formal sources included public extension service providers, 
farmer field schools and NGO extension service providers while informal sources were 
mainly neighbours. It is also expected that the effect of each specific combination on the 
value of crop production might differ.  However the current study estimates the effect of the 
entire soil conservation package and the issue of effects of specific combinations of soil 
conservation practices is beyond the scope of this study. 
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5.4.2 The Effect of MSCPs on the Value of Crop Production
Table 5.3 presents the results of propensity score matching (PSM) generated using the 
psmatch2 Stata command module developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). According to the 
Log likelihood test, the probit model used in the estimation of propensity scores is significant 
at the 0.01 level (p<0.01).  The Pregibon’s linktest (Pregibon 1980) used to check model 
misspecification, rejects the null hypothesis that the model is mispecified.  The prediction 
power of the model is also strong as indicated by the percentage of correct predictions 
(77.9%). Table 5.3 indicates that farm size, gender of household head, asset ownership, 
regional dummies and the proportion of marketed output had statistically significant effects 
on the behavior of farmers in terms of undertaking multiple soil conservation practices.  Since 
this model was used merely as a statistical tool to estimate the propensity scores, only a brief 
behavioral interpretation to the results will be offered here. The positive influence of 
household assets implies that household wealth helps to ease the constraints on resources 
needed when implementing multiple soil conservation practices.  Farm size had a negative 
significant effect on implementation of MSCPs. Since soil conservation practices compete 
directly with crop enterprises for land, farmers with smaller parcels of land are unlikely to 
implement multiple soil conservation practices. Another possible reason for this would be that 
smaller parcels of land are unlikely to vary in attributes and therefore a single soil 
conservation practice would be sufficient. Finally, some location dummies had significant 
positive effects on implementation of MSCPs. Location attributes such as altitude and weather 
conditions might determine whether a farmer engages in multiple soil conservation practices 
or not.
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Table 5.3:   Results of the probit model used in generating propensity scores 
Covariates Coefficients  Std. Err. Marginal 
effects 
Gender of household head (Male=1) 0.38 0.258 0.13
Age of household head (years) 0.01 0.008 0.00
Farm size (ha)  -0.12** 0.062 -0.04
Square of farm size (ha) 0.00 0.003 0.00
Average Household education level (years) -0.01 0.031 0.00
Number of adults in the household -0.05 0.056 -0.02
Dummy for attending training (1=Yes) -0.05 0.204 -0.02
Distance to the river (Kms) 0.02 0.034 0.01
Household asset ownership (0-1 index) 4.63*** 1.101 1.51
Perception on soil erosion as a problem in the area 0.27 0.177 0.09
Dummy for cattle ownership (1=Yes) 0.41 0.376 0.15
Dummy for secure land tenure(1=Yes) 0.11 0.209 0.04
Dummy for access to extension(1=Yes) 0.30 0.202 0.10
Natural log of off-farm income per year 0.03 0.019 0.01
Dummy for location in Kianjogu WRUA (1=Yes) 1.33*** 0.511 0.26
Dummy for location in Lower Malewa WRUA (1=Yes) 0.82** 0.414 0.20
Dummy for location in Middle Malewa WRUA (1=Yes) 0.37 0.352 0.11
Dummy for location in Upper Malewa WRUA (1=Yes) 0.51 0.391 0.14
Dummy for location in Mkungi Kitiri WRUA (1=Yes) 0.11 0.321 0.04
Dummy for location in Upper Gilgil WRUA (1=Yes) 0.02 0.328 0.01
Dummy for location in Upper Turasha WRUA (1=Yes) 0.26 0.299 0.08
Proportion of marketed output (%) -0.60** 0.327 -0.20
Constant -2.39*** 0.658
Model summary statistics
Number of observations   293
LR ߯ଶ (24)     70.24***
Pseudo R2 0.19 
Log likelihood -145.61                    
% of correct predictions 77.9
*,**,*** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.  
The effect of implementing MSCPs was estimated using two outcome variables: the 
value of crop production and the log of the value of crop production. The estimates of average 
effect of implementing multiple soil conservation technologies on the value of crop 
production per hectare (ATT) are presented in Table 5.4. As shown in the table, t-tests were 
conducted to assess the quality of the matching to ensure that the distribution of covariates is 
equal between the treated and control samples independent of the treatment. The t-statistics 
obtained (p>0.1) indicates that satisfactory matching quality was achieved for all covariates 
included in the model. The test of the balancing property was done considering only those 
observations that were on common support. Results indicate that farmers who had 
implemented multiple soil conservation practices   generated 34.45%15 higher value of crop 
15 The percentage was computed using the formula: percent change in Y = 100 (ediff - 1), where diff =mean 
difference on the log. variable and Y is the value of crop production. For more about this formula see the Sports 
science journal webpage: http://www.sportsci.org/resource/stats/contents.html.
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production than those who did not. The monetary equivalent of this effect will be discussed 
later together with the opportunity costs of implementing soil conservation practices.    
Table 5. 4: Effect of implementing multiple soil conservation practices (MSCPs)
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
Value of crop 
production per hectare
Log of value of crop 
production per hectare
Before matching
Mean difference 6,000 0.181
t-stat 0.36 1.416**
After matching
ATT 13,627 0.296a
t-stat 0.61 1.89**
Balancing property
Attained? YES YES
Standardized mean bias 5.2% 5.2%
Common support condition 
Imposed? YES YES
N on common support 170 170
Number of observations 
Total 293 293
Treated 80 80
Controls 90 90
** Value statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
a- The outcome variable was computed by dividing the total value of crop production by the land under crops
b- The outcome variable  was computed by dividing the total value of crop production by the land under crops plus the  degraded land that 
was not usable
Soil conservation practices involve both direct costs and indirect costs. Direct costs 
emerge from the investment of scarce farm resources such as land and labour on initial 
installation16 and maintenance of soil conservation practices. Indirect costs emerge since 
farmers have to forego crop production and wages so as to allocate land and labour towards 
soil conservation practices. As elaborated by Ellis-Jones and Tengberg (2000), opportunity 
costs17 in implementation and maintenance of soil conservation practices arise from two main 
components. The first component is the gross margin of the crops that would have been 
grown in the portion of land occupied by the soil conservation practices. For every year, since 
that portion of land cannot be available for crop production, then the output foregone 
constitutes the opportunity cost. The second component was the opportunity cost of labour 
used in maintenance of soil conservation practices. To evaluate the opportunity cost of labour, 
16 In the current study since we are assessing the benefits during one specific time period, we do not factor in the 
initial installation costs but rather the opportunity costs for that specific time period. 
17 However, note that contour farming and cover crops which are part of the soil conservation practices analyzed 
in the current study do not involve real maintenance costs or compete with crops for land and therefore their 
opportunity cost of land and labour was taken to be zero.
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the labour requirement estimates provided by Ellis-Jones and Tengberg (2000) and the wage 
rates reported by farmers were used. The wage rates differed with locations ranging between 
Ksh. 100 (1 €) and 250 (2.5 €) with a mean of Kshs. 150 (1.5€).
The opportunity costs are unique for every region and could also differ even for every 
farmer because they depend on farm and farmer circumstances such as the slope of the farm, 
the prevailing wage rates for the off-farm employment opportunities that each farmer has 
access to and the gross margins of the enterprises that each farmer has, which is in turn 
dependent on prices. Table 5.5 presents the opportunity cost estimates under four categories. 
The categorization aimed at capturing the unique attributes that determine the magnitude of 
opportunity costs. Each category considers the slope of the farm, productivity of each farm 
based on the average gross margin and the wage rate. Low productivity farmers where those 
whose gross margins were in the first and second quartiles while the high productivity farmers 
were those in the third and fourth quartiles. To facilitate meaningful comparison of the 
opportunity costs and the benefits generated by soil conservation practices as presented in 
Table 5.4, the opportunity costs were computed for the reference year (2010) and therefore 
did not include the initial outlay costs incurred when the soil conservation practices were 
implemented.   
The figures in Table 5. 5 indicate that the extremely sloping farms had higher 
opportunity costs partly because larger land in these areas was dedicated to soil conservation 
practices. Opportunity cost of land formed a larger part of the total opportunity costs.  
Table 5. 5: Opportunity costs of implementing MSCPs 
Category 1: 
Low 
productivity
, moderately 
sloped 
Category 3: 
Low 
productivity
, extremely 
sloped
Category 2: 
High 
productivity
, moderately 
sloped
Category 4: 
High
productivity
, extremely 
sloped
(1) Gross margin (Kshs/ha) 2,644 1,850 100,084 61,195
(2) Average land lost to SCPs (Ha) 0.36 1.12 0.26 0.39
(3) % of total land under SCPs 14% 21% 14% 15%
(4) Opportunity cost of land (Ksh) 1,291 9,804 23,366 29,811
(5) Opportunity cost of labour (Kshs) 937 3,406 653 1,134
(6) Total Opportunity cost (OC) (KSh) 2,228 13,210 24,019 30,945
(7) Average farm size (ha) 1.41 1.23 1.04 0.80
(8) Total opportunity cost (Kshs/Ha) 1,580 10,740 23,095 38,489
(9) Average value of crop production (D=0) 21,662 39,529 102,041 66,446
(10) Value of crop production attributable to 
MSCPsa 
7,582 13,385 35,714 23,256
(11) Difference between OC and Benefits 6002 3095 12619 -15233
a. This value is obtained by multiplying row (9) with 34.5%
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At this point, the effect of soil conservation practices in monetary value can be 
computed.  Given that MSCPs were found to generate 34.5% higher value of crop production, 
the monetary value under each category can be computed by multiplying the figures in row 
(9) of Table 5.5 with this percentage. This computation indicates that the value of crop 
production that can be attributed to multiple soil conservation practices ranged between Kshs. 
7,582 and  Kshs. 23,256 per ha per year (row (10)). Comparing these marginal benefits with 
the opportunity costs (row (8) we can see that under category 1-3, the marginal benefits are 
large enough to cover the opportunity costs, while in category 4 the costs outweigh the 
benefits. The benefits generated by MSCPs are substantial since they range between 16-50% 
of the annual wages considering the average wage rate. Four issues emerge from these results. 
First, high productive farms located in extremely sloped areas had opportunity costs larger 
than the additional benefits since in such areas soil conservation measures occupy more land. 
This is consistent with what Pagiola, (1994) found in the case of Kitui and Machakos regions 
of Kenya where he found that steeper farms required closer spacing of terraces and therefore 
reducing the cultivable land even further. Secondly, reduction in effective area combined with 
loss of soil fertility as a result of soil erosion seems to work against farmers located in 
extremely sloped areas as seen in the differences between category 1 and 2. Third, a cross 
tabulation between the categories and adoption of soil conservation practices indicates that  
despite farmers in category four having opportunity costs larger than the benefits generated by 
the soil conservation practices, majority of them were implementers of MSCPs. This could 
imply that there are other motivations to implementing soil conservation practices beside the 
economic benefits. Finally, we see that although farmers in category 2 have low productivity;
they still had a positive benefit from soil conservation. This implies for such farmers, soil 
conservation was indeed beneficial since is the highly degraded land that is likely to benefit 
more from soil conservation efforts. 
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5.4.3 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of the ATT
5.4.3.1 Determinants of the Value of Crop Production 
Exogenous switching regression analysis based on matched observations of 
implementers and non implementers of multiple soil conservation practices was used to check 
the robustness of the results obtained through  PSM. Table 5 presents the results of exogenous 
switching regression models. The results in 
Table 5. 6 indicate that the coefficients of the cost of fertilizers, size of land allocated
to crops and proportion of marketed output were consistent in sign and significance for both 
implementers and non implementers of MSCPs. The positive influence of fertilizer use on 
crop productivity is obvious. The negative effect of land under crops is consistent with 
theoretical expectation that farmers with smaller parcels of land are able to optimize their 
production better and receive higher yields compared to those with larger parcels. Otsuki
(2010) claimed that smaller plots tend to be more productive than larger plots, especially in 
the case where households mostly use family labor for crop production. The proportion of 
marketed crop output, a proxy for agricultural commercialization had a positive effect on the 
value of crop production. Farmers who are commercial oriented are also most likely to have 
higher productivity as confirmed by the results since they are also likely to use more 
purchased inputs. The crop output for the implementers of MSCPs however seemed to be 
more responsive to external inputs as indicated by the significant coefficients of use of 
pesticides and manure in the model for implementers of MSCPs. Against expectation, more 
educated implementers of soil conservation practices were found to have lower value of crop 
production. A possible explanation to this finding is that more educated individuals dedicate 
much of their effort to off-farm income generating activities. This result was confirmed by the 
fact that farmers who participated in off farm income generating activities had slightly lower 
value of crop production (mean difference = Ksh.  1,967, t (291) = 0.108). Likewise, access to 
extension services was found to negatively influence the value of crop productivity. As also 
indicated by Gautam, (2000) who also found a similar result, it would be misleading to 
interpret this result to imply that extension has a negative effect on crop productivity. Rather, 
this negative effect could be as a result of endogeneity issues. For instance, it could be that 
given the demand driven extension model used in Kenya, access to extension is biased in 
favour of elite and more productive farmers who can afford the services. This fact may 
therefore make it difficult to identify the effect of extension on productivity from cross-
sectional data (Gautam 2000).
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Table 5. 6: Determinants of value of crop production
Explanatory variables 
Implementers of 
ISCTs
Std. Err. Non 
Implementers 
of ISCTs
Std. 
Err.
Dummy for engagement in off-farm activity 0.39** 0.172 0.15 0.180
Dummy for use of hired labour 0.27 0.160 0.15 0.223
Land under crops -0.37*** 0.112 -0.39*** 0.094
Cost of fertilizer   per year (Ksh.) 0.0001** 0.0002 0.0001** 0.0003
Age of household head (years) -0.01* 0.006 0.00 0.008
Soil erosion perceived present (1=Yes) -0.32* 0.169 -0.14 0.195
Dummy for engagement in exchange of  materials 0.30 0.240 0.32 0.289
Dummy for use of pesticides  0.32* 0.187 0.08 0.222
Livestock ownership (TLU) 0.02 0.020 -0.01 0.023
Distance to nearest tarmac road 0.02 0.019 0.02 0.027
Dummy for post secondary  education -0.90* 0.497 0.30 0.514
Dummy for use of manure 0.37** 0.156 -0.03 0.191
Proportion of marketed output 0.86*** 0.353 1.85** 0.376
Number of  interacted with by household 0.001 0.001 0.00 0.001
Dummy for practicing irrigation 0.24 0.190 0.28 0.237
Access to extension services -0.38* 0.200 0.13 0.218
Dummy for location of household -0.13 0.198 0.04 0.208
Slope of the farm (1=Extremely sloping) -0.32 0.272 -0.29 0.307
Constant 10.71*** 0.588 10.18** 0.628
Model summary statistics 
Number of Observations 80 90
F-statistics F18,61 = 7.99*** F18,71 = 4.55***
R-squared 0.70 0.54
*,**,*** indicates parameters are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively.
Table 5. 7 presents mean differences in predicted value of the log of crop production 
per hectare. The results indicate a significant positive influence of implementing multiple soil 
conservation practices on the value of crop production per hectare. In general, results of the 
exogenous regression analysis are consistent with those obtained with Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM). The mean difference of the predicted value of the log of value of crop 
production was 0.29. When translated into a percentage, this implies that implementers of 
MSCPs had 33.6 % more value of crop production compared to non implementers. 
Considering the categories presented in Table 5, this would imply that implementing multiple 
soil conservation practices would generate additional value of crop production ranging 
between Ksh. 7,279 and Kshs. 22,325. Both PSM and exogenous switching regression show a 
significantly higher value of crop production for individuals who had implemented MSCPs. 
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Consistency in the sign of the effect is satisfactory while the slight difference in the figures 
obtained from the two approaches could be due to the use of different approaches which is 
acceptable so long as the differences are within a reasonably narrow margin.
Table 5. 7: Differences in means of predicted logarithm of the value of crop production   
Number of 
observations
Mean Std. error
Implementers 80 11.98 0.080
Non-Implementers 90 11.27 0.089
Mean difference 0.29 0.120
T-test 2.428***
*** indicates statistics are significance at the 0.01 level
5.4.3.2 Sensitivity of the ATT to Unobserved Heterogeneity
The sensitivity of the ATT to unobserved heterogeneity was assessed using the   
Rosenbaum (2002) bounds test. The results on Table 5. 8 indicate that the treatment effects 
are not very sensitive to hidden bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity which results from 
unobserved covariates - such as individual skills or personal abilities - that might 
simultaneously affect the treatment and outcome variables. The upper bound of the p-value 
(p+) becomes insignificant when the sensitivity parameter (ī) is equal to 1.2. This implies that 
the probability of receiving treatment by two individuals with the same observed covariates 
can differ by up to 20% without altering the inference on the treatment effect. These results 
indicate a relatively low sensitivity of the ATT to hidden bias, and therefore the estimated 
effect is a result of implementation of multiple soil conservation practices.
Table 5. 8: Bounds test results indicating sensitivity of treatment effects to hidden bias
Sensitivity 
parameter ( ડכ) Level of significance (p+) Level of significance (p-) Confidence interval 
1 0.026 0.026 -0.001 0.634
1.05 0.040 0.016 -0.048 0.659
1.1 0.058 0.010 -0.076 0.690
1.15 0.080 0.006 -0.111 0.722
1.2 0.107 0.004 -0.137 0.747
1.25 0.139 0.002 -0.158 0.769
1.3 0.174 0.001 -0.175 0.799
1.35 0.214 0.001 -0.210 0.821
1.4 0.256 0.001 -0.232 0.847
1.45 0.300 0.000 -0.261 0.870
1.5 0.346 0.000 -0.286 0.897
*This parameter represents the odds ratio and measures the degree of departure from equal treatment between observations. 
A value of 1 implies that the odds ratio of treatment is the same and therefore the study is free from hidden bias.
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5.5 Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The main objective of this study was to estimate benefits of implementing multiple 
soil conservation practices. Using data obtained from smallholder farmers in Lake Naivasha 
basin, Kenya, the study employed Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to estimate the 
additional value of crop productivity that can be attributed to implementation of MSCPs. 
Investigating returns to soil conservation practices is of crucial importance for successful 
promotion of soil conservation technologies because farmers will continiously use MSCPs if
they believe that they are profitable.  PSM was used to address self-selection bias and 
evaluate conservation technology effect on the value of crop production.
Consistency of the resulst was checked using exogenous switching regression models
and t-tests, while sensitivity of the results to unobserved heterogeinity was checked using 
bounds test. From the PSM, matched samples of implementers and non implementers of 
MSCPs were obtained to ensure uniformity in the samples such that  the individuals who were 
compared differed only in the treatment.  
The estimated average treatment effects (ATT) obtained through PSM method show 
that implementation of MSCPs yields positive significant effects on the value of crop 
production per hectare. The results were confirmed by the alternative approach used.   
However, to make a more reasonable conclusion, these benefits were compared with 
opportunity costs of soil conservation practices. Results indicate that soil conservation 
practices will only generate positive benefits that are large enough to cover the opportunity 
costs only under certain circumstances. The marginal benefits were found not to be high 
enough to cover the opportunity costs associated with the implimentation of MSCPs in highly 
productive and extremely sloped farms. The results reveal that the magnitude of benefits from 
soil conservation practices  will depend on land productivity and the slope of the farm. 
Indirectly, the prices of output and input might also influence these benefits. 
Also, the fact that majority of farmers whose marginal benefits were not large enough 
to cover the opportunity costs still implemented MSCPs could indicate that there are other 
non economic motivations to soil conservation. These could be intrinsic social incentives 
(Willy & Holm-Mueller 2013) or the ability to access labour from communal labour sharing 
mechanisms (Pagiola 1998). Our study also reveals that it is beneficial to combine multiple 
soil conservation practices into a soil conservation package. A previous study  by Zhunusova, 
(2012) in the same basin where this study was conducted found that    individually, terraces 
had a negative effect on crop productivity. However, as revealed in the current study, when 
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such a practice is used within  soil conservation package involving MSCPs, the overall effect 
is positive. This result highlights the importance of using the approach of assessing the 
complementary effects of different soil conservation practices such as the one used in the 
current study.  
Given these findings, policies that emphasize on multiple approaches to soil 
conservation are encouraged, where comprehensive soil conservation packages that suit 
farmers’ local conditions are promoted. The suitability of soil conservation practices vary 
with topography, soil types and other parameters. These parameters vary greatly even within 
the same farm and therefore farmers need technical assistance in selecting the practices that 
are best suited to their local conditions. Also, given that economic benefits are not the sole 
determinants of soil conservation, it is also imperative for policy makers to identify and 
address any other constraints to the implementation of MSCPs. There is an opportunity for 
future research where a dynamic assesment is done that incorporates time preference 
considerations in the assessment of the effect of multiple soil conservation practices on the 
value of crop production.
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CHAPTER SIX
6 Effects of Social Influence and Collective Action on Soil 
Conservation Efforts18
6.1 Introduction 
The agricultural sector plays a key role in livelihood support and economic 
development in Sub-Saharan African (SSA). However, statistics indicate that historically 
agricultural productivity growth in SSA has been lower than in the rest of the world (OECD 
& FAO, 2012). The stagnation in productivity growth can be attributed to suboptimal external 
input use, pests and diseases, soil degradation, frequent and prolonged droughts, and poor 
market integration among other challenges (World Bank, 2008). Soil degradation which 
occurs mainly through soil erosion and loss of soil fertility is a major challenge to SSA 
agriculture because it not only causes a decline in crop yields and desertification but also 
increases crop production costs in the long run. Smallholder farming systems in SSA are 
characterized by high rates of land fragmentation, intensive tillage of land, nutrient mining 
and extraction of crop residues to feed livestock. These practices accelerate soil degradation 
and soil erosion, making agriculture one of the most serious sources of non-point water 
pollution. In cases where rural agriculture has intensified, increased use of inorganic 
fertilizers leads to infiltration of Nitrogen and Phosphorous from agricultural fields to surface 
water bodies (Berka et al. 2001). Effective soil erosion control could therefore enhance long
term productivity of farmers’ most valuable physical asset-land, mitigate the negative impacts 
of soil degradation on crop yields and the environment and also boost efforts towards rural 
poverty alleviation. 
Achieving substantial adoption and diffusion of soil and water conservation practices 
and other agricultural innovations in SSA has been a challenge in recent decades, a trend that 
authors attribute to low awareness, negative attitudes and insufficient financial capacity 
among other factors (Khisa et al., 2007; Pretty et al., 1995 and van Rijn et al., 2012).
However, it is noted that sometimes even when the right conditions prevail, adoption rates 
may still remain low. As Lynne et al. (1988) note, awareness, right perceptions and 
18 This Chapter is based on the article: 
Willy, D.K., Holm-Mueller, K., 2013. Social Influence and Collective Action Effects on Farm Level Soil 
Conservation Effort in Rural Kenya. Ecological Economics 90, 94-103.
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substantial capacity are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the adoption of soil 
conservation practices. This observation raises the question: Why would farmers not adopt a 
practice even when economic incentives seem sufficient?
To answer this question, we have to seek other factors beyond individual capacity and 
perceptions that could explain farmers’ choices such as social factors. Given that soil and 
water conservation practices are associated with benefits that are partly public goods, one of 
the important aspects to consider is the effect of communal coordination mechanisms on 
individual adoption behavior. Collective action is cited as one of the most successful 
coordination mechanisms for natural resources management and also for increasing 
agricultural production (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002 and Ravnborg et al., 2000). Collective 
action can be defined as what happens when individuals voluntarily contribute to an effort 
towards achieving an outcome (Poteete & Ostrom 2004) or when voluntary action is taken by 
individuals within a group to achieve a common goal (Meinzen-Dick & Di Gregorio 2004). 
At community level, the effects of collective action are clear since individuals are able to 
mobilize local resources as an avenue for seeking solutions to societal problems, especially 
where isolated individual efforts to solve these problems are not tenable (Swallow et al. 
2002). What is not clear is the indirect role of participation in collective action as a driver for 
individual efforts on soil and water conservation. Do individuals who participate in collective 
action acquire certain network externalities which enable them to implement better practices? 
To explain this we need to look at how collective action emerges and operates. Social 
networks and social participation which are important components of social capital enable
individuals to engage in frequent interactions with others and facilitate the access to 
information and sharing of knowledge and better access to markets through collective 
bargaining. Reciprocity based on trust and trustworthiness is also an important feature that 
facilitates collective action since individuals  within a social group may engage in informal 
exchanges with each other in the hope that the counterparts will reciprocate (Pretty & Ward 
2001). Through reciprocate exchanges; individuals are able to minimize costs associated with 
acquisition of inputs hence making technology adoption easier. Social networks and repeated 
interactions create mutual social influence between individuals within a group, a phenomenon 
that is manifested through subjective norms and neighbourhood social influences. A 
subjective norm is defined as “a person’s perception that most people who are important to 
him or her think (s)he should or should not perform the behavior in question” (Ajzen & 
Fishbein 1975). Neighbourhood social influences relate to the degree of prompting that an 
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individual receives from peers. There is however limited evidence in the literature on the 
direct role of neighbourhood social influences and subjective norms in determining soil
conservation effort.
Against this backdrop, the current study seeks to analyze the effect of neighbourhood 
social influence and participation in collective action initiatives on soil conservation effort 
among smallholder farmers in Lake Naivasha basin, Kenya.  Soil conservation effort is 
measured by the number of soil conservation practices that a farmer has implemented among 
a variety of practices: Terracing, Napier grass, Contour farming and Filter grass strips. The 
study seeks to ascertain whether social capital facilitates collective action which then 
enhances individual action and whether social control that may emerge from social networks 
within a community   may substitute for pure economic incentives to undertake individual 
action on soil conservation. To achieve the stated objectives, a two stage econometric 
estimation procedure was applied to primary data collected during a household survey among
307 randomly selected small-scale farmers.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: section 6.2 presents our theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks and empirical models and section 6.3 describes the study area and
data collection methods. Section 6.4 presents and discusses descriptive and regression results, 
while section 6.5 concludes and draws policy implications.
6.2 Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks
6.2.1 The Agricultural Household Model
Following Fernandez-Cornejo (2007), our theoretical model modifies the agricultural
household model (Singh et al., 1986) to accommodate participation in collective action 
initiatives and technology adoption decisions. The agricultural household model explains farm 
household optimization behavior by maximizing utility (U) as per the objective function:
ܯܽݔ ܷ = (ܩ, ܮ,ܪ,߮) (6.1)
where G = purchased consumption goods, L= leisure, H = factors exogenous to the current 
GHFLVLRQVVXFKDVKXPDQFDSLWDODQGĳ RWKHUKRXVHKROGFKDUDFWHULVWLFV. Household utility is 
maximized subject to: 
ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁ ܿ݋݊ݏݐݎܽ݅݊ݐ ׷ ௚ܲܩ = ௤ܲܳ െ ௫ܹࢄᇱ +ࢃࡹᇱ + ܫ (5.2)
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Technology constraint : ܳ = ܳ[ܺ(߬),ܨ(߬),ࡴ, ߬,ࡾ], ߬ ൒ 0 (5.3)
ܶ݅݉݁ ܿ݋݊ݏݐݎܽ݅݊ݐ ׷ ܶ = ࡲ(߬) +ࡹ+ ࡸ, ࡹ ൒ 0 (5.4)
where ௚ܲ and ௤ܲdenote the prices of purchased goods and farm output respectively, G and Q 
are quantities of purchased goods and farm output respectively; ௫ܹ and X are row vectors of 
price and quantity of farm inputs  which is a function of the intensity of technology adoption 
(߬); I is exogenous income, R is a vector of exogenous factors that shift the production 
function; and T denotes the total household time endowments, which is split between off farm 
activities,  M;  Leisure,  L and farm work, F which is a function of the intensity of technology 
adoption (߬) since some technologies are labour saving hence freeing some labour time for 
allocation to other activities. The technology constrained measure of household income is 
obtained by substituting (6.3) into (6.2)  (Huffman, 1991): 
௚ܲܩ = ௤ܲܳ[ܺ(߬),ࡲ(߬),ࡴ, ߬,ࡾ]െ ௫ܹࢄ(߬)ᇱ +ࢃࡹᇱ + ܫ (6.5)
The first order optimality conditions (Kuhn-Tucker conditions) are obtained by setting 
up the langragian function (6.6) and maximizing ࣦ over (G, L) and minimizing the function 
over the Langrage multipliers (Ȝ, ȝ): 
ࣦ = ܷ(ࡳ,ࡸ,ࡴ,߮) + ɉ൛P୯Q[X(߬),۴(߬),۶, (߬),܀]െ܅୶܆(߬)ᇱ +܅ۻᇱ + ܫ െ P୥Gൟ+
ρ[Tെ F(߬) െMെ L] (6.6)
Reduced form equations of the household model obtained from the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions of (6.6) can used to obtain optimizations for off farm participation decisions and 
decisions on adoption of technology. The household decision to participate in off-farm 
activities depends on the relation between the wage rate and the marginal product of farm 
labour. This relation can be used to obtain the demand functions for on-farm labour and 
leisure and eventually the supply function for off farm time.  Non-zero optimum off farm time 
allocation occurs when marginal product of farm labour is equal to the wage rate, or when the 
wage rate exceeds the reservation wage (Fernandez-Cornejo 2007). On the other hand, the 
optimal extent of adoption will occur when the value of marginal benefit of adoption is equal 
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to the marginal cost of adoption, which includes the marginal cost of production inputs and 
the marginal cost of farm work brought up by adoption of the technology, valued at the 
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption of goods. Fernandez-Cornejo 
(2007) suggests the use of implicit function theorem to derive expressions for off-farm labour 
supply and technology adoption as a function of wages, prices, human capital, non-labour 
income and other exogenous factors. These factors may be replaced in the reduced form 
representations of farm labour supply and technology adoption by observable farm and farmer 
characteristics.
6.2.2 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
Adoption and diffusion of agricultural technologies has been studied extensively since 
the inaugural work by Ryan & Gross (1943) and Rogers (1962). Previous studies have 
identified key determinants of soil conservation technology adoption which can be 
categorized into personal characteristics such as age, gender and education level (Napier et 
al. 1984 ; Doss and Morris, 2001), economic factors like income, farm size and household 
asset ownership( Ervin & Ervin, 1982; Kabubo-Mariara et al., 2006;  Marenya & Barrett, 
2007 and Nkonya et al., 2008); physical factors like slope, altitude, climate and soil quality 
(Kabubo-Mariara, 2012);  social  and institutional factors such as credit, access to extension 
services, land tenure and perceptions on existence of soil erosion problem and the benefits of 
engaging in soil conservation (Ervin & Ervin, 1982; Kabubo-Mariara, 2012; 2007; Meinzen-
Dick & Di Gregorio, 2004 ; Migot-Adholla et al., 1991; Place & Swallow 2000; Rogers, 
1995 and Shiferaw & Holden, 1998).  
To understand individual decision making beyond a purely individual perspective, 
behavioural approaches have also been used initiated by Lynne & Rola (1988) and Lynne et 
al. (1988) who applied the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) developed by Ajzen & Fishbein 
(1975) in the analysis of farmers attitudes and conservation behavior. TRA links behaviour to 
attitudes and social norms. An application of TRA to water conservation behaviour by Lynne 
et al (1995) finds a positive influence of community (subjective) norms on the likelihood and 
intensity of adoption. Technology adoption can be seen as a social process where individuals’
decisions are conditioned by the social context within which they exist (Barrett et al. 2002). 
The social environment can be viewed as a complex pattern of a) individuals interacting and 
working together to achieve common goals and b) the possibilities of individuals influencing 
each other towards performing certain behaviours. The social influence-technology adoption 
link is expressed through subjective norms and neighbourhood social influences which are 
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embedded within social norms and social capital. Neighbourhood social influences facilitate 
social learning, a process that helps to shorten the adoption process. Frequent interaction with 
potentially influential agents also creates  network externalities (Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995, 
Kim & Park, 2011, Nyangena, 2006) and fosters the formation of social capital. 
Social capital is a composite concept which encompasses social participation, social 
support, social networks, reciprocity and trustworthiness and enhance the ability of 
individuals to cooperate hence formation of collective action (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009) which 
can support or even make up for the lack of individual action in natural resources 
management. As Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002) indicate, participation in collective action 
initiatives is influenced by household and community characteristics such as distance to the 
market, level of social capital, location of a household within a resource supply system, group 
size and leadership quality. Participation in collective action may also be influenced by the 
perceived benefits of participation and attitudes on the usefulness of such participation. As 
Meinzen-Dick et al., (2002) note, the presence of other organizations facilitates participation 
in collective action since it provides an opportunity for boosting social capital and 
organizational density especially when an individual is also involved in the activities of these 
other organizations. The number of adults in a household and the number of years of living in 
a community may further enhance the capacity of a household to participate in collective 
action. Figure 6. 1 shows relationships between dependent and explanatory variables and 
hypothesized signs of these relationships.    
Figure 6. 1: Conceptual framework 
Source: Authors’ conceptualization. 
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6.2.3 Binary and Ordered Probit Regression Models
To estimate the decisions to participate in collective action initiatives and soil 
conservation effort empirically, a two stage econometric model is specified to address self 
selection problems. Participation in collective action exhibits self selection because the 
households’ decisions to participate in collective action are not random but rather individuals 
self select into participation depending on –among other attributes- specific household 
characteristics including their expected gains from participation and level of social capital. In 
the first stage, a binary probit model was used to regress participation in collective action 
initiatives on farmers’ perceived benefits of participation, level of social capital and other 
personal attributes. A binary probit model was chosen because of the nature of the dependent 
variable which takes the value ଵܻ௜=1 if a farmer was participating in collective action 
initiatives and ଵܻ௜ = 0 otherwise. The observed decision ( ଵܻ௜) is however assumed to represent 
a latent variable ଵܻ௜כ which represents farmers’ utility acquired from participation in collective 
action. We observe ଵܻ௜ if the underlying latent variable ଵܻ௜כ exceeds a certain threshold 
following the decision rule:  
ଵܻ௜ = ൜1 ݂݅ ଵܻ௜כ > 00 ݂݅ ଵܻ௜כ ൑ 0 (6.7)
Participation in collective action is specified as follows:
ଵܻ௜ = ࢄଵ௜ᇱ ࢼ૚ + ߝଵ (6.8)
where ଵܻ௜ is a dummy participation variable, ܺଵ௜ᇱ is a vector of explanatory variables 
conditioning the decision to participation in collective action, which include the perceived 
benefits, level of social capital and other household characteristics.  ߚଵ is a vector of 
coefficients to be estimated and ߝଵ captures stochastic disturbances, assumed to be normally 
distributed.
In the second stage, the effect of participation in collective action, neighbourhood social 
influence and subjective norms on the soil conservation efforts was estimated. The inverse
mills ratio (Heckman 1979) generated from the first stage entered the second model as an 
explanatory variable. The number of soil conservation practices that a farmer has 
implemented was used to represent the effort of soil conservation. Each farmer faces multiple 
choices on the number of soil conservation practices which they can implement, with a 
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possibility of multiple adoptions. To account for the multiple adoption possibilities and the 
ordinal nature of the dependent variable, an ordered probit model was used. Among the four 
soil conservation practices considered in this study, five possible choices are generated: 
ଶܻ௜ = 0 (none of the practices implemented), ଶܻ௜ = 1 (only one practice implemented) ଶܻ௜ = 2
(two practices implemented); ଶܻ௜ = 3 (three practices implemented) and ଶܻ௜ = 4 (four 
practices implemented). However, since there were too few farmers (~ 2%) who had 
implemented all the four practices, this category was merged with the one with 3 practices, 
ending up with four categories. To model the four soil conservation effort outcomes we use an 
ordered response model: 
ଶܻ௜כ = ࢄଶ௜ᇱ ࢼଶ + ෠ܻଵ௜כߙ + ࡿ࢏ ߛ + ࡺ࢏ߴ + ߝଶ; ߝଵ ׾ ܰܫܦ(0,ߪଶ) (6.9)
and 
ଶܻ௜ =
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ 0 if ଶܻ௜כ ൑ ߠଵ,1 if ߠଵ < ଶܻ௜כ ൑ ߠଶ,2 if ߠଶ < ଶܻ௜כ ൑ ߠଷ,3 if ߠଷ ൑ ଶܻ௜כ  (6.10)
where ଶܻ௜כ can be interpreted as the soil conservation effort, ߠଵ are threshold parameters to be 
estimated simultaneously with the other coefficients: ࢼ૛,હ, ઻ and ૔ . ଶܻ௜ is the number of 
soil conservation practices implemented by farmer i ; ܺଶ௜ᇱ is a matrix of control explanatory 
variables, ෠ܻଵ௜כ are the inverse Mills ratio values obtained from the binary probit model in step 
one, ܵ௜ and ௜ܰ are row vectors representing households’ subjective norm and households’ 
neighbourhood social influence index respectively and ߝଶ are stochastic disturbances, 
assumed to be normally distributed. The parameters in both models were estimated using 
maximum likelihood in STATA 11.
6.3 Variable Description
Descriptions of the variables used in the estimations and their descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 6. 1. The dependent variable for the first model was participation in 
collective action initiatives (CAPART). In the study area, there are several collective action 
initiatives including community mutual support initiatives, maintenance of rural access roads, 
and maintenance of communal water infrastructure and collective efforts for managing natural 
resources such as community water supply organizations. Individuals may choose to engage 
in   the communal collective action initiatives either by contributing finances or by allocating 
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time to these activities or both. Participation was measured by asking respondents whether 
they had participated in any of the collective action initiatives in the community either 
through contribution of their time or financial resources. Individuals who had participated in 
at least one collective action initiative by either of the means were considered as participants.  
The dependent variable in the second model was the number of soil conservation 
practices implemented (SCEFFORT). The respondents were asked to give information on the 
soil conservation practices they had implemented on their farms, the year when first adoption 
occurred and the extent of implementation of these practices. The farmers where considered 
as adopters only when the extent of implementation was above a certain threshold (these 
thresholds are presented in Table 3). An ordered dependent variable was then generated by 
counting the number of soil conservation practices that each farmer had implemented.  
The explanatory factors considered in the participation in collective action initiatives  
model were: the number of years a household has lived in the community (COMYEARS), 
number of adults in the household (ADULTS), distance to the nearest tarmac road as an 
indicator of access to markets (DSTAMAK), contacts with an external organization 
(EXTORG),  whether a farmer thinks it is beneficial to participate in CA or not (PERCBEN), 
whether the household is located close to a river source or not (RIVPROX) and the level of 
social capital. Social capital was hypothesized to be an important precondition for 
participation in collective action. The role of social capital as a driver for participation in 
collective action was assessed using the indices of five components of social capital: social 
participation, social networks, social support, reciprocity and trustworthiness. These indices 
were generated by explorative factor analysis using Principal Components Analysis (PCA). 
PCA was conducted in three steps: First, respondents were asked specific questions that were 
used as indicators of each of the 5 components of social capital. Second, PCA with orthogonal 
rotation was carried out on these items. Sampling adequacy for the analysis was verified using 
Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) statistic while Bartlett’s test of sphericity was used to test 
whether correlations between items were large enough for PCA. Third, the components 
obtained from step 2 with Eigenvalues greater than 1 were selected for further analysis. The 
factor scores in each PCA component were summed up for each social capital component to 
obtain a single score and normalized on a 0-1 scale. The final indices were taken to represent 
the level of each of the 5 social capital components and were used as explanatory variables in 
the regression model. The PCA results and complete list of the specific questions/indicators 
used in the PCA are as provided in Chapter 3. 
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In the second model the personal attributes used as explanatory variables to estimate 
soil conservation effort included: gender of household head (GENDER), farm size 
(FARMSIZE) and household education level (HHEDUC). Institutional variables included 
land tenure (LANDTEN), access to extension services (EXTSERV) and access to credit 
(CREDTACES). Cattle ownership (CATOWN) was included in the model to control for 
direct benefits generated from soil conservation practices while perception that soil erosion is 
a problem (PECEROYES) was used to capture farmers’ attitude and perceptions towards soil 
erosion. The inverse mills ratio generated from the participation in collective action initiatives 
model was used as a proxy for the probability of participating in collective action on soil 
conservation effort. 
A neighbourhood social influence variable was included to represent the social 
pressure.   A neighbourhood social influence (NEISOCINFL) indicator for each farmer i
located in village k with N individuals at time t was computed using the expression below as 
formulated by the authors: 
ܰܵܫ௜௧ = σ ௜ܺ௧σ ௞ܲ௧ேିଵ௜ୀଵ (6.11)
where ܺ௜ represents the behaviours performed by farmer i that are similar to those of their 
peers in the village (for example the number of technologies adopted or not adopted), ௞ܲ௧ are 
the behaviors performed by all other farmers within the village except i. Finally, the believe 
that individuals would adopt a technology just because those who are important to them think 
that they should was used to capture subjective norms (SUBNORM). 
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Table 6. 1 :  Description of dependent and explanatory variables  
Variable  Description/Measurement Mean Std. 
dev
Expected 
sign
Dependent variables 
CAPART Participation in collective action initiatives (1=Yes) 0.49
SCEFFORT Soil conservation effort (Ordered numbers: 0,1,2,3) 1.65 0.89
Explanatory variables (Binary Probit )  
PERCBEN Participation in CA beneficial?  ( 1=Yes)  0.68 +
DISTTMK Distance to the nearest tarmac road (Kms) 5.01 12.15 +
COMYEARS Length of time  household has lived in the community 
(Years) 
29.48 14.62 +
ADULTS Number of adults in the household 3.28 1.57 +
ASSETINDEXa Level of household wealth      0.35 0.12 +
SNETINDEXa Intensity of social networks  0.19 0.14 +/-
SPARINDEXa Intensity of social participation   0.31 0.18 +
SCSPINDEXa Degree of social support 0.19 0.11 +
TRUSTINDEXa Level of trustworthiness    0.45 0.33 +
RECINDEXa Level of involvement in reciprocate exchanges   0.44 0.21 +
RIVPROX Farm located close to river source  (1=Yes) 0.24 +
EXTORG Involvement with an external organization 0.26 +
Explanatory variables (Ordered Probit)
FARMSIZE Size of the farm (ha) 2.60 3.83 -
HHEDUC Average years of schooling completed 7.30 3.35 +
CREDTACES Number of credit sources accessible to the household 
(Number)
1.30 0.79 +
DSRIVER Distance from the farm  to the nearest river (Kms) 2.10 3.06 -
MILLSRATIO Inverse Mills ratio 0.48 0.305 +
NEISOCINFL Neighbourhood social influences index ( 0-1) 0.669 0.179 -/+
GENDER Gender of household head  (1=Male) 0.86 +
SUBNORM I would adopt a technology  because those important to me 
think I should (1=Yes) 
0.65 +
PECEROYES Perception that soil erosion is a problem (1=Yes) 0.50 +
CATOWN Ownership of cattle by household ( 1=Yes) 0.92 +
LANDTEN Land owned with title deeds ( 1=Yes) 0.62 +
EXTSERV Contact with extension service providers  (Dummy 1=Yes) 0.46 +
LOCDUMMY Location of the household (1=K-Plateau) 0.36 +
a. These variables are measured by an index, with values ranging from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1. 
6.4 Results and Discussions 
6.4.1 Participation in Collective Action 
Results indicate that 49% of the sampled households were participants in collective 
action initiatives. Time expenditure on communal activities was split between the activities 
indicated in Table 6. 2. On average, households spend about 43 hours per year, ranging from 
1 to 384 hours on collective action related activities. A larger proportion of this time is spent
on water related activities, since this is a major form of collective action in the area. Financial 
contribution to communal activities averaged at Kshs. 1,758 (17€) ranging from Kshs. 100
(1€) to Kshs. 11,000 (110€) within the year 2010.  
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Table 6. 2: Household time expenditure on communal activities   
Communal collective action activity 
% of households who 
participated 
% time spend on activity
Water management activities 77.2 68.8
Tree planting 12.0 10.7
Access road maintenance 5.0 8.1
Soil erosion control 2.9 3.4
Construction of communal facilities 2.9 9.0
Source: Authors’ survey data
6.4.2 Trends on Implementation of Soil Conservation Practices 
Farmers in the Lake Naivasha basin have been using various strategies to control soil 
erosion since 1960s. The most popular soil conservation practices are: bench terraces, Napier 
grass, filter grass strips, contour farming, crop rotation, cover crops, planting of trees and 
inter-cropping. Among these practices, four practices were selected for in-depth analysis in 
this study because of their direct role in soil erosion control and permanent nature. Napier 
grass (Pennisetum purpureum) is a perennial plant native to Africa that is usually used as 
fodder. When planted on slopes, Napier grass controls soil erosion by formation of a natural 
barrier which obstructs soil movement. Napier grass has fibrous and rhizomatous roots with 
fast tillering characteristics which makes it an effective medium for soil erosion control 
(Mutegi et al., 2008). However, this rooting characteristic also makes it a potential competitor 
with crops for nutrients. Bench terracing is a practice that involves construction of bunds 
along the contour by digging ditches and heaping the soil on the upper or lower part to form 
an embankment, suitable especially for farms with moderate and steep slopes (Chow et al.,
1999). These embankments prevent soil erosion by holding rain water and preventing run-off. 
By trapping soil particles, bench terraces also reduce phosphorus transportation to water 
bodies. Although this is a good measure against soil erosion, some studies have indicated that 
bench terraces may cause low crop yields in the short run, especially in high rainfall areas 
(Kassie et al., 2011; 2008; Tang, 1998). Filter grass strips is a practice involving planting 
strips of grass along and/or across gullies and water ways to act as a sediment filter. The 
commonly used grasses in the study area for this purpose are cock’s foot (Dactylis glomerata) 
and Elmba Rhodes grass (Chloris gayana) which are also used as fodder. Vetiver grass also 
(Vetiveria zizanoide) is suitable for soil erosion control (Dalton et al. 1996). Finally, contour 
farming involves tilling land across the slope and establishing crops on the furrows formed by 
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tillage. The technique controls erosion by slowing down run-off and redirecting it around the 
hill-slope. The practice also prevents the movement of soil particles and fertilizer loss. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the four soil conservation practices. Given the 
duration that these practices have been in use in the study area, the practices were mature at 
the time of the study therefore we are not likely to generate biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates that can be obtained if practices are studied when they have just been introduced 
(Marenya & Barrett 2007). 
Table 6. 3:  Soil conservation practices implemented by sampled farmers 
Soil conservation 
practice
Adopters 
(%)
Extent of adoption Threshold Length of practice 
(years)
Mean SD Unit Mean SD
Napier grass 76.6 0.14 0.15 ha 2% of farm 12.6 11.22
Bench terraces 31.8 264.7 322.29 m/ha 50 m/ha 17.1 14.16
Contour farming 38.0 0.72 0.510 ha 10% of farm 17.9 13.96
Filter grass strips  20.5 267.1 314.59 m/ha 50 m/ha 12.7 12.83
Source: Authors’ household survey data. 
The trends of long term diffusion of the soil conservation practices (Figure 3) 
indicate that the penetration rate of these practices has been low, with only Napier grass 
having penetrated more than 50% of the potential adopters by 2011.
Figure 6. 2: Trends in diffusion of soil conservation practices in the study area 
Source: Authors’ household survey data
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6.4.3 Binary and Ordered Probit Regression Results
Table 6. 4 and Table 6. 5 present regression estimates from the binary and ordered probit 
regression models respectively. Both models are highly significant (p<0.01), based on the 
likelihood ratio test for the null hypotheses that all the coefficients in each model are 
simultaneously equal to zero. Pregibon’s link test for model specification (Pregibon, 1980)
and Hosmer–Lemeshow statistic were used to assess the fit of the models. Given that p > 0.1 
in both cases, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the models accurately fit the data. 
6.4.3.1 Determinants of Participation in Collective Action 
Participation in the collective action initiatives was found to be significantly influenced by 
all the components of social capital included in the model. Social participation, social support, 
reciprocity and trustworthiness had significant positive influences on participation in 
collective action. It is worth noting that the different components of social capital are 
embedded and complement each other as indicated  by their strong joint influence on 
participation in collective action (Wald statistic = 68.56, p < 0.01). For example, social 
participation, which was measured by the degree of household membership and active 
participation in communal groups and associations, provides opportunities for individuals to 
establish social networks and engage in repeated interactions hence form reputation and 
trustworthiness.
An increase in social participation by one unit increases the probability of participating 
in collective action initiatives by 41 percentage points. Trustworthiness was measured using 
indicators that required respondents to express to what extent they felt fellow community 
members could be trusted and was found to positively influence participation in collective 
action. A high level of trustworthiness creates trust among individuals in a community and 
enhances the tendencies of individuals to work together. Most collective action initiatives 
which involve reciprocate exchanges are built on trust, which ‘‘….involves opportunities for 
both trustor and trustee to enhance their welfare’’ (Ostrom & Ahn 2009). For instance, a 
farmer will only lend their labour time to other farmers when he/she can trust that they will 
reciprocate in future. When trust is well established, it eliminates the need for costly 
monitoring and enforcement since individuals expect others to act in accordance with the 
shared norms. 
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Table 6. 4: Determinants of participation in collective action 
Variable Coefficients Std. error Average marginal 
effects
Constant -4.086*** 0.677
Degree of social support 1.490* 0.882 0.393
Intensity of social participation 5.354*** 0.693 1.411
Intensity of social networks -1.474** 0.698 -0.388
Level of participation in reciprocate exchanges 0.969* 0.524 0.255
Level of trustworthiness 0.683** 0.267 0.180
Farm located close to river source 0.356* 0.207 0.094
Household asset ownership 0.512 0.730 0.135
Perceives participation as beneficial 0.138 0.246 0.036
Distance to tarmark road 0.010 0.009 0.003
Years of living in the community 0.008 0.006 0.002
Number of adults in the households 0.055 0.054 0.014
Involvement with an external organization 0.432** 0.206 0.114
Model summary
Number of observations 307
Pseudo R2  0.32/5Ȥ2 (12 d.f)                      136.95***
Log likelihood                  -144.191
% of correct predictions a 76.55
a Model predictions based on the threshold,  c = 0.5 *, **, and *** Coefficients are significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.
A unit increase in the intensity of social networks reduces the probability of 
participating in collective action initiatives by 38.8 percentage points. One possible 
explanation for this result is that because this indicator included networks outside the 
community, community members with wider and stronger links outside the community may 
opt out of local communal initiatives and therefore reduce the likelihood of participating in 
local collective action. This result was supported by the positive influence of distance to the 
tarmac road indicating that the households in the interior with little access to the outsiders 
were more likely to participate in collective action initiatives at local level.  As expected, 
households within WRUAs located closer to a river source had a higher probability of 
participating in collective action by initiatives 9.4 percentage points. Proximity to river 
sources makes it technically easier and cheaper for individuals to tap water for domestic and 
irrigation purposes collectively from a common intake, one of the most common forms of 
collective action in the area.  
6.4.3.2 Determinants of Soil Conservation Effort 
The estimated average marginal effects in Table 6. 5 are interpreted as percentage 
changes on soil conservation effort when an explanatory variable changes by one unit. For a 
positive marginal effect, an increase in explanatory variable would cause an increase in the 
Chapter 6: Effects of Social Influence and Collective Action on Soil Conservation Efforts
118
latent variable, hence the probability that Yi=3 will increase while the probability that Yi=1 
will decrease.  
Male gender, higher level of education and better access to credit had positive
influence on the soil conservation effort as expected.  Male headed households are 8.4 
percentage points more likely to implement 3-4 soil conservation practices compared to 
female headed households. This finding is consistent with that of Marenya and Barrett, 2007. 
Gender differences in soil conservation behaviour are manifested through gender influences 
on access and control of resources (such as land and labour), and access to information and 
credit services, factors that are important in determining soil conservation effort. Consistent 
with human capital theory, increasing the average household education level by one year 
increases soil conservation effort by 1.1 percentage points.
Access to credit influenced the soil conservation effort positively. Access to credit 
relaxes the household cash constraint thereby facilitating the acquisition of inputs necessary 
for establishing soil conservation practices. Secure land tenure and access to extension 
services had the expected positive influence on soil conservation effort but the coefficients 
were insignificant. The coefficient of farm size was negative, against expectations. Although 
it is obvious that soil conservation practices vary with scale of operation, a possible 
explanation of this finding is that in the Lake Naivasha basin case, farmers with smaller farms 
could have higher incentives to implement more soil conservation practices to prevent soil 
erosion from further reducing their actual area of production. 
Results indicate that households who perceived soil erosion as a problem in the area 
also had a higher soil conservation effort. This is in agreement with earlier work by Asafu-
Adjay, 2008; Ervin & Ervin 1982 and Rogers, 1995 who identified  perception on soil erosion  
as  a key first step preceding decisions to adopt soil conservation practices. Ownership of 
cattle increased the soil conservation effort by 12.0 percentage points. Farmers are likely to 
implement soil conservation practices that have win-win benefits such as Napier grass and 
Filter grass strips which provide fodder to complement those that only create long term 
benefits of soil erosion control and improved crop productivity such as terraces.  
The marginal effect of the inverse mills ratio was 0.044 and significant indicating the 
presence of a positive selectivity bias in the model. This implies that an individual with 
average sample characteristics who self selects into participation in collective action 
implemented more soil conservation practices compared to an individual with average set of 
characteristics drawn at random from the population. Participation in collective initiatives 
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enhances soil conservation since it creates an opportunity for farmer-to-farmer exchange of 
planting materials, information and labour. Exchange of labour enables the household to 
overcome labour constraints and therefore improve their prospects to implement labour 
intensive soil conservation practices. Community collective action initiatives also boost soil 
conservation because of the possibility of collective learning, selection of appropriate soil 
conservation practices and accessing innovations that adapt soil conservation practices to 
local conditions.
Increasing neighborhood social influence intensity by one unit was found to decrease 
the   soil conservation effort by 16.0 percentage points. Considering that neighbourhood social 
influences could either be positive (encouraging soil conservation) or negative (discouraging 
soil conservation) this result implies that the negative neighbourhood social influence among 
the sampled households is stronger. This may explain the observation that soil conservation 
effort was generally low. For example only 31.8% of the farmers had implemented terracing 
which is a more demanding soil conservation practice.  
Finally, subjective norms had a significant positive influence on soil conservation effort. 
The subjective norm considered in the analysis was the believe that individuals would adopt a 
technology (or not adopt) just because those important to them think they should do so. 
Individuals who held such believe had a higher soil conservation effort by 9.7 percentage 
points. As indicated by Ajzen and Fishbein (1975) subjective norms reflect some degree of 
social pressure and therefore the behavior of referent farmers may influence a farmer’s 
intention on accepting a particular practice. 
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Table 6. 5:  Determinants of soil conservation effort
Coefficients Std. Err. Average Marginal Effects
Explanatory variables ȕ S.E Prob 
(Yi=0)
Prob 
(Yi=1)
Prob 
(Yi=2)
Prob 
(Yi=3)
Gender of household head 0.353** 0.188 -0.052 -0.070 0.038 0.084
Farm size -0.051*** 0.017 0.008 0.010 -0.005 -0.012
Education level of household 0.048** 0.021 -0.007 -0.010 0.005 0.011
Access to credit 0.229*** 0.088 -0.034 -0.045 0.025 0.055
Distance to the River 0.039* 0.022 -0.006 -0.008 0.004 0.009
Subjective norms 0.408*** 0.134 -0.060 -0.081 0.044 0.097
Perception that soil erosion is a 
problem 0.296** 0.127 -0.044 -0.059 0.032 0.071
Cattle ownership 0.500** 0.255 -0.074 -0.099 0.054 0.120
Land tenure 0.127 0.137 -0.019 -0.025 0.014 0.030
Access to extension services 0.042 0.134 -0.006 -0.008 0.005 0.010
Household located in the Kinangop 
plateau -0.025 0.146 0.004 0.005 -0.003 -0.006
Neighbourhood Social Influence
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.668*
0.184*
0.357
0.104
0.099
-0.027
0.133
-0.037
-0.072
0.020
-0.160
0.044
Threshold parameters
ߠଵ -0.245 0.459ߠଶ 1.065 0.462ߠଷ 2.254 0.469
Model summary
No. of observations 307
Pseudo R2  0.087
/5Ȥ2 (13 d.f )                      67.49***
Log likelihood                  -356.300
*, **, and ***: coefficients are significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively
6.5 Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the effects of social influence and 
participation in collective action initiatives on soil conservation effort among smallholder 
farmers in Lake Naivasha basin, rural Kenya. The chapter applies binary and ordered probit 
models in a two stage regression procedure to cross-sectional data collected through a 
household survey among randomly selected smallholder farmers.  Smallholder farming 
systems in the research area are associated with practices that render farmlands susceptible to 
soil erosion causing negative impacts on land productivity and the environment. Therefore, 
strategies that encourage soil conservation are likely to also offer solutions for dealing with 
agri-environmental challenges and poverty alleviation. 
The binary probit regression results indicated that three components of social capital: 
social participation, social support, reciprocity and trustworthiness had positive influences on 
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the probability of participating in collective action while social networks had a negative 
influence. Location of households closer to sources of rivers and involvement with external 
organizations was found to also enhance participation in collective action. It therefore 
emerges that social capital facilitates collective action. The findings from the ordered probit 
regression model indicate that participation in collective action initiatives enhances individual 
soil conservation efforts. This important finding indicates that social control that emerges 
from peer pressure and intrinsic subjective norms can substitute for pure economic incentives 
as a motivation for engaging in soil conservation. Neighbourhood social influences, subjective 
norms, gender, education level, farm size, access to credit and livestock ownership also 
emerge as key determinants of soil conservation effort.
From these findings three main policy implications can be drawn. First, soil 
conservation could benefit from efforts to encourage participation in collective action and 
enhanced effectiveness of existing collective action initiatives. One possible approach to 
achieve this is through policies that recognize local groups and facilitate capacity building 
through training of trainers within the community to strengthen local knowledge, leadership 
and innovativeness. Further, community participatory approaches could be enhanced as an 
incentive for participation in collective action on management of natural resources. Also, 
strategies that encourage regional social capital formation such as creating an enabling 
environment for local groups to form and thrive may boost collective action, especially on soil 
conservation and management of other natural resources. Secondly, the existing extension 
policy needs to be strengthened to incorporate strategies that recognize the important role 
played by neighbourhood social influence and subjective norms in dissemination of 
information and technologies including soil conservation practices.        
Third, the results also suggest the need for strengthening of existing policies on access 
to agricultural credit and those that address gender related challenges on access to resources 
and information such as the law on affirmative action to encourage soil conservation among 
marginalized groups. 
Chapter 7: Modeling the Diffusion of Rain Water Harvesting Techniques 
122
CHAPTER SEVEN
7 Modeling the Diffusion of Rain Water Harvesting 
Techniques19
7.1 Introduction 
According to the World Bank (2013) the annual renewable internal freshwater 
resources per capita in Kenya averaged at 497.48 M3 in 2011, placing Kenya among water 
scarce countries. This figure is projected to drop to 359 M3 by 2020 (UN-WWAP 2006), 
mainly due to the increased demand resulting from population growth. In addition to general 
water scarcity, most regions of Kenya are prone to high rainfall variability which, together 
with high evaporation rates, results in frequent temporary shortages of available water for rain 
fed crops and agricultural, domestic and livestock watering uses. Since access to public water 
infrastructure is underdeveloped in rural areas, agricultural productivity and availability of 
water for household and livestock use is to a large extent dependent on natural weather 
conditions, making farm households highly vulnerable to droughts. Also, given the relative 
importance of water as an agricultural input, water scarcity and unstable supply is likely to 
have negative impacts on the agricultural sector and on rural development. To deal with the 
challenge, it is essential that appropriate and affordable adaptive and coping strategies are 
implemented. Some of the possible adaptive mechanisms to deal with weather related shocks 
include crop and livestock insurance, diversification of crop enterprises, adoption of drought 
tolerant varieties (DTVs) and irrigation. Although the first three strategies are also important, 
this study focuses on irrigation. Irrigation is a strategy that can enhance crop productivity, 
minimize crop failures and enhance employment in agriculture in the face of extreme dry 
weather conditions (Jara-Rojas et al. 2012). However, sustainable and reliable supply of water 
is a critical success factor for irrigation. At the micro-level (household), one of the options for 
establishing a reliable supply of water and ensuring sustainable food production is engaging in 
ex-situ rain water harvesting (RWH) (Ngigi 2003). 
Ex-situ rain water harvesting is a simple and relatively low cost decentralized water 
supply technique that involves collecting and storing rain water for future use in productive 
19 This Chapter is based on the article: 
Willy, D.K., Kuhn, A., Forthcoming. Modelling Diffusion of Rain Water Harvesting Techniques under 
Uncertain Weather Conditions: A Duration Analysis. Agric. Water Management. (Under Review).  
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activities such as domestic purposes, livestock watering and crop production. RWH enables 
households to improve their water supply and avert weather related risks and uncertainties. 
Since households who face frequent droughts also experience excess runoff during the rainy 
season, they could harness this excess run-off during the rainy season and use it during the dry 
season or during intra-seasonal dry spells to improve crop productivity especially in dry land 
farming. The most common ex-situ rain water harvesting techniques (RWHTs) are surface 
runoff harvesting and roof catchment rain water harvesting. Surface runoff harvesting 
involves diverting water-that flows off land when it rains- from road drainage or ephemeral 
streams into constructed reservoirs while roof catchment is a technique that involves 
harvesting rain water from roofs and storing in reservoirs or water tanks. RWH can be viewed 
as one of the most practical and cost effective solutions to water shortages, especially in 
improving rural water supply in many parts of the world where centralized water supply 
solutions prove too costly and ineffective. However, the diffusion of these techniques among 
rural households has been slow (Kahinda & Taigbenu 2011).     
Previous studies on adoption and diffusion of RWHTs have focused mainly on  
understanding the interactions between rain water harvesting and crop yields (Adekalu et al. 
2009; Barron & Okwach 2005; Wimalasuriya et al. 2008); modelling the ecohydrological 
dynamics associated with RWH (Ngigi 2003; Welderufael et al. 2013); testing and assessing 
the economic feasibility of RWHTs (Abu-Zreig et al. 2000; Kahinda et al. 2010; Pandey 
1991) and assessing the challenges associated with RWH (Kahinda et al. 2007). An equally 
important aspect of rain water harvesting but which has received limited attention in literature 
is the identification of constraints to the implementation and spatial-temporal diffusion of 
RWHTs. A study by Kahinda and Taigbenu (2011) identified  poor legislation, financial 
constraints and organizational issues as some of the constraints to diffusion of RWHTs at 
National level in South Africa. A few other studies in this vein (for example Jara-Rojas et al. 
2012) and Sidibé 2005) have assessed adoption and diffusion at household level to identify 
the factors that constraint individual efforts to implement in-situ rain water harvesting. From 
these studies, it has emerged that natural and social capital, age, education level, income and 
access to extension services have a positive effect on the adoption of RWHTs. Differences in 
adoption behaviour could also be explained by technological advancements that could make 
the technology affordable and profitable over time, farmers’ attitudes towards risk, land 
tenure, farmers’ age, education and land tenure (Fuglie & Kascak 2001; Rogers 1995).   
Chapter 7: Modeling the Diffusion of Rain Water Harvesting Techniques 
124
Despite the relative importance of RWHTs in rural development and food security, 
there is dearth of empirical studies that address the issue of diffusion of these techniques at a 
wide spatial scale.  Beside understanding why some people would adopt a technology while 
others would not, it is also important to use approaches that help to explain the timing of 
adoption decisions since in most cases there are significant differences in adoption behaviour
over time (Burton et al. 2003; Fuglie & Kascak 2001). 
Lags in adoption between farms could have implications on farm performance and 
survival considering that farms who engage in timely adoption of a technology are likely to 
accrue the benefits associated with that technology first. Understanding why some individuals 
adopt a technology earlier than others would therefore be important in facilitating 
development of strategies and policies that accelerate dissemination of technologies.  
This chapter uses a parametric econometric duration model (log-logistic) to analyze 
the diffusion of two RWHTs in a case study for the Lake Naivasha basin in Kenya’s rift 
valley. The study seeks to assess the trends in diffusion of RWHTs in the 50 years preceding 
2010 and identify the drivers and constraints to the diffusion process of these techniques. 
Specifically the study seeks to analyze the influence of rainfall variability household water 
demand on the diffusion path of RWHTs over time.  Further, the influence of information 
sources, perceptions on water scarcity and other demographic attributes on the time that 
farmers wait before adopting run-off and roof-catchment rain water harvesting techniques is 
explored. 
The rest of the chapter is planned as follows: Section 7.2 describes the theoretical and 
empirical models while section 7.3 describes data collection methods, variables and 
hypotheses. In section 7.4 we present and discuss descriptive statistics and log-logistic 
regression analysis results. Section 7.5 concludes and draws policy implications and future 
research outlook.
7.2 Theoretical, Empirical and Conceptual Frameworks
7.4.1 Epidemic Theory of Innovation Diffusion 
A number of theories have been put forward to explain the process of technology 
diffusion among individuals and explain the lag in technology diffusion among individual 
farmers or firms. One of the popular theories that explain why and how technologies diffuse 
among individuals over time is the theory of diffusion of innovations developed by Rogers 
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(1962), which is one of the epidemic theories of innovation diffusion. According to the
theory, the spread of a new technology is driven by the innovation, communication channels, 
time, and the social system. The basic tenet of the theory is that innovations diffuse 
contagiously across space driven by exposure to information and knowledge which creates 
awareness and favourable attitudes/perceptions leading to adoption. It is assumed that there is 
a population of initial innovative and risk taking adopters who take the lead in adoption of 
new innovations and then they are imitated by an exponentially growing number of later 
adopters. Technology diffusion is believed to be mainly driven by contact and communication 
among individuals within the environment where the technology is disseminated (Calatrava & 
Franco 2011). Communication facilitates build-up of internal information and experience 
within the system which circulates as existing users spread it among the potential adopters 
through contagion. Consequently, individuals will adopt a technology at different times. For 
every individual, adoption of innovations is assumed to go through five steps: knowledge, 
persuasion, decision, implementation and confirmation (Rogers 1962).  
More recently, some advances on the epidemic theories of technology diffusion have 
emerged. For example a theory by  Karshenas & Stoneman (1993) considers three possible 
mechanisms that may cause technology adoptions at different times, mapping out the 
technology diffusion path. The authors call these mechanisms rank, stock, and order effects. 
The rank effects assume that individuals are heterogeneous in personal attributes causing 
individual variation in the net benefits obtained from an innovation. Individuals who are 
likely to achieve high returns adopt the technology earlier and those likely to generate lower 
returns adopt the innovation later. Secondly, the stock effects relate to the costs and benefits 
that accrue to marginal adopters which are assumed to decline with time. Initial high costs 
imply that only few firms take up the new technology and benefit from the high returns. High 
initial profits encourage adoptions of the technology until a point of saturation where a 
decline in prices causes a decline in profitability and therefore discouraging more adoptions.
Finally, the order effects are associated with the assumption that the returns a firm gets from 
adoption will depend on their position in the order of adoption. Adoption decisions are based 
on the potential effect of waiting (moving down the order) on profitability. Individuals will 
therefore act strategically depending on their expectations on the number of future adopters. 
To model the above mentioned process theoretically, the approach by Karshenas & 
Stoneman (1993) and also applied by  Abdulai & Huffman (2005) is adapted. It is assumed 
that farmer i in village j may adopt   RWH   by investing in a RWH technique at an 
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investment cost of  ܥ௧ at time t. The gross benefits that the farm obtains from using the 
technology in period ߬ can be represented by ݇௜௧(߬). The benefits are a function of individual 
attributes (ܺ௜) (rank effects), the number of previous adopters ( ௝ܼ(ݐ)) (stock effects) and the 
expected number of future adoptions ( ௝ܸ(ݐ))(order effects). That is, a farmer i, adopting a 
RWHT at time t, expect the following gross benefits per period in time ߬ : 
݇௜௧(߬) = ݂ ቀ ௜ܺ, ௝ܼ(ݐ), ௝ܸ(߬)ቁ ; ߬ ൒ ݐ, ଶ݂ < 0, ଷ݂ < 0 (7.1)
Letting r be the interest rate and assuming no depreciation, the increase in present value 
of gross benefits in time t (ܭ௜(ݐ)) will be: 
ܭ௜(ݐ) = ׬ ܾ(ܺ௜, ௝ܼ(ݐ), ௝ܸ(߬)ஶ௧ ) exp{െݎ(߬ െ ݐ)} ݀߬ (7.2)
According to Karshenas & Stoneman (1993), the optimal timing of adoption will 
depend on two conditions. First, the profitability condition requiring that adoption will occur 
at time t if at that time the technology yields a positive net benefit.   The net present value of 
acquisition of the technology ௜ܰ(ݐ) can be expressed as: 
௜ܰ(ݐ) = െܥ௧ + ܭ௜(ݐ) ൒ 0 (7.3)
The second condition is called the arbitrage condition because it requires that at the 
optimal time of adoption, net benefits are not increasing over time. That is,  
ݕ௜(ݐ) = ݀[ ௜ܰ(ݐ) exp(െݎݐ)]݀ݐ ൑ 0 (7.4)
where ௜ܰ(ݐ) is discounted to ensure a common time basis for evaluation. For each 
potential adopter, it is the arbitrage condition that determines the optimal adoption time (ݐכ)
such that: 
ݕ௜ݐ௜כ ൑ 0 (7.5)
It can be shown that there exists an optimum value of ௜ܰ(ݐ) at some time ݐ < λ. To 
do this, the conditions under which ௜ܰ(ݐ) can be bounded are identified. Assuming an upper 
bound തܾ for the benefits ܾ(ȉ) and a lower bound for the cost of the technology ܥ, then,
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௜ܰ(ݐ) ൑ ׬ തܾஶ௧ exp{െݎ(߬ െ ݐ)} ݀߬ ൑ െܥ + ҧ݃ ݎΤ and ௜ܰ(ݐ) is bounded from above. Therefore, 
it is possible to show that for every potential adopter in the population, there exists an 
optimum time ݐ௜כ < λ, where net benefits of adoption are maximized. For an individual to be 
considered an adopter there must be a cost ܥ௧ ൒ ܥ where the net benefits ௜ܰ(ݐ) are non 
negative. Therefore, the limit of  ௜ܰ(ݐ) as time goes to infinity is given by 
݈݅݉௧՜ஶ ௜ܰ(ݐ) = ݈݅݉௧՜ஶൣെܥ + ׬ തܾஶ௧ ݁ݔ݌{െݎ(߬ െ ݐ)}݀߬൧ = െܥ < 0. Since it is assumed that 
every individual is a potential adopter [ ௜ܰ(ݐ) > 0 ݂݋ݎ ݈݈ܽ ݅], then ௜ܰ(ݐ) must achieve its 
maximum at some ݐ < λ. This also implies that for a potential adopter the arbitrage 
condition dominates the profitability condition and therefore it is the arbitrage condition that 
determines the optimum adoption time.  Combining (7.2) and (7.3) and differentiating e(െݎݐ) ȉ ௜ܰ(ݐ) with respect to t yields the following expression of ݕ௜(ݐ)
ݕ௜(ݐ) = ݎ ܥ(ݐ) + න ܾଶ(ஶ௧ ܺ௜, ௝ܼ(ݐ), ௝ܸ(߬))ݏ(ݐ) exp{െݎ(߬ െ ݐ)}݀߬ െ ܾ(ܺ௜, ௝ܼ(ݐ), ௝ܸ(ݐ)) (7.6)
where s(t) and c(t) are the expected changes in the number of users and the cost of the 
technology in a small time interval (t, t+dt). Equation (7.6) states that the benefits from 
waiting for a time interval before adopting is a function of the interest saved, the expected 
reduction of adoption cost, the net present value of the changes in benefits resulting from a 
move down the order of adoption for all ߬ ൒ ݐ and the benefits forgone for not having the 
technology for the time interval. For simplicity, it is assumed that the marginal benefits from 
moving down the adoption order at time t are independent of the level of future stock of 
adopters  ௝ܸ(߬) for ߬ > ݐ. Therefore, equation (7.6) can be simplified to: 
ݕ௜(ݐ) = ݎ ܥ(ݐ) + ܿ(ݐ) + ܾଶ ቀܺ௜ , ௝ܼ(ݐ), ௝ܸ(ݐ)ቁ ݏ(ݐ) ݎΤ െ ܾ(ܺ௜ , ௝ܼ(ݐ), ௝ܸ(ݐ)) (7.7)
The exact time of adoption ݐ௜ for indivindual i can be obtained from (7.6) and (7.7). 
This model abstracts from real life factors that are known with certainty to the adopters but 
may not be included in the model directly. These factors may be incorporated into the model 
through a random error term, ߝ. Therefore, the stochastic form of equation (7.5) assuming a 
distribution of ߝ that is invariant across all individuals over time will be: 
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ݕ௜(ݐ) + ߝ ൑ 0 (7.8)
From equation (7.8) we can establish the empirical model that captures the theoretical 
process described above. This is best captured by specifying a duration or hazard function. 
The probability of adopting in the time interval   t, t+dt given that an individual has not 
adopted until that time can be represented as the hazard rate ݄(ݐ) given by 
݄௜(ݐ) = ݌ݎ݋ܾ[(ݕ௜(ݐ) + ߝ ൑ 0)] = ߦ[െݕ௜(ݐ)] (7.9)
The unconditional probability of adoption can be expressed as a function of time and the 
parameters influencing individual adoptions. The density function (݂(ȉ)) of adoption time can 
be expressed as ݂(ݐ,ܺ, ߚ) and its associated distribution function is therefore F(ݐ,ܺ,ߚ). The 
hazard function can then be specified in terms of the density distribution function as follows: 
݄(ݐ) = ݈݅݉݀ݐ ՜ λ Pr(ݐ + ݀ݐ > ߬ > ݐ|߬ > ݐ)݀ݐ = ݂(ݐ)ܵ(ݐ) (7.10)
Where ܵ(ݐ) = ݌ݎ݋ܾ(݀ݐ > ݐ) is the survival function, which captures the probability 
that the non-adoption state will last at least until t. The survival function is a monotone non-
increasing function of time and measures the probability that the length of the spell is at least 
t. In other words, it provides the proportion of the sample that has not yet adopted up to time t. 
On the other hand, the hazard function is the instantaneous rate of adoption and gives the rate 
of change in the survival function with respect to time. It is the probability that adoption 
occurs at a certain time interval, given that the subject has survived up to the beginning of that 
interval.  Further, since 1-S(t) gives the probability that an individual will have adopted the 
technology by time t, this could be extended to the population and used to represent the 
proportion of individuals that has adopted the technology. This is the expected diffusion of the 
technology.
7.4.2 The Log-Logistic Duration Model
Estimating the hazard function empirically can either be done through parametric or 
non-parametric procedures.   Non-parametric models such as the proportional–hazard model 
(Cox 1972) are used when a specific functional form of the baseline hazard function is not 
assumed.  The parametric models on the other hand involve the assumption of a parametric 
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distribution for the time-to -adoption and then estimation of the coefficients. The most 
common parametric functional forms that have been used for duration models are: 
exponential, log-normal, Weibull, log-logistic, and Gamma probability distributions. The 
functional form of the hazard function depends on the distribution of the baseline hazard rate; 
therefore it is important to carefully select the parametric model to be applied in every 
specific case. To determine the parametric functional form that fits the   data, two approaches 
are commonly used. According to Cleves et al. (2008) a smoothed estimate of the baseline 
hazard function is generated to determine the functional form. Alternatively, a generalized 
Gamma distribution model is estimated first and then likelihood ratio or Wald test is used to 
determine which of the nested models provides a satisfactory fit for the data (Jenkins 2004).   
In the current paper, both approaches were used leading to selection of the log-logistic  
duration model as the one that provides the best fit for the data on  the diffusion of run-off  
and roof catchment rain water harvesting. The log-logistic duration model is an Accelerated 
Failure Time (AFT) metric model with a non-monotonic hazard function. The ATF models 
are called so because a positive coefficient in ߚ serves to increase the expected value of the 
log of time to adoption   and also because the marginal effects of the covariates accelerate 
with time.
The log-ORJLVWLFGXUDWLRQPRGHOKDV WKHKD]DUGUDWHKW;ȕZKLFK is expressed in 
equation (7.11).
݄(ݐ,ܺ,ߚ) = ߤଵఊݐ(ଵఊିଵ)
ߛ ቈ1െ (ߤݐ)ଵఊ቉ (7.11)
where ߛ is the shape parameter and if ߛ < 1 then the hazard first raises with time then 
falls monotonically; ߤ ؠ ݁ݔ݌(െߚכƍܺ) where X  is a vector representing rank, stock and order 
explanatory variables and  
ߚƍܺ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ( ଵܺ + 1) + ߚଶܺଶ +ڮ+ ߚ௞ ௜ܺ (7.12)
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The unknown parameters (ȕk and Ȗ) are to be obtained by estimating equation (7.11) 
using maximum likelihood method subject to right censoring by maximizing the likelihood 
function: 
(7.13)
The log-logistic model described above was used to identify the factors that influence 
the length of time that farmers wait before they adopt RWHTs. The hazard rate is the 
probability that a farmer adopts a water harvesting technology at time t given that they have 
not adopted until that time. The dependent variable is the log of the number of years between 
the time when the technology became available and the time a farmer eventually adopted the 
technology. Farmers who had not adopted the technologies by the beginning of 2011 when the 
survey was conducted were right-censored. The effects of individual characteristics on the 
hazard function are captured by the covariates included in X.
7.3 Variables and Hypotheses 
In the Lake Naivasha basin, crop production is mainly rain fed, while water for 
activities such as domestic, livestock watering and supplementary irrigation is sourced from 
boreholes/wells, surface water reservoirs, and other rainfall-dependent sources such as rivers 
and wetlands (Figure 7. 1). This dependence on rainfall for water for major uses implies that 
farmers are largely vulnerable to weather related shocks and sensitive to temporally water 
shortages. 
Figure 7. 1: Relative importance of water sources in the Lake Naivasha Basin
Source: Authors’ survey data
An interview schedule was used to collect data on rain water harvesting techniques 
that had been implemented by the farmers. The respondents were asked to recall the year 
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when they first adopted rain water harvesting techniques. This information was then used to 
compute the time lag from when the rain water harvesting techniques were available to the 
time they actually adopted, which is used as the dependent variable. We are aware that long 
time of recall may introduce measurement errors, and therefore during data collection it was 
ensured that there was substantial probing and also use of check questions to minimize the 
reporting error. However, although this response error may increase the variance of estimates, 
it will not cause bias in the coefficients as long as unobserved heterogeneity is identified and 
handled appropriately (Fuglie & Kascak 2001). Data on the household’s socio-economic, 
demographic and institutional attributes was also collected.   
To generate the variables on rainfall variability, daily rainfall data records from sixty-
seven rain gauges within the Lake Naivasha basin for the period 1957-2010 were obtained 
from the Kenya meteorological department. Gaps in the rainfall data were interpolated using 
the squared inverse weighted distance (IWD) interpolation method (Shepard 1968). In this 
method, the rain stations close to the one being interpolated contribute more than those far 
away. (Meins 2013) provides detailed procedures on the process of interpolation of the 
rainfall data used in this study. The final daily rainfall data was used to construct indicators of 
weather variability for each of the eight sub-catchments (WRUAs). In this study, the rainfall 
anomaly index (RAI), Consecutive Dry Days (CDD) and the amount of rainfall per rainy day 
were used as indicators of rainfall variability. The RAI indicator was developed by Van Rooy
(1965) and is based on the long term average of rainfall and reveals by what percentage the 
rainfall in a particular year is either higher (positive RAI) or lower (negative RAI) than the 
long term average. On the other hand, CDD (Deni & Jemain 2009) captures the total number 
of consecutive dry days with no measurable rainfall within a particular year.  
The choice of explanatory variables was done systematically by first deciding which 
variables were theoretically important for the two models and then each variable was 
examined to decide whether it should be included in the final model or not following the 
procedure suggested by Hosmer & Lemeshow (1999). To achieve this log-rank test of 
equality of survival functions was used in the case of categorical variables while for 
continuous variables the univariate Cox proportional hazard regression, a semi-parametric 
method was applied. A value of p = 0.2 was used as the maximum threshold and therefore all 
the variables that were significant at the p < 0.2 where selected for inclusion in the model.  
While it would have been better to include all the relevant time-variant covariates in 
the models, this was not possible in the current study due to data limitations. Inclusion of 
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time-variant covariates such as farm size, prices and household labour and asset endowments 
would require panel data indicating the level of these variables at different points in time. 
However, to assess the change in adoption behaviour with time, the data was split into two 
sub-periods and estimated regression models for the two sub-periods an approach similar to 
that of Abdulai & Huffman (2005).
A list of relevant explanatory variables representing rank, order and stock effects was 
selected. Variables capturing rank effects included variables on farm and farmer specific 
attributes such as farmer’s age at the time of adoption, education level, and information 
sources, perceptions on water scarcity and location and rainfall variability indicators. Stock 
and order effects were captured through the number of previous adopters and the number of 
expected adopters at village level. The current water use in cubic meters per capita for 
domestic and non-domestic uses was included as an indicator of household water demand. We 
hold the household water use behaviour constant and therefore these variables can also be 
considered time invariant. Table 7. 1 lists the variables used in the current study, their 
descriptive statistics and hypothesized signs.
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Table 7. 1 : Variables used in duration analysis of rain water harvesting techniques 
Description  and measure Mean Expected 
sign 
Age of household head at the time of adopting roof catchment  44.57 +
Age of household head at the time of adopting run-off harvesting  42.27 +
No formal education attained (1 = yes, 0=No) 0.21 +
Attained  primary education level (1 = yes, 0=No) 0.46 -
Attained  secondary education level(1 = yes, 0=No) 0.27 -
Attained  post-secondary education (1= yes, 0=No) 0.06 -
Number of previous adopters of roof catchment technology(village) 16.55 -
Number of potential roof catchment adopters (village) 23.42 -
Number of previous adopters of run-off harvesting practice(village) 0.63 +/-
Number of expected run-off  harvesting adopters (village) 31.56 +/-
Obtained information from  informal sources   (Dummy: 1=yes) 0.32 -
Perception that water in getting scarce (Dummy: 1=yes) 0.92 -
Ownership of  well/Borehole (Dummy: 1=yes) 0.21 -
Access to formal sources of information  (Dummy: 1=yes) 0.46 -
Access to credit (Dummy: 1=yes) 0.86 +
Distance from the farm to the nearest river (km) 2.07 -
WRUA located in high altitude region (Dummy: 1=yes) 0.36 +
Number of consecutive dry days per year 49.26 -
Annual rainfall anomaly index .005 -
Long season rainfall anomaly index .015 -
Short season rainfall anomaly index -.001 -
Annual average amount of rainfall per rainy day  3.20 -
Long season  average amount of rainfall per rainy day  4.02 -
Short season average amount of rainfall per rainy day  2.95 -
Domestic water demand (M3/ adult equivalent/year) 13.29 -
Non domestic water demand (M3/ adult equivalent/year) 37.79 -
7.4 Results and Discussions 
7.4.1 Trends in Diffusion of Rain Water Harvesting Techniques 
The diffusion path of RWHTs among the sampled households is as shown in Figure 7.
2, while Figure 7. 3 shows the spatial distribution of water ponds in the Lake Naivasha Basin.
The earliest adoptions of run-off rain water harvesting and roof-catchment rain water 
harvesting were in 1960 and 1963 respectively as reported by the respodents. The adoption of 
both RWH practices was slow in the initial years, but accelerated after 1980, with faster 
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adoption rates reported in the roof-catchment rain water harvesting technique. The period post 
2000 displayed a relatively accelerated rate of technology diffusion. 
Figure 7. 2: The rate of diffusion of RWHTs among the sampled farmers
Figure 7. 3: Sub-catchments and distribution of water pans in the Lake Naivasha Basin 
Table 7. 2 presents information on the waiting time until adoption of RWHTs in the 
eight sub-catchments. The table presents percentages of farmers who adopted RWHTs within 
each of the specified time periods: less than 10 years, between 10 and 20 years and more than 
20 years. The waiting time was shorter in the adoption of roof catchment since 54.7% of all 
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adoptions occurred within a period of less than 10 years, as compared to 36.8% of run-off 
harvesting adoptions. 
Table 7. 2: Time lags before adoption of RWHTs among sampled farmers  
Run-off harvesting Roof catchment
% of adopters per time 
category
Mean time 
to adoption 
(years)
% of adopters per time 
category 
Mean time 
to adoption 
(years)
Sub-catchment less than 
10 years
10-20 
years
Over 20 
years
less than 
10 years
10-20 
years
Over 20 
years
Kianjogu  46.2 26.9 26.9 13.08 65.7 22.9 11.4 9.74
Lower Malewa    0.0 0.0 100.0 12.73 66.7 14.3 19.0 9.57
Middle Malewa    29.2 25.0 45.8 18.54 50.0 26.9 23.1 12.54
Upper Malewa  0.0 50.0 50.0 20.00 43.8 43.8 12.5 11.37
Mkungi Kitiri  33.3 66.7 0.0 8.33 33.3 33.3 33.3 16.44
Upper Gilgil  50.0 40.0 10.0 10.40 61.3 25.8 12.9 10.84
Upper Turasha  36.8 36.8 26.3 13.26 59.5 21.6 18.9 9.49
Wanjohi  0.0 100.0 0.0 13.00 38.5 46.2 15.4 11.08
Total Sample 36.8 32.2 31.0 14.70 54.7 26.9 18.4 11.22
The Kaplan-Meier estimator, a non-parametric procedure was used to summarize the 
time taken until adoption (survival time). In the presence of right-censoring, the Kaplan-Meier 
(K-P) estimator of the survivor function ܵ(ݐ௜) provides a nonparametric and consistent 
estimate of the underlying survivor function (Burton et al. 2003). The K-P estimates are
presented in the step functions in Figure 7.4. The horizontal axis represents the 51 year period 
between 1960 when first adoptions were reported and 2011 when the survey was conducted. 
At time t = 0 all subjects are considered non adopters so the survivor function takes the value 
of 1. All farmers enter the function at t=0 regardless of the calendar time when they begin to 
be observed. As adoptions occur, the survival rate drops. 
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Figure 7.4: Kaplan-Meier survivor functions  
7.4.2 Trends in Rainfall Variability in the Lake Naivasha Basin
7.4.2.1 Mean Rainfall and Coefficient of Variation 
One of the factors that were hypothesized to explain the differences in timing of 
RWHTs between individuals and sub-catchments is rainfall variability. Variability was higher 
in the short rains season (October-December) with the amount of rainfall ranging from 79.50 
mm in 2007 to 634.38 mm in 1961 (Mean= 218.62 mm; CV= 43.99%). Rainfall in the long 
rain season (March-May) ranged from 106.86 mm in 2000 to 500.30 mm in 1977 
(Mean=321.72 mm; CV = 30.58%). Overall in the basin, the annual rainfall varied from 
665.19 mm in 2000 to 1293.75 mm in 1977 with a mean annual rainfall of 974.85 mm 
(CV=15.33%). The number of rain days ranged from 230 days  (1984) to 337 days  (2010) 
with a mean of 283.9 days (CV=8.49%). The number of rain days within the short season 
varied from 50.9 in 1970 to 90 in 2002 with a mean of 74.5 days (CV=13.1%) while in the 
long season the average number of rain days was 80.0 (CV=12.3%) and varied from 51.9 days 
in 1973 to 91.1 days in 2010. Descriptive statistics of variables used as indicators of rainfall 
variability are explained next.
7.4.2.2 Rainfall Variability Indicators   
As indicated in Figure 7.5, rainfall variability differed between the seasons. The 
annual RAI reveals a period of consistently below average rainfall between 1969 and 1979, 
which was followed by above average rainfall until 1985, after which annual rainfall has been 
relatively stable. Rainfall in the long rains season was more variable with two ten year time 
periods (1970-1980 and 1995-2005) where a prolonged below average rainfall was received. 
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On the CDD indicator, the Lake Naivasha basin experiences an average of 48 consecutive dry 
days per year (Figure 7. 6). Further there is a general trend of declining amount of rainfall per 
rainy day annually and seasonally (Figure 7.7). Rainfall variability is hypothesized to be a 
main driver of the diffusion of rain water harvesting techniques. Specific effects of these 
indicators on the diffusion path are explored in detail in the next section. 
Figure 7.5: Rainfall anomaly indeces in the Lake Naivasha basin 
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7.4.3 Determinants of Time to Adoption of Rain Water Harvesting Techniques 
Coefficient and time ratio estimates of the determinants of the time to adoption of 
roof-catchment and run-off harvesting rain water harvesting practices are presented in Table 
7. 3. The coefficients can be interpreted directly as marginal effects while the time ratio gives 
the factor by which the time until adoption is multiplied by if a covariate changes by one unit. 
In the roof catchment duration analysis model, the estimated Gamma is 0.63 (SE=0.033) 
while that of the run-off harvesting model is 0.46 (SE=0.042). The values RIȖ < 1 indicate 
that the hazard rates conditional on the covariates are non-monotonic unimodal, that is, the 
hazard rate first increases then monotonically decreases with time. This further justifies the 
choice of log-logistic parametric duration model. The coefficient of the log of Gamma was 
Figure 7. 6: Mean number of consecutive dry days (CDD) by WRUA 
Figure 7.7 : Trends in the annual and seasonal amount of rainfall per rainy day 
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negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in both models. This implies that both 
run-off and roof catchment rain water harvesting techniques exhibit negative time 
dependence, that is, the longer an individual stays in the non-adoption state, the less he is 
likely to adopt. The models were tested for unobserved heterogeneity which may result from 
the fact that some unobserved covariates such as inherent skills may cause some farmers to be 
more prone to failure (adoption) than others. Using the frailty model approach proposed by 
Hougaard (1995) the null hypothesis that un-observed heterogeneity is not present was tested. 
From the test, a near zero frailty variance was observed indicating that there was negligible 
unobserved heterogeneity in both models. Next the coefficients of covariates that were 
significant are interpreted.
Age and education level were found to significantly influence the time to adoption of 
both RWHTs. The estimated time ratio of the variable age was above 1 for both technologies. 
This indicates that younger farmers adopt rain water harvesting techniques faster compared to 
older ones. These results are consistent with the findings by He et al. (2007) who also found a 
negative relationship between rain water harvesting technology adoption and age. A possible 
explanation to this finding is that RWHTs involve long term investments and older farmers 
may have short investment horizons and may lack the patience to wait for returns on long 
term investments such as rain water harvesting.  The level of education had a significant 
reducing effect on the time to adoption of roof catchment RWHT implying education 
accelerates diffusion of RWHTs. The three indicators used to capture the degree of rainfall 
variability (RAI, CDD and amount of rainfall per rainy day) were found to have some 
accelerating effect on the speed of both RWHTs. The number of consecutive dry days and the 
short season rainfall anomaly index had a negative significant influence on the time to 
adoption of run-off harvesting technologies while the amount of rainfall per rainy day in the 
long season had a positive significant influence on the diffusion rate of roof catchment 
technique. Statistical significant of these variables confirms the hypothesis that households 
are likely to respond to variability in the weather conditions and undertake private 
investments towards stabilizing their water supply as an adaptive mechanism. 
The possibility of alternative water sources such as groundwater abstraction through 
sinking of boreholes and shallow wells was found to delay the diffusion of rain water 
harvesting since the coefficient of ownership of a borehole /well was positive. This finding 
implies that in periods of surface water scarcity, ground water abstraction may increase since 
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households who have access to ground water resources are unlikely to engage in rain water 
harvesting.  
The coefficient of the number of previous adopters at village level was 
negative in both practices as expected, but only the coefficient in run-off harvesting practice 
was significant, implying significant neighbourhood effects on run-off harvesting.  These 
results imply that the possibility of farmers learning from others speeds up diffusion. It could 
also imply that people in the same sub-catchment are sharing unobserved determinants of 
adoption of that practice. This result is consistent with that of informal sources of information 
which were also found to accelerate the diffusion process. Likewise, the coefficient of contact 
with extension service providers was also negative and significant in the roof catchment rain 
water harvesting model. 
Table 7. 3: Log-normal estimates for determinants of time to adoption of RWHTs 
Covariates Roof catchment Runoff harvesting
Coef. Std. Err. Time 
ratio
Coef. Std. 
Err.
Time ratio
Age of household head 0.04*** 0.01 1.04 0.05*** 0.007 1.047
Primary education -0.10 0.20 0.90 0.07 0.250 1.072
Secondary education -0.50** 0.23 0.61 -0.37 0.270 0.689
Secondary education -0.34 0.35 0.71 -0.02 0.396 0.983
Informal source of infom. -0.40*** 0.15 0.67 -0.67*** 0.203 0.510
Access to extension -0.18 0.15 0.84 -0.13 0.172 0.882
Perception on scarcity   -0.35 0.33 0.70 -0.12 0.327 0.887
Credit access 0.06 0.10 1.06 -0.05 0.107 0.952
Owns well/borehole 0.78*** 0.20 2.18 0.28 0.218 1.322
Distance to river -0.02 0.02 0.98 0.00 0.029 0.998
Previous adopters 0.00 0.01 1.00 -0.03* 0.016 0.971
Expected adopters -0.03** 0.01 0.98 -0.02 0.012 0.982
Location 0.22 0.21 1.25 -0.18 0.280 0.833
Cons. dry days 0.00 0.01 1.00 -0.01** 0.006 0.988
Annual anomaly index 0.91 1.50 2.48 1.10 1.769 3.015
LS anomaly index -0.73 0.62 0.48 -1.48* 0.793 0.227
SS anomaly index -0.99 0.91 0.37 -0.81 1.177 0.444
Rainfall/day_Annual -0.68 0.51 0.51 0.08 0.630 1.081
Rainfall/day_LS 0.71** 0.29 2.04 0.17 0.347 1.182
Rainfall/day_SS 0.09 0.29 1.09 0.36 0.375 1.428
Domestic water demand_ -0.14 0.10 0.87 0.04 0.112 1.044
Water demand for other uses 0.28*** 0.07 1.33 0.13 0.085 1.143
Constant 0.28 0.94 0.54 1.052
Ln_Gam -0.50 0.056 -0.76 0.090
Gamma 0.61 0.034 0.47 0.041
Number of obs. 300 306
LR chi2(22) 247.98*** 222.31***
Log likelihood -361.45 -148.64
***, **, and * imply that parameters are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
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These findings imply that both formal and informal sources of information played a 
complementary role in facilitating diffusion of RWHTs. However, in both practices, informal 
sources of information were associated with faster adoption compared to formal sources of 
information, considering the magnitude of the coefficients. This supports the claim that 
farmer to farmer exchange of information is likely to play a bigger role in the process of 
technology diffusion compared to formal channels as a result of neighbourhood social 
influence and subjective norms (Willy & Holm-Mueller 2013).  
The coefficient of the order effects, represented by the number of expected adopters at 
village level, was negative but significant only in the roof catchment model. This implies that 
as people move down the adoption order, they are more likely to learn from others’ 
experiences and develop positive perceptions on RWHTs and eventually adopt. 
Finally, the coefficients of water demand for domestic and non domestic uses had 
negative and positive effects on diffusion respectively. Since the household water demand for 
only one time period was used rather than a time series, these coefficients must be interpreted 
only as indicative. The negative coefficient of domestic water demand implies that households 
with higher demand for water are likely to engage in RWH to cushion themselves against 
short term shortages.
7.4.4 Assessment of Adoption Behaviour along the Diffusion Path 
Changes in adoption behaviour along the technology diffusion path were assessed by 
splitting the data into two time periods. An assessment of the long term trends in the diffusion 
of rain water harvesting techniques revealed a possible structural change in the year 2000. 
Therefore, the first time period represented a period associated with slow diffusion that 
occurred between 1960 and 1999. The second time period was between 2000 and 2010 and 
was associated with faster diffusion. The estimated coefficients, time ratios and their 
associated standard errors for the two time periods are presented in Table 7. 4 and Table 7. 5.
While most of the variables considered in the study such as age, education, perceptions and 
alternative water sources had consistent effects over time, information sources and rainfall 
variability were found to have varying effects on the adoption behaviour in the two time 
periods.   
In the earlier time period, farmers who had contact with extension service providers 
adopted roof catchment rain water harvesting faster than those who did not. This role of 
extension service providers even increased in the second time period as indicated by a 33% 
increase in the coefficient. In both models, the coefficient of access to information from 
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informal sources was negative and insignificant in the earlier time period but became 
significant in the latter time period. This result indicates that informal sources of information 
have gained importance in the recent time period playing a crucial role in the diffusion of rain 
water harvesting techniques. The coefficients of contact with informal sources of information 
were also consistently larger than the coefficients of contact with formal extension service 
providers. The fact that informal sources of information seem to have gained importance over 
access to extension services concur with the general observation that public access to 
extension services has declined over time especially in remote areas growing low value crops 
(Milu & Jayne 2006).    
The influence of rainfall volatility on the diffusion of RWH practices was also found 
to vary in the two time periods in both RWH practices. In the case of run-off harvesting, the 
number of consecutive dry days and short season rainfall anomaly index were found to have 
significantly influenced the speed of RWH technology diffusion in the earlier period (1960-
1999). These effects continued in the latter time period, and also the annual rainfall anomaly 
index became an important driver of the diffusion process during this time period.   As for 
roof-catchment, the three rainfall variability indicators were associated with faster diffusion of 
the technique, as indicated by the negative signs of the coefficients. Seasonal variation in 
amount of rainfall per rainy day was found not to have played an important role in the 
diffusion of run-off RWHTs. Considering the magnitude of coefficients, rainfall variability 
seems to have played a bigger role on the diffusion of rain water harvesting in the earlier time 
period and a lesser role in the latter time period. This result implies that people’s sensitivity to 
rainfall variability might have changed over time, becoming lower in the latter period. There 
are a number of important insights that can be drawn from this finding. The long term 
variability in rainfall might be masked by short term peaks which occur consistently (Figure 
7.5) and therefore reduce farmer’s sensitivity to long term rainfall variability. However given 
that the process of diffusion continued in the latter period despite the reduced sensitivity to 
weather variability could indicate that there are other drivers that were important during that 
time period. One of such factors is informal sources of information which as discussed earlier, 
gained a significantly larger influence on the process of technology diffusion. The implication 
of this finding is that social learning and neighbourhood social influences could overcome any 
external influences on peoples’ technology adoption behaviour. Informal information sources 
in this case have played an important role in the process of diffusion of RWHTs and 
Chapter 7: Modeling the Diffusion of Rain Water Harvesting Techniques 
143
compensated for the reduced influence of the rainfall variability variables and access to 
extension services.
Table 7. 4: Determinants of time to adoption of roof catchment : Split time
1960-1999  2000-2010
Coef. SE Time ratio Coef. SE. Time ratio 
Age of household head 0.04*** 0.009 1.046 0.03*** 0.007 1.034
Primary education -0.04 0.273 0.958 -0.52* 0.290 0.596
Secondary education -0.48 0.300 0.621 -0.82** 0.321 0.440
Post secondary education -0.84* 0.454 0.432 -0.28 0.492 0.757
Informal source of info. -0.17 0.200 0.846 -0.54** 0.214 0.582
Access to extension -0.14 0.217 0.873 -0.15 0.207 0.859
Scarcity Perception   -0.71 0.460 0.491 0.16 0.440 1.171
Credit access -0.06 0.130 0.940 0.05 0.130 1.053
Owns well/borehole 0.64** 0.283 1.903 0.29 0.307 1.332
Distance to river -0.05 0.035 0.949 0.01 0.037 1.006
Previous adopters 0.07*** 0.019 1.071 -0.01 0.018 0.995
Expected adopters -0.06*** 0.014 0.943 -0.01 0.024 0.993
Location 0.31 0.279 1.357 0.28 0.301 1.323
Cons. dry days 0.00 0.007 0.999 0.01 0.009 1.010
Annual anomaly index -0.43 2.168 0.653 0.32 2.480 1.376
LS anomaly index -1.21 0.914 0.300 -0.40 0.830 0.671
SS anomaly index -1.75 1.143 0.173 0.17 2.158 1.180
Rainfall/day_Annual -1.14 0.698 0.319 -1.19 0.739 0.305
Rainfall/day_LS 1.03** 0.366 2.792 1.01** 0.456 2.735
Rainfall/day_SS 0.35 0.414 1.417 0.12 0.396 1.123
Water demand_Dome. -0.32** 0.143 0.724 -0.08 0.131 0.920
Water demand_other 0.31*** 0.096 1.358 0.30*** 0.086 1.345
Constant 1.12 1.242 -0.16 1.444
Ln_Gam -0.49 0.077 -0.59 0.080
Gamma 0.62 0.048 0.56 0.045
No. of observations 307 188
/5Ȥ2 (19) 278.55*** 162.60**
*
Log likelihood -203.48 -178.19
***, **, and * imply that parameters are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
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Table 7. 5 : Determinants of time to adoption of run-off water harvesting: Split time
1960-1999  2000-2010
Coef. SE Time ratio Coef. SE. Time ratio 
Age of household head 0.05*** 0.015 1.06 0.04*** 0.008 1.04
Primary education -0.32 0.503 0.73 0.01 0.288 1.01
Secondary education -0.58 0.582 0.56 -0.31 0.286 0.74
Post secondary education -0.44 0.741 0.65 0.22 0.425 1.25
Informal source of info. -0.06 0.422 0.94 -0.48* 0.248 0.62
Access to extension 0.70* 0.378 2.01 -0.15 0.182 0.86
Scarcity Perception   0.13 0.590 1.13 -0.30 0.446 0.74
Credit access -0.14 0.208 0.87 -0.13 0.113 0.88
Owns well/borehole 0.38 0.451 1.47 0.13 0.243 1.14
Distance to river -0.08 0.052 0.93 0.09* 0.052 1.10
Previous adopters 0.08 0.046 1.08 -0.04** 0.018 0.96
Expected adopters -0.08*** 0.025 0.92 0.00 0.013 1.00
Location -0.44 0.513 0.64 -0.06 0.325 0.94
Cons. dry days -0.02 0.012 0.98 0.00 0.010 1.00
Annual anomaly index 0.85 3.442 2.34 -0.96 2.063 0.38
LS anomaly index -4.99** 1.941 0.01 -1.16 0.910 0.31
SS anomaly index -1.18 2.204 0.31 1.61 1.684 5.02
Rainfall/day_Annual -1.19 1.200 0.30 -0.05 0.803 0.95
Rainfall/day_Long season 0.45 0.639 1.57 0.12 0.393 1.13
Rainfall/day_Short season 1.97** 0.983 7.16 0.10 0.403 1.11
Water demand_Domestic -0.17 0.240 0.84 0.01 0.136 1.02
Water demand_ other 0.17 0.162 1.19 0.17* 0.091 1.19
Constant 1.43 2.251 1.09 1.281
Ln_Gam -0.55 0.147 -0.96 0.111
Gamma 0.57 0.085 0.38 0.042
No. of observations 306 272
LR chi2(19) 131.93*** 187.65***
Log likelihood -74.11 -79.54
***, **, and * imply that parameters are significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
7.5 Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This chapter applies a parametric econometric duration model (log-logistic) to analyze 
the diffusion of rain water harvesting techniques (RWHTs) among smallholder farmers in the 
Lake Naivasha basin, Kenya. The study utilizes household survey data from 307 farm 
households who are dependent on rain-fed agriculture in a region where rainfall has 
historically been relatively volatile. When rainfall is volatile, RWHT helps to stabilize water 
supply and help farmers avert weather related risks. This study seeks to identify constraints to 
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the spread of RWHTs by exploring how rainfall variability influences the timing of decisions 
to adopt RWHTs alongside other household and spatial characteristics. 
The duration model results reveal that rainfall variability, informal sources of 
information, education, age of household head, access to extension services and ground water 
abstraction are the main variables driving the diffusion of RWHT. Further, the number of 
previous and expected adopters at village level, household water demand and access to 
extension were also found to be significant determinants of the process of RWHT diffusion.  
After splitting the dataset into two separate time periods, results indicate that the 
adoption behavior of farmers has changed over time. These results indicate that although 
rainfall variability is a significant determinant of diffusion of RWHTs, farmers’ sensitivity to 
rainfall variability has declined over time. Instead, access to informal sources of information 
has gained importance in  diffusion of RWHT implying that adoption has become more of an 
endogenous process of social exchange within communities, and less driven by external 
natural pressure and persuasion by state agents. Two observations stand out here. First, 
farmers seem to have become less sensitive to rainfall variability as a driver for adoption. 
RWHTs may increasingly have become part of the standard technology set of a farm 
household. A second observation was that access to informal information sources became a 
substantially significant driver of technology diffusion during the later time period, while the 
role of access to public extension services appears to have declined. The increasing 
importance of informal information (from family, neighbours or other members of the village 
community) suggests that adoption has become more of an endogenous process of social 
exchange within communities, and less driven by external natural pressure and persuasion by 
state agents. 
From these results it can be deducted that farmer to farmer exchange of information 
can become a powerful driver of adoption in the process of technology diffusion as compared 
to more formal sources of information. Therefore, technology extension policy should 
recognize the emerging role of informal information dissemination mechanisms and try to 
better integrate them into extension models. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT
8 Overall Conclusions and Policy Implications 
8.1 Summary of Research Problem and Objectives 
Lake Naivasha is a Ramsar site located in Kenya’s Rift valley. The lake Naivasha 
basin is an important watershed for both local and national economy because of the role it 
plays in supporting economic activities, providing employment and generating foreign 
exchange. There are also much formal legislation and other institutional arrangements for 
coordinating the management and use of natural resources in the basin. However, despite 
these legislations, the entire lake basin has been facing many environmental challenges 
compromising its ability to remain sustainable. The basin is grappling with three 
environmental challenges: siltation, eutrophication and fluctuations in water quantities. Water 
abstractions are also above the capacity of the resource and illegal water abstraction is 
ubiquitous. Obviously, a large component of these challenges is linked to anthropogenic 
pressure. Therefore, assessing the interactions between social and ecosystem components in 
the basin would contribute towards finding solutions to agri-environmental challenges. 
The current study sought to contribute towards finding solutions to these challenges 
and sustainable management of the Lake Naivasha basin. The overall objective of this study is 
to make a contribution to sustainable management of Lake Naivasha basin through analyzing 
the interactions between social and ecological systems in the basin. The analysis seeks to 
identify the institutional challenges encountered while seeking solutions to agri-environmental 
externalities and in the process of diffusion of technologies and techniques to mitigate these 
agri-environmental externalities. The study uses cross-sectional data which was collected 
during a household survey conducted between April and August 2011. A mix of statistical, 
econometric and descriptive tools was then used to analyze the data. In the next section the 
results obtained from each specific objective are summarized. 
8.2 Summary of Key Findings 
8.2.1 Determinants of Cooperative Behaviour 
The objective of chapter four was to identify who were co-operators or defectors among 
the sampled households. Further the chapter sought to determine the factors influencing 
cooperation among the sampled households. Two step cluster analysis results reveal that 
defection was the dominant strategy among the sampled farmers in the Lake Naivasha basin. 
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Just like in many other prisoners’ dilemma situations, this would be expected. Individuals 
tend to pursue strategies which seem to yield more individual expected pay-offs. However 
such decisions might not be socially optimal. In order to understand what motivates the 
cooperative behaviour, a logistic regression model was used. From the model the choice of 
the decision to cooperate or defect was found to be significantly influenced by expected
benefits, human capital and labour endowments. Further, informal sanctions and norms of 
trust emerged as significant factors that are positively correlated with cooperation. These 
factors can be seen as catalysts that can be used to enhance cooperativeness and discourage 
defection in the study area and in other watersheds facing a similar challenge. 
8.2.2 The Effect of Soil Conservation on Crop Productivity
In chapter five the effect of implementing soil conservation practices on the value of 
crop production was assessed. The aim of this chapter was to assess the private economic 
benefits that are associated with implementation of soil conservation practices. Using a 
propensity score matching (PSM) model, results indicated that implementing multiple soil 
conservation practices (MSCPs) yielded positive economic benefits in terms of higher value 
of crop production. Integration of multiple soil conservation practices into a soil conservation 
package boosts the benefits that can accrue from soil conservation practices.  However, the 
results indicate that under certain circumstances, the productivity gains associated with 
MSCPs might not be substantial enough to cover the opportunity costs of these practices in 
the Lake Naivasha basin case. Therefore, pure private economic incentives offer limited 
incentives for implementation and continued maintenance of soil conservation practices. To 
encourage farmers in implementation of soil conservation practices needs additional 
motivating factors beside pure economic benefits.
8.2.3 Social Motivations on Adoption of Soil Conservation Practices
In light of the results obtained in chapter five, chapter six sought to determine other 
factors that could motivate adoption of soil conservation practices. The objective of this 
chapter was to analyze the influence of participation in collective action and social influence 
on the individual soil conservation effort. A two stage regression procedure utilizing binary 
and ordered probit regression models was used. The results indicate that collective action 
facilitates adoption of soil conservation practices. From these results, it can be noted that the 
ability of an individual to participate in collective action was boosted by their socioeconomic 
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attributes, location in the basin and level of social capital-social networks, intensity of social 
participation and trustworthiness. Once an individual is participating in collective action, then 
their potential to implement soil conservation practices is enhanced. An intuitive reasoning 
behind this finding is that the network externalities - such as training and exchange of 
information - enhance an individual’s capacity to implement certain practices on their private 
farms. Further, social control emerging from neighbourhood social influences and intrinsic 
subjective norms may substitute for pure economic benefits and enhance the implementation 
of soil conservation practices even if they don’t seem to be economically attractive. Soil 
conservation is also constrained by institutional factors such as access to agricultural credit. 
8.2.4 Drivers of the Diffusion of Rain Water Harvesting Technology 
Finally chapter seven presents an analysis of the process of diffusion of two rain water 
harvesting techniques. Water harvesting and conservation is a strategy that can be used to 
minimize the externality associated with water over-abstraction. The major techniques used 
by households in the Lake Naivasha basin to stabilize household water supply are run-off rain 
water harvesting and roof catchment water harvesting. However, a substantial impact is likely 
to be felt if these strategies diffuse to a wider scale in the basin. It was hypothesized that the 
diffusion of these RWHTs across the basin was driven by both individual and climate related 
factors. 
The results indicate that diffusion of rain water harvesting techniques was influenced 
by rainfall variability, socio-economic factors and access to information. This study reveals
that in the recent past, farmers have become less sensitive to rainfall variability hence 
reducing the influence of this factor on the diffusion of rain water harvesting techniques. At 
the same time, access to information through informal sources – such as neighbours- has 
emerged as a more important determinant of the diffusion of the RWHTs compared to access 
to information through formal sources- such as public extension services and rainfall 
variability. Combining these two findings leads to the premise that the diffusion of rain water 
harvesting techniques in the Lake Naivasha basin has become more of an endogenous process 
of social exchange within the communities in the study area and less driven by natural 
pressure and persuasion from external state agents.
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8.3 Policy Implications 
Agri-environmental externalities are likely to be an important focal area in the future. 
The current study identifies some areas where policy seeking to mitigate agri-environmental 
externalities could focus on:  
1. The issue of farmer to farmer information exchange emerges as an important driver of 
the process of transfer technologies for mitigating negative agri-environmental 
impacts. Policy makers could embark on identifying the best farmer information 
exchange strategies in the community, improve on these models and incorporate them 
into dissemination programmes. To enhance efficient and communication of accurate 
information, policy could also aim at enhancing local knowledge base by frequent 
training of trainers in the community or establishment of community information 
centers. Once these systems have been established, they could be used as medium for 
information dissemination to create awareness on important aspects such as the 
interactions between agriculture and the environment. This could make use of 
information and communication technology (ICT) utilizing the widely spread mobile 
phone technology. 
2. There is need for policy to encourage participation in local collective action by 
eliminating the barriers to such participation through policies that encourage local 
community participatory approaches. The range of incentives towards participation in 
collective action around natural resources could also be encouraged through increased 
devolution of resources and decentralization of state power. The efficiency of 
collective action could also be enhanced through identification and recognition of 
local user groups, capacity building and strengthening of local knowledge systems, 
leadership and innovation. 
3. There is need to re-think the demand – driven extension and advisory services model 
currently used in Kenya. This study confirms previous findings that the role and 
effectiveness of public extension in the transfer of technology has declined. At the 
same time, lack of technical support could compromise the ability of communities to 
sustainably manage natural resources. Although it is a good approach, the demand –
driven extension approach might skew access to agricultural information in favour of 
the elite farmers hence marginalizing disadvantaged groups in the community. There 
has to be a deliberate effort to ensure that these groups are targeted. Therefore both 
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demand and supply driven approaches need to be used depending on specific 
circumstances. 
The low efficiency of extension services could also be attributed to lack of 
resources to facilitate service provision. To ease the burden of provision of extension 
services currently borne by the government, policy could focus on encouraging 
pluralistic provision of extension services. New extension models that make more use 
of other potential media for technology transfer and support such as farmer to farmer 
information dissemination approaches could be explored. The role of public extension 
service providers could be more of support and supervisory to educate farmers and 
building local human capital through training of trainers at community level. These 
farmer trainers can then be used as agents for technology transfer and technical 
support for other farmers. Extension could also focus on building of social capital at 
local and regional level to facilitate regional cooperation. However, this will depend 
on resource availability therefore the need for improved public investment in the 
agricultural sector.
4. Participation in collective action was found to be important in mitigating agri-
environmental externalities. Policy makers seeking to encourage participation in 
collective action could do so first be recognizing the existence of successful local 
initiatives that communities have established to solve local problems. Policy should 
therefore play a complementary role and that of enhancing local capacity. Successful 
local social sanctioning mechanisms should be identified and incorporated in the 
resource management strategies to enhance monitoring and enforcement especially 
where regulatory instruments face implementation challenges. On the other hand, 
policy must recognize that collective action may sometimes lead to marginalization of 
some segments of the society. Therefore it must be ensured that collective action is 
facilitated in such a way that it does not serve the interests of the elites while 
marginalizing minority and less effluent groups but rather enhance equity. Expected 
and selective benefits were found to be a motivation to participation in collective 
action. Therefore, a possible policy focus is towards empowering local cooperative 
initiatives to widen the range of selective benefits 
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8.4 Outlook for Further Research 
The debate on how to deal with agri-environmental externalities in the developing 
countries is far from coming to a close. Although this thesis has attempted to offer some 
insights into how to address this enormous challenge, a number of gaps still exist that could 
form a basis for future research. First, although rain water harvesting would be a good 
solution for solving private water scarcity at household level it would be important to assess 
the social implication in terms of reduced surface water run-off and ground water recharging. 
Secondly, while analyzing the private benefits associated with soil conservation practices, 
only cross-sectional data was used and benefits at one point in time were considered. 
However, the costs and returns to soil conservation efforts would be estimated better if a 
dynamic approach is used, which considers a stream of costs and benefits over time. 
Considering the individual pure rate of time preferences in soil conservation decision making 
could also be helpful. 
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 : Survey Instrument 
RCR Lake Naivasha Basin Survey, 2011
Water Users Interview Schedule
_____________________________________________________________________________
Introduction
I am part of a University research team which consists of researchers from Kenya and Germany. 
We are currently conducting a survey, seeking to understand different ways of using and 
managing water in the Lake Naivasha Basin. You have been randomly selected to give views on 
water management and use in your farm and this area in general. We appreciate your 
VOLUNTARY participation in this survey. The information you disclose will completely be 
CONFIDENTIAL and your opinion will be combined with those of others to give a general 
view. For more information you can contact Daniel Kyalo through: 0724598988. 
SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION
Enumerator _______________________ 
Respondent’s Name _______________________ 
County _______________________ 
District _______________________                                                             
Division _______________________                                                           
Location _______________________                                                        
Sub-Location _______________________ 
Village _______________________ 
enumcode [_____]
hmnum* [_____]
count [_____]
dist [_____]
div [_____]
loc [_____]
subloc [_____]
vill [_____]
*Insert number from Table K1 after the interview
GPS Readings:
Altitude [________________]
UTM [________________]
Longitude [________________]
Latitude [________________]
Appendix 1: Survey Instrument Qnum[__]
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SECTION B: GENERAL WATER USE TRENDS
B1. Give me the following details on the specific water uses within your household
Type of water use
(Probe for each use) 
What are the two main sources of water for the following purposes 
and what are the average quantities used per day from each source? 
(Use codes below)
General water 
quality for the use
1=Good 2=Poor
1st
Source
Qty/day Qty 
Units 
2nd
Source
Qty/day Qty 
Units
1st
Source
2nd
Source
Watuse wsrc1 wsrc1qty qunit wsrc2 Wsrc2qty qunit2 Src1qlt Src2qlt
Domestic (Drinking, 
cooking, washing) 
Irrigation 
Livestock watering
Sources of water: 1=River/stream 2=Roof catchment 3= Own Borehole 4= Communal Borehole   
5= Well 6= Spring 7=Wetland/swamp 8=Tap water (home) 100=other   
(specify)____________
Units: 1=Litres 2=20 Litre container 3=Cubic metres 100=Other (specify)__________________
B2. In your assessment, what has been the general trend in the quantity of water available from 
rivers in this area  the last 10 years?                                              rwatertr [_____]
1=Decreased 2=Increased 3=Remained the same 4= No idea
B3. In your assessment, what has been the general trend in the quantity of water available from 
boreholes in this area  the last 10 years? bwatertr [_____]
1=Decreased 2=Increased 3=Remained the same 4= No idea 
B4. If decreased in B2 or B3, what measures have you taken to cope with this change?  (cope1-4)  
............................................................................................................................................................
SECTION C: SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION
We shall start by talking about the water used in your household. We will talk about where you get this water from, and 
the quantities you use. We will also talk about how the quantity of water has been changing in this area in the last 10 
years. 
I would now like to ask you about any methods of soil and water conservation that you know and 
those that you have been using in your farm, or those that you are planning to use or you are 
reluctant to use. I would also like to know how you benefit from these methods, and the challenges 
you encounter while practicing.  C1. What methods of soil erosion control do you know? (Seromtd1- 4)
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
C2. What methods of saving water or using water wisely do you know? (Wsavmtd1-4)
...........................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
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C3. In your opinion, how can you describe the slope of your main farm? 1=Extremely steep 2= Moderately steep 3= Flat slopefm[____]
C5. Do you experience any form of soil erosion in your main farm? 1=Yes 2=No                                                 erosion [_____]  
C6.  If Yes, in C5, what is the soil erosion status in your main farm? 1=Very little 2=Little 3=Moderate 4=Extreme 5= Very extreme erofarm [____]
C8. Have you implemented any of the following soil erosion control measures on your farm? 
Soil conservation method Status of 
Implementation
1=Already using
2=Have desire to 
use
3= Reluctant to use
Extend of practice When 
did you 
start 
this 
practice 
(year)
Main 
source (s)  
of materials  
for  this 
practice
(Use codes 
below)
Mode(s) of 
acquisition 
by source
1=Free 
2=Purchased   
Main source 
(s)  of 
information 
about this 
practice
(Use codes 
below)
Since you 
started the 
practice, 
have you 
expanded?
If  Yes, 
by what 
margin
(Use 
codes 
below)
If No 
expansion, 
why?
(Use codes 
below)
conmech Nr. status extent ystart Matsrc1-3 Modacq1-3 Infsrc1-3 expand mrgexp Rsnnoexp1-3
Tree planting 1 1Number[______]
Napier grass 2 2Acres [______]
Grass (other) strips 3 3Metres[______]
Terracing 4 3Metres[______]
Contour ploughing 5 2Acres [______]
Contour cropping 6 2Acres[______]
Crop rotation 7 4Times/year[_____]
Cover crops 8 2Acres[______]
Mixed cropping 9 2Acres[______]
Material sources: 1= Private nursery 2=Own nursery 3=Neighbour 4=NGO 5=Governmental organization 6= Community group 100=Other (specify)________
Margin of expansion: 1= Less than half 2=About half 3= More than half 4=Doubled 5=More than doubled 100=Other (specify)__________________
Information sources: 1=Agricultural extension officers 2=Farmer field schools 3= Local school 4=NGOs 5=Media 
(Print, Audio and Visual) 6= Other Farmers/Neighbours 7=Community based organisation 
(CBO)  8=Church 100=Other (Specify)________________________
Reasons for no expansion: 1=Lack of materials 2=Needs too much labour  3=Costly to implement 4=Not beneficial 5=No land for expansion 100=Other______
C4. ENUME: Check the actual slope of the farm and record (use codes in C3) actslope [_____] 
C7. ENUME: Check the actual soil erosion condition on the farm and record (use codes in C6)      eroeact [_____]
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C9. For the technologies practiced in Table C8 above, make a follow up on the following aspects
Technology
(Transfer from 
Table C8, using 
Nr. as the code)
When did you start 
using this practice 
after learning about 
it?
(Use codes below)
How do you benefit from this 
practice?
(Use codes below)
Do you depend on external 
support on the following    
things to maintain this 
practice?
1=Yes 2=No 
Techn Adotime benefit1-4 Advice External inputs
advdep inpdep
Adotime: 1=Immediately (within one season)   2=After a short time (within one –two years)   3=After a long time 
(More than two years)
Benefit: 1=Improved yield 2=More fodder for livestock 3= Better soil status 4= Conserve water
100=Other (specify)__________
C10. Have you ever given planting materials to another farmer /other farmers for free? 
1=Yes 2=No matgive[____]
(ENUM: If No, Skip to Qn C13)
C11. If Yes, specify the planting materials   pltmat1 [_____] pltmat2 [_____] pltmat3 [_____]
1=Horticultural crop seedlings 2=Seeds (cereals) 3= Napier grass cuttings 4=Other fodder vines 
5= Tree seedlings 100=Other (specify______________________
C12. How often have you given planting materials to another farmer? givefreq [_____]
1=Rarely 2= Sometimes 3= Very frequently
C13. Have you ever sold planting materials to another farmer /other farmers?     
1=Yes 2=No matsell[____]
(ENUM: If No, Skip to Qn C16)
C14. If Yes, specify the planting materials     pltmat1[_____] pltmat2[_____] pltmat3[_____]
1=Horticultural crop seedlings 2=Seeds (cereals) 3= Napier grass cuttings 
4=Other fodder vines 5= Tree seedlings 100=Other (specify)_________________  
C15. How often have you sold planting materials to another farmer? sellfreq[_____]
1=Rarely 2= Sometimes 3= Very frequently
C16. Have you ever participated in a Payment for Environmental Services (PES) scheme?     
1=Yes 2=No                   PESyes [_____]
DO NOT SKIP
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C17. Have you implemented any of the following water conservation and storage measures on your farm? 
Water conservation method Status of 
Implementation?
1=Already using
2=Have desire to use
3= Reluctant to use
Extend of practice When 
did you 
start this 
practice 
(year)
Main source 
(s)  of 
information 
about this 
practice
(Use codes 
below)
Since you 
started the 
practice, 
have you 
expanded?
If  Yes, by 
what margin
(Use codes 
below)
If No expansion, 
why?
(Use codes 
below)
conmech status extent ystart Infsrc1-3 expand mrgexp Rsnnoexp1-3
Roof catchment 1 1Capacity of storage (L) [______]
Check dams 2 2Number [____________]
Runoff harvesting 3 1Capacity of storage (L) [_______]
Drought resistant varieties 4 3Names of crops[______________]
Other______________ 5
Margin of expansion: 1= Less than half 2=About half 3= More than half 4=Doubled 5=More than doubled 100=Other (specify)__________________
Information sources: 1=Agricultural extension officers 2=Farmer field schools 3= Local school 4=NGOs 5=Media (Print, Audio and Visual) 6= Other 
Farmers/Neighbours 7=Community based organisation (CBO)  8=Church 100=Other (Specify)________________________
Reasons for no expansion: 1=Lack of materials 2=Needs too much labour  3=Costly to implement 4=Not beneficial 5=No land for expansion 100=Other______
C18. What constraints do you face in implementing soil conservation technologies? soilcon1[____] soilcon2 [_____]soilcon3[____]
1= Lack of enough labour 2=High costs of starting 3=Lack of sufficient information 4=Lack of sufficient land 5= High cost of maintenance 100=Other
(specify)___________________ 
C19. What constraints do you face in implementing water conservation technologies? wtcon1[____] wtcon2[____] wtcon3[____]
1= Lack of enough labour 2=High costs of starting 3=Lack of sufficient information 4=Lack of sufficient land 5= High cost of maintenance 100=Other 
(specify)___________________ 
C20.  Have you or any member of your household participated in any training on soil conservation in the last 12 Months?                                                                                                       
1=Yes 2=No soilcontr [_____]
C21. Have you or any member of your household participated in any training on water conservation and efficient use in the last 12 
Months?  1=Yes 2=No swatcontr [_____]        
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C22. Have you been involved with any organization(s) that has been promoting water conservation in this area? 
1=Yes 2=No                                   sconprom [_____]
(ENUM: If No, Skip to Qn C24)
C23. If Yes in C22 provide name(s) 
............................................................................................................................................................
C24. Have you been involved with any organization(s) that have been promoting soil conservation in this area?
1=Yes 2=No wconprom[_____]
(ENUM: If No, Skip to Qn C26)
C25. If Yes in C24 provide the name(s) 
............................................................................................................................................................
C26. Have you been involved with any organization that has been promoting efficient water use in this area?
1=Yes 2=No                                                      effwprom[_____]
(ENUM: If No, Skip to Qn D1)
C27. If Yes in C26 provide name(s) 
............................................................................................................................................................
SECTION D: LAND USE AND CROP PRODUCTION
D1. I would like to know some details about the land owned or used by your household
Total land owned in acres totland
Land  rented in (within the basin)  (acres) drentin
Land  rented out (within the basin)  (acres) ldrentot
Other land accessed (gift/public/communal) acres othland
Land under crops (acres) cropland
Land under pastures (acres) pastland
Land under homestead(acres) hmeland
Land purely occupied by trees (woodlot)  (acres) treeland
Land that is not usable (acres) lntuse
Riparian Land (if farm next to river) (acres) ripland
D2. What is the mode of ownership for the main farmland                            tenure [_____]
1= Owned with title deed 2=Owned without title deed 3=Rented 4= Gift 100=Other (specify)___
D3. Which year did you start farming? farmstat [_____]
D4. What is the daily wage for general farm work in this area?                    wage[_____] (Kshs)
We are now going to talk about the crops you produce in your farm, the inputs you use in producing 
the crops, for example fertilizers. We will also talk about different ways in which you use your land, 
and the portions of your land that you use for different purposes.   
Appendix 1 : Survey Instrument              QNUM ____
175
D5. Did the household produce any crops during the Long rains season 2010 (March-August rains) (1=Yes 2=No) cropls[_____]
D6. If Yes in D5, indicate the details below for all the crops produced during the season 
Crop 
(Use 
codes 
below
)
Plo
t
Land
Size
(acres
)
Lan
d 
prep
.
Cost
in
Kshs
Seeds 
(for Units use codes 
below) 
First 
Fertilizer
(For type &Units, use 
codes below)
Second 
Fertilizer
(For type &Units, use codes 
below)
Third 
Fertilizer
(For type &Units, use 
codes below)
Harvest 
(For  
units, use 
codes 
below)
Sales
(For  
units, use 
codes 
below)
Av.
sellin
g
Price
Per 
unit
Mode 
of 
waterin
g
Qt
y
Uni
t
Cost/uni
t
Ty
p
Qt
y
uni
t
Cost/uni
t
Ty
p
Qt
y
Uni
t
Cost/Uni
t
Ty
p
qt
y
uni
t
Cost/uni
t
Qt
y
Uni
t
Qt
y
Uni
t
Unit codes Crop codes Fertilizer types  Watering 
mode
1=90 kg bag
2=Kgs
3=Litre
4=Crates
5=Numbers
6=Bunches
7=Gorogoro
8=Tonnes
9=50 kg bag
10=Debe
11=Grams
12=Wheelbarrow
13=Cart
14=Canter
15=Pickup
16=2kg 
packet(seed)
1= Beans
2= Cow peas      
3= Green grams
4= Soya beans                          
5= Green peas
6= Pigeon peas                  
7= Dolichos lab lab 
8= cowpea leaves
9 = Maize(Dry)             
10 = Maize (Green)
11 = Sorghum
12= Finger millet
13=Bulrush millet
14 = Wheat
15= Sukumawiki
16= Arrow root                              
17= Spinach                 
18 = Tomatoes  
19 = Cabbage
20 =French bean        
21= Carrot
22 Cauliflower
23=Traditional 
vegetables      
24= Onions
25= Cassava
26= Sweet potatoes           
27= Irish potatoes      
28= Bananas
29=Oranges
30= Mangoes
31=Sweet melon
32=Passion fruit
33=Avocado
34= Pumpkin
35= Pawpaw
36= Green pepper         
37= Sunflower
38= Sugarcane
39= Cut flowers
40= Barley
41=Baby corn 
100=Other(specify)
____________________
1= CAN
2= DAP
3= NPK (20:20:0)
4= NPK (17:17:0)
5 = Urea 
6 = Foliar feed
7= Animal Manure 
8=Compost manure 
9=Other (specify)
1=Rain fed
2= Irrigated 
3=Both 
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D7. Did the household produce any crops during the short rains season 2010/2011(Oct-Dec. rains)(1=Yes 2=No) croppss [____]
D8. If Yes in D7, indicate the details below for all the crops produced during the season
Crop 
(Use 
codes 
below
)
Plo
t
Land
Size
(acres
)
Lan
d 
prep
.
Cost
in
Kshs
Seeds 
(for Units use codes 
below) 
First 
Fertilizer
(For type &Units, use 
codes below)
Second 
Fertilizer
(For type &Units, use codes 
below)
Third 
Fertilizer
(For type &Units, use 
codes below)
Harvest 
(For  
units, use 
codes 
below)
Sales
(For  
units, use 
codes 
below)
Av.
sellin
g
Price
Per 
unit
Mode 
of 
waterin
g
Qt
y
Uni
t
Cost/uni
t
Ty
p
Qt
y
uni
t
Cost/uni
t
Ty
p
Qt
y
Uni
t
Cost/Uni
t
Ty
p
qt
y
uni
t
Cost/uni
t
Qt
y
Uni
t
Qt
y
Uni
t
Unit codes Crop codes Fertilizer types  Watering 
mode
1=90 kg bag
2=Kgs
3=Litre
4=Crates
5=Numbers
6=Bunches
7=Gorogoro
8=Tonnes
9=50 kg bag
10=Debe
11=Grams
12=Wheelbarrow
13=Cart
14=Canter
15=Pickup
16=2kg 
packet(seed)
1= Beans
2= Cow peas      
3= Green grams
4= Soya beans                          
5= Green peas
6= Pigeon peas                  
7= Dolichos lab lab 
8= cowpea leaves
9 = Maize(Dry)             
10 = Maize (Green)
11 = Sorghum
12= Finger millet
13=Bulrush millet
14 = Wheat
15= Sukumawiki
16= Arrow root                              
17= Spinach                 
18 = Tomatoes  
19 = Cabbage
20 =French bean        
21= Carrot
22 Cauliflower
23=Traditional 
vegetables      
24= Onions
25= Cassava
26= Sweet potatoes           
27= Irish potatoes      
28= Bananas
29=Oranges
30= Mangoes
31=Sweet melon
32=Passion fruit
33=Avocado
34= Pumpkin
35= Pawpaw
36= Green pepper         
37= Sunflower
38= Sugarcane
39= Cut flowers
40= Barley
41=Baby corn 
100=Other(specify)
____________________
1= CAN
2= DAP
3= NPK (20:20:0)
4= NPK (17:17:0)
5 = Urea 
6 = Foliar feed
7= Animal Manure 
8=Compost manure 
9=Other (specify)
1=Rain fed
2= Irrigated 
3=Both 
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D9. For the first four crops in Table D6 above, what is the maximum yield you have ever 
achieved?                                                                     
Crop
(Use codes in Table D4)
Maximum yield
(Quantity)
Units
(Use codes below)
Area to which yield 
applies (Acres) 
Crop maxyld unit area
Units: 1=90 kg bag bag 2=Kgs 3=Litre 4=Crates 5=Numbers 6=Bunches  7=Gorogoro 8=Tonnes  9=50 kg  10=Debe
13=Cart 14=Canter 15=Pickup
D10. Indicate the following details on all inputs used on crops (Except Fertilizers and seeds) 
during the last year (April 2010-March 2011)
Input type 
(Use codes 
below)
Season
1=Main 
2= Short 
Quantity 
Used 
Quantity units
(Use codes 
below)
Source
(Use codes 
below)
If source = 
purchased, 
price per unit
(Kshs)
Inptype season qtyused qunits source punit
Inptype: 9= Pesticides 10=Herbicides 11=Fuel 12= Transport 13= Packaging material  14=Hired Labour 
15= Fungicide 100=Other (specify)_________________
Units: 1=90 kg bag 2=Kgs 3=Litre 4=Crates 5=Numbers 6=Bunches 9=Gorogoro 11=50 kg bag 12=Debe   
13=Grams 14=Wheelbarrow 15=Cart 16=Canter 17=Pickup 18=2kg packet
Source: 1=Purchased 2=Given by another farmer 3=Government donation 100=Other(specify)________________
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SECTION E: IRRIGATION (APPLICABLE ONLY TO FARMERS WHO IRRIGATE)
E1. What are the legal requirements that a farmer must meet if s/he wants to use water for 
irrigation?                                              irreq1[_____] irreq2[_____] irreq3[_____]
1=None 2=Obtain a water permit 3=Install a water meter 4=Obtain verbal permission from community water leaders 
5=Make a payment according to the amount of water used 100=Other___________ 
E2. For all the crops where mode of watering was irrigation or both irrigation and rain fed, 
(refer to Tables D6 and D8) indicate the following details
Irrigate
d crop
(Transfe
r from 
Tables 
D6 and 
D8)
Numbe
r of 
plantin
gs 
within 
2010
For the first planting 
indicate: 
(1) Acreage covered 
by the crop
(2) Number of 
months crop was 
irrigated
(3) Number of times 
irrigation done 
per week
For the second 
planting indicate 
(1) Acreage covered 
by the crop
(2) Number of 
months crop was 
irrigated
(3) Number of times 
irrigation done 
per week
For the Third 
planting indicate 
(1) Acreage covered 
by the crop
(2) Number of months 
crop was irrigated
(3) Number of times 
irrigation done per 
week
Main 
method 
of 
irrigatio
n
(Use 
codes 
below)
Average 
time taken 
per 
irrigation 
session(Hr
s)
(Ask for 
first 
planting 
only)
irrcrop planum acres
1
mnts
1
irtimes
1
acres
2
Mnts
2
irtimes
2
acres
3
Mnts
3
Irtimes
3
irrmtd rsnirrg
Methods of irrigation: 1= Sprinkler 2= Furrow 3=Basin 4=Drip 5=Flood  6=Watering can 
100=Other (specify)___________
E3. What is your most preferred irrigation method? (Use codes in Qn E2 above) prefmtd [_____]
E4.  Why do you prefer the above mentioned irrigation method?      
prefwhy1[_____] prefwhy2[_____] prefwhy3[_____]
1= Uses less water 2=Requires less labour 3=Cheap to install 4=Easy to use/not complex 5=The only one known 
100=Other Specify_____________________ 
E5. Indicate how the intensity of irrigation varies within the year
Irrigation Intensity  Months 
(1=Jan, 2=Feb,...,12=Dec)  
Number of times 
irrigated per week
High (When irrigation is done many times)
Moderate (When irrigation is done average times)
Low (When irrigation is done fewer times)
E6.  How do you obtain your irrigation water?                    irrwtac1[_____] irrwtac2[_____]
1=Flow by gravity 2=Pumping (from river) 3= Pumping (from borehole) 4=Directly from the river (bucket) 
You mentioned to me that you irrigated some crops in the past seasons. Therefore, I would like us to 
talk a little bit about your irrigation activities. That is, how you obtain irrigation water, the methods 
you use for irrigation, and the challenges you face in your irrigation activities.  
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5=Directly from a Well (bucket) 6= Directly from the tap 100=Other (specify)_______________
E7. For the method(s) of water abstraction that are used by the farmer, make a follow up to 
estimate the water quantities
Farmers with Water meter  
Average quantity per month in  low irrigation intensity Months (M3) qtylow
Average quantity per month in medium  irrigation  intensity Months (M3) qtymode
Average quantity per month in high irrigation intensity Months (M3) qtyhigh
From Tap 
(To do the estimation, get a container from the farmer and fill it at the tap three times and record the following)
Capacity(size) of container (Litres) capcont
Amount of time taken to fill first time (Minutes) Time1
Amount of time taken to fill  second time(Minutes) Time2
Amount of time taken to fill  third time (Minutes) Time3
Length of time taken to irrigate 0.25 acre plot Timeirr
Is the current water pressure....
1= Normal, 2=Lower  or 3=Higher (than Normal) 
presure
Farmers Using Water Pumps 
Size of Pump (GPH) pumpsze
Diameter of pipe from Pump (inches) diampipe
Type of fuel used   (1=Petrol 2=Diesel 3=Electricity 4=Manpower) fueltyp
Average quantity  of  fuel used per  week fuelqty
Quantity units 1= Litres 2= Kwh  qtyunits
Time pump runs to irrigate one acre timeacre
Depth of borehole  in Metres  (for farmers with boreholes) depth
Farmers drawing water directly from the source using buckets 
Average size (capacity)  of bucket used (Litres) capbuckt
Number of buckets used to irrigate 0.25 Acre of land numbukt
E8. Is the water that you receive (for irrigation) sufficient for your irrigation needs? 
1=Yes 2=No sufwater[_____]
(ENUM: If Yes, Skip to Qn E10)
E9. If No in E8 above, if you needed more water what options do you have? (Waterad1-4 )  
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
E10. What constraints do you face when undertaking day to day irrigation activities? irrcon 1-4
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
ENUME: For water use from unmetered piped water, do the estimation using the guideline 
provided. Otherwise where there is a meter or abstractions involving a water pump, ask the 
questions for the relevant abstraction method.   
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E11 Are there any traditional believes or taboos about water in your community? tradbel[_____]
1=Yes 2=No
(ENUM: If No, Skip to Qn E13)
E12. If yes in E11, what are the three most important ones according to you? tradbel1-5
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
E13. Do you have a water permit from WRMA?                1=Yes 2=No permown [_____]
(ENUM : If No Skip to QN E17) 
E14. If yes, in E13 what is the class of the Permit?                                            permclass [_____]
1=A   2=B  3=C  4=D  5=E 
E15. How much did you pay for the permit (Kshs)                                             permamt [_____]
E16. Which year did you acquire the permit (Year)                                            permyr [_____]
E17. How long did it take you from the time you applied for the permit to the time you received 
it?(Months)                                                                                                     perdpmt[_____]
E18. Indicate the following details on payments for irrigation water 
Amount paid for water (Kshs) Units for which payment applies 
Units: 1=M3  2=Litre 3= Month (flat rate) 100=Other (specify)_______________
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SECTION F: LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP AND  PRODUCTS
F1. Did the household have any livestock in the last one year (April 2010- March 2011)
1=Yes 2=No liveown[_____]
(ENUM: If No, Skip to   Section G)
F2. If Yes, in QN F1, fill in the following details 
Livestock Number owned   
April 2011
Number sold
within 2010
Unit selling 
price(Kshs)
livetype numm11 numsale selprc
Cattle 1
Calves 2
Goats 3
Sheep 4
Donkeys 5
F3. For all the livestock products within the reference period (April 2010-March 2011) record 
the following details 
Livestock Product
Number of 
months of 
production
within the 
year
Average
production
per month
Unit of 
Production
(Use 
codes 
below).
Number of 
months of 
sales per 
year
Average 
Amount 
sold 
/month
Price received 
per Unit
(Kshs) on the
largest sale
liveprod mprod avpmon untprod mnsal avsld price
Milk 1
Eggs 2
Manure 3
Other (specify) 4
Unit codes : 1 = 90 Kg bag  3= Litres 2= Kgs 5=300 ml bottle 14= Wheelbarrow  15 = Hand carts  21=750ml bottle 
22=Big cup 23=Small cup 20=Trays  24=500 ml bottle 27 = 90 Kg bag  28 = Pick- up 
100= Other (specify)_________________________
F4. How do you utilize or dispose manure from your livestock? mandisp1[___] mandisp2[___]
1=Sell 2=Apply on my farm 3= Dump by the roadside 4=Give to neighbours 5=Heap somewhere on my farm
6= Leave on the cattle Boma 100=Other (specify)_______________
In most cases, livestock production is done together with crop production activities. I would like to 
know whether you have any livestock in your farm, and the types of livestock products that you have 
produced in the past 12 months.    
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SECTION G: CREDIT ACCESS , TRUST, MEMBERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION IN 
GROUPS  
G1. Are you or any member of your household a member of any Water Resource Users 
Association (WRUA)?                    1=Yes 2=No WRUAmem [_____]
(ENUM: If No, Skip to  Qn  G5)
G2. If yes in G1 what is the name of the WRUA?    WRUAname[_______________________]
G3. Do you feel that you benefit by being a member of the WRUA? 1=Yes 2=No WRUAben[___]
G4. If Yes, what are the benefits? (WRUAben1- 4)
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
G5. Are you or any member of your household a member of any Community water project?  
1=Yes 2=No wpromem [_____]
(ENUM: If No, Skip to  Qn G9)
G6. If yes, what is the name of the Community water project?   Wproname [_____________]
G7. Do you feel that you benefit by being a member of the CWP ? 1=Yes 2=No Wproben [___]
G8. If Yes, what are the benefits? (Wproben1-4)
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
G9. Have you or has any member of your household participated in any activity that required 
the participation of community members in the last 12 Months       
1=Yes 2=No parcom[_____]
We will now talk about participation in any community group by any member of your household and 
how your household benefits from participating in the groups. We will also talk about how people in 
your village cooperate, help each other and trust each other. We will also talk about where people in 
this area can obtain credit.  
Appendix 1 : Survey Instrument                                                                               QNUM ___
183
G10.If Yes in G9, indicate the following (PROBE for specific water and soil conservation 
activities) 
Household 
member  
who 
participate
d 
(Name) 
First activity   participated in Second activity   participated in Third activity   participated  
Activity  
Name   
Times 
in last 
year 
Averag
e
Hours 
per time  
Activity  
Name   
Times in 
last year 
Averag
e
Hours 
per time  
Activity  
Name   
Times in 
last year 
Averag
e
Hours 
per time  
mempart act1na
m
act1fre
q
avhrs1 Act2na
m
Act2fre
q
Avhrs2 Act3na
m
Act3fre
q
Avhrs3
Activity: 1=Communal tree planting 2=Maintenance of community water system 3=Communal 
soil erosion control activity 100=Other (specify)___________
G11. How likely is it that those who do not participate in communal activities will be 
criticized?                                                                                                                  crttlike[_____]
1=Very likely 2=Somehow likely   3=Unlikely 4=Very unlikely 
G12.Have you made any financial contribution towards communal water management in the 
last 12 months?             fincont [_____]
G13. If Yes in G12, how much          contamt Kshs.[_____]
G14. Other than the WRUA, are you or any member of your household a member of any 
voluntary communal or religious group: organization, network or association? 1=Yes 2=No
grpmem [___]
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G15. If yes in Qn G14 fill in the following details 
Name of 
househol
d 
member
Name of 
organizatio
n/
group 
When 
did 
the 
perso
n join 
(Year
)
Type 
of 
group 
(Use 
codes 
below)
Number 
of 
members 
in the 
group
Role 
in 
group
(Use 
codes 
below)
Number of 
times 
group 
holds 
meetings  
Requiremen
ts for 
membership 
What 
benefit 
(s) do 
you 
draw 
from 
the 
group? 
Ranking 
of group 
(1=Most 
important 
to 
househol
d)
hhmna
me
orgname yrjoi
n
grptyp
e
memsnu
m
grprol
e
Nu
m 
fre
q
memreq benefi
t
grank
Types of groups: 1= Welfare group 2=Farmers group 3=Water users group 4= Church 5= Youth group       
6=Women group 7=Cultural association 8=Merry-go-round 9=Village Association  
10=Professional Association 100= Other (specify)___________________________  
Role in group   :     1=Member 2=Chairperson 3=Other official/Committee member
Frequency        : 1=Week 2=Month 3=Year 100=Other (specify)_____________________
Membership requirements: 1= Voluntary joining 2=Mandatory to join 3= Invited membership 4=Based on   
engagement in certain activity 5=Payment of membership fee  
100=Other(specify)______________________
Benefits: 1= None 2= Access to natural resources 3=Benefit our community 4= Recreation 5=Spiritual benefits 
6= Access to markets 7=Help in times of problems 100=Other (specify)___________________
G16. Suppose your neighbour suffers a misfortune, who do you think should help him/her 
financially? (Circle the first four mentioned)
help1-4
1 No one should help 6 Village elder 11 Mutual support group to which s/he belongs
2 Family 7 Business people 12 Assistance group to which s/he belongs
3 Friends 8 Police 13 Don’t know/not sure
4 Neighbors 9 Social authorities 14 Non Governmental Organizations
5 Religious leader or group 10 Political leader 15 Fellow men/women (If Man/Woman)
G17. How many of your neighbours would you trust with a loan? loantr[_____]
1=All 2=Most of them 3= Just a few 4=None
G18. When did you start living in this community? (Year)                                   comlivyr[_____]
G19. If you need a loan today, what are the possible sources available to you? 
lnsorc1[_____] lnsorc2[_____] lnsorc3[_____]
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0=None 1= Equity bank 2=KCB bank 3=Cooperative Bank 4=Employer 3=Farmers Union 4=Community 
group 5= Local money lender 6= Faulu Kenya 7=KWFT 8=K-REP 9=SACCO 10=AFC 11=Neighbour 
100= other (specify)_________________________
G20. Have you requested for a loan in the last one year 1=Yes 2=No loareq [_____]
(ENUM: If No, Skip to Qn G26)
G21. If yes in G20 from which source(s)?                   loasrce1 [_____] loasrce2 [_____]
0=None 1= Equity bank 2=KCB bank 3=Cooperative Bank 4=Employer 3=Farmers Union 4=Community 
group 5= Local money lender 6= Faulu Kenya 7=KWFT 8=K-REP 9=SACCO 10=AFC 11=Neighbour 
100= other (specify)_________________________
G22. Were you granted the loan?                                               1=Yes 2=No loagrant [_____]
G24. Loan granted by which lender (s) (Use codes in G21)    lendok1[_____]     lendok2[_____]
G25. If No in G22, why were you not granted the loan?                                loanowhy [_____]
1= No security for loan 2=previously defaulted 3=No guarantors 4=Group member 
defaulted
100= Other (Specify)_________________________
G26. How many times have you had a contact with the following people in the last one year?
Type of officer  Number of times 
visited
The main 3 purposes   of 
visit
Government extension officer 1
NGO officers 2
Government water management officer 3
Community water management officer 4
Purposes: 1=Advice on crop production 2=Advice on livestock production 3=Advice on water conservation 
5=Collection of water fees 6=Advice on water conservation 100= Other specify______________
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SECTION I: PERCEPTIONS AND WATER RULES 
I1. I am now going to read to you some statements, and then you will tell me the extent to which you agree or disagree with them.  
Statement Strongly 
agree
Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree
My farming activities affect the people who are located downstream from my farm fameff
Compared to 10 years ago, water in our village is getting more scarce wscarse
I am satisfied with the communal rules governing water use for irrigation in this area Comsat
There is no r/ship between my individual farming activities and the status of water resources in my area Famwat
I would be willing to protect water resources in my area for the sake of everybody  Prowill
The communal methods of punishing those who break rules on water are fair to all Comfair
Government water administrators are more efficient than the communal water administrators Goveff
I am satisfied with the system used currently to collect water fees Feesat
Water management in my area improved after 2005 Impr05
I don’t benefit by  participating in communal activities Noben
The government  ways of punishing those who break rules on water are fair to all Govfair
I am satisfied with the method used in this area to allow people to use water for irrigation Righsat
The government has played an important role in water management issues Govrole
I am satisfied with the government rules governing water use in this area Grulsat
I have confidence in the Community water management leadership Leadcon
Soil erosion has an impact on crop productivity Serprod
Generally speaking I have confidence in government officials managing water issues Govcon
People in my village are concerned mainly with the welfare of their own families but not that of others Welown
I am satisfied with the communal rules governing water use for domestic purposes in this area Crulsat
People in this area are generally concerned with the use of water efficiently Ppleff
I would like to know your opinion and perceptions on a number of things related to water management efforts by the government and 
community organizations in this area.  We will also talk about both government and communal water rules that exist in this area, and 
any traditional or cultural believes about water that are in your community. 
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Statement Strongly 
agree
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree
In this area, anybody can report another person if they are breaking water rules Brekrep
If I drop my purse or wallet in the neighborhood whoever will see it will return it to me Purse
Members in this village/neighborhood are always more trustworthy than those in another 
village within this area
Trust
The quality of the water I get is affected by the activities of the people who are upstream Upaffe
Most water conservation technologies are very difficult to implement Techdiff
Soil erosion is a major environmental problem in our area eroprob
Water scarcity is  not a major problem affecting crop production in this area wscacrop
People in this area would not contribute money or dedicate their time in punishing law 
breakers in case they are required to do so
conpun
I would start using a new technology (e.g. planting a new seed)  just because my 
neighbour is planting the same 
techneib
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I2. What government, communal and traditional rules on water use for different purposes are 
you aware of? List as many as possible 
Government rules Communal rules Traditional (cultural)
Domestic water use
Livestock watering
Irrigation water use
I3. In your opinion what is the likelihood that people in this area will break existing 
government water rules? govobey[_____]
1= Very unlikely 2=Unlikely  3=Likely 4=Very likely
I4. What kind of action is usually taken against people who break government water rules?             
(govsanc1-4)
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
I5. In your opinion do people stop breaking the rules after they or someone else has faced the 
actions you mentioned? 1=Yes 2=No    gvpunef[_____]
I6. In your opinion what is the likelihood that people in this area will break existing communal
water rules? combrek[_____]
1= Very unlikely 2=Unlikely 3=Neutral 4=Likely 5=Very likely
I7. What kind of action is usually taken against people who break communal water rules? 
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
I8. In your opinion is do people stop breaking the rules after they or someone else has faced the 
actions you mentioned in I7? 1=Yes 2=No                    cmpunef[_____]
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I9. Do you think action should be taken on people for taking more water than what is allowed?  
1=Yes 2=No    wtpun[_____]
I10. For either yes or No answer please tell me more on the reason why you think so. 
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
I11. How would you generally rank the performance of the following? 
Very 
satisfactory
Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Very 
Unsatisfactory
Government water management system govrank
Local water management systems comrank
The prices of water we are paying pricrank
Government rules on water access and use grlerank
Community rules on water access and use crlerank
Performance of the WRUAs in managing water wruarank
I12. In your opinion does anybody who participates in communal water management activities
benefit in any way?      1=Yes 2=No                                                                      comben[_____]
I13. If yes, what are the benefits somebody can get?  (Partben1-4)
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
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SECTION H: HOUSEHOLD ASSET OWNERSHIP AS A WELFARE INDICATOR
H1. Please tell us about the ASSETS that you own at the moment
Item
Number
Current*
Unit 
value
Total 
current  
value
Item
Number
Current*
Unit 
value
Total 
current  
value
item cnum Untval totval item cnum Untval totval
1. Cow shed (s) 19 Farm house(s)
2. Ox plough 20 Furniture
3. Food store 21 Panga
4. Water trough 22 Jembe
5. Milking shed 23 Vehicle(s)
6. Fence for paddocks 24 Tractor
7. Chuff cutter 25 Tractor trailer
8. Wheel barrow 26 Motorbike
9. Sprayer  27 Water tank
10. Donkey/ox cart 28 Posho mill
11. Feed troughs 29 Cereals Sieve
12. Milk Buckets 30 Well
13. Bicycle 31 Power saw
14. Television 32 Mobile phone
15. Radio 33 Fixed land line 
16. Spade/shovel 34 Borehole
17. Solar panel 35 Water pump
18. Irrigation equipment
Name: 
100 Other (specify) 
Note: * This is the value of the asset as it is, in its depreciated state. 
SECTION K: HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
As we near completion of our discussion, I would like us now to talk about the value of assets that 
you own within the household. 
Finally, let us talk about the members of your household. These are the people with whom you live 
together, share food from the same pot, make decisions as one unit, and work in your farm 
together. Particularly, we shall talk about those who have lived here with you for a period not less 
that one Month within the last one year, that is from April 2010 to March 2011.  We will talk about 
their age, education, and if they are involved in any income generating activity outside the farm. 
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SECTION K: HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
K1. Indicate the following details for all the household members who were home for atleast one month within the last one year 
(April 2010- March 2011)  
House 
hold 
member 
number
First 
Name
Gender
1=Male
2=Female
Year
of
birth
Relationship 
to head
1=head
2=spouse
3=Child
4= Parent
5= Niece
6= Nephew
7= Worker
8= Grand child
9=Bro/Sis 
inlaw
10=Bro./Sis
100=Other
Number 
of 
months 
living
at home 
in
the last 
12 
months
Marital status
1=Single
2= Married
3=Divorced
4=Widowed
5=Separated
100=Other
___________
Level of 
education
completed
0= none
1= Primary
2=Secondary
3= Tertiary 
college
4= 
University
5= Adult 
education
Was this 
person 
involved in 
any 
OFFFARM 
Income 
generating
activity in 
the past 12 
months
1 = Yes
2 = No (got 
to next 
member)
If yes, What are 
the main 2 
Income 
generating
activities?
(See Activity 
Code below)
Months involved in the 
activity in the last 12 
months
Monthly 
estimate
of  income
from this 
activity
(KShs)
IGA1 IGA2 IGA1 IGA2 IGA1 IGA2
hmnumfname Gender 
Ybirth 
relhead
mhome
mstat educlev incgen Igact1Igact2Iga1mon Iga2mon Iga1inc Iga2inc
1
2
3
4
5
Income generating activities
1 =Charcoal burning                                                  
2=Selling firewood                                                    
3=Timber /poles trading                                            
4 =Brick making                                                        
5=Boat making                                                          
6 =Carpentry                                
7=Industrial worker
8=Pension
10 10=Subordinate staff
11=Curio trader
12=Lumbering/wood cutting
13=Pit sawing
14=Mining
15=Tree seller, commercial
16=Selling tree seedlings/seeds
17=Manager
18=Mechanic
19=Messenger
20 =Nurse
21=Pastor/religious services
22 =Driver
23= Doctor
24=Tea picker
25=Teacher
26=Veterinary doctor
27=Waiter/cook
28=Watchman
29=Building/Mason
30=Chain Sawing (power saw
31=Tailor
32=Electrician
33=Engineer
34 =General farm worker
35 =House help
37=Lab attendant
38=Lecturer/tutor
39=Herbalists
40=Policeman/woman
41=Road constructor
42=Sales person
43=Secretary
44=Shop keeper/attendant
45=Subordinate civil services
46=Surveyor
47=Trading in agric produce
48=Income from sale of agric produce from 
another farm
100=Other (specify)____________
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K2. Indicate the estimated household income from other sources in the last one year (include 
in-kind receipts to the household) 
Income source Amount 
(Kshs)
Number of Months 
income  received within 
between April 2010 and 
March 2011
Remittances  (Includes Money send home by 
people working in towns) 
Reminc 
Rental income (Land)  renincl
Rental income (Buildings) renincb
Income from Farm outside the basin farinc
Donations/Gifts doninc
Other(specify)
Other(specify)
INFRASTRUCTURE (DISTANCES IN KILOMETERS)
K3. What is the distance from your home to the nearest shopping centre?    distshop[_____]
K4. What is the distance from your home to the nearest tarmac road?          disttmk[_____]
K5. What is the distance from your home to the nearest health centre?          disthc [_____]
K6. What is the distance from your home to where you can tap electricity?    dstelec [_____]
K7. What is the distance from your home to where you can get piped water?  dstpipe[_____]
K8. What is the distance from your home to public/private extension services? dstext[_____]
K9. What is the distance from your home to the nearest river/stream? dsrver[_____]
K10. What is the distance from your home to the intake point for the community water? dscomwat[_____]
General Comments from the respondent
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................................
********************************* THE END **********************************
